11
A Final Assessment



[193] The western parliamentary tradition, as this study of the cortes of Castile-León illustrates, is a rich and varied one. Students of comparative constitutional history will recognize that the cortes shared certain characteristics with the English parliament, the French assemblies of estates, and the German imperial diet, but that like them, it was also endowed with its own unique features.
The cortes enjoyed a distinction of sorts because it emerged sooner than parliaments elsewhere in the peninsula and northern and central Europe. This was not because the people of Castile-León possessed a greater genius than others, but was rather the consequence of two important conjunctions of time and place. First, by the twelfth century the municipalities, unlike many of those in northern Europe, were already self-governing entities, directly dependent on the crown with administrative responsibility for both urban settlements and extensive rural areas. In this respect, they may be compared with the city-states of Lombardy and Tuscany. Besides providing significant military [194] contingents for royal campaigns against the Moors, they also served as a source of essential financial aid for the crown.
Second, Roman law, the subject of intensive study in Italy in the twelfth century, had an early impact on the peninsula. Castile-León belonged to the Mediterranean community and was open to the new juridical ideas and methods originating in Italy. Roman law familiarized the Castilians and Leonese with the idea of a corporation that could be represented by a procurator with full powers, and with the principle quod omnes tangit, ab omnibus debet approbari, which encouraged the crown to take counsel with all those who might be affected by any major decision. Thus Roman law provided the theoretical justification for the convocation of the municipalities and the practical instruments to bring that about.
Eventually the same principles would facilitate parliamentary development elsewhere, in accordance with the peculiar situation of each country. In England there emerged a single parliament consisting of two houses, the one constituted by the spiritual and temporal lords, and the other by the knights of the shires and burgesses of the towns. The pattern of development in Castile-León was different, in part because of the greater territorial expanse of the kingdom, and in part because of the patchwork fashion in which it was put together over several centuries. As a consequence, each of its constituent elements retained a strong sense of identity. Whereas in England there was only one parliament, a separate cortes originated in both Castile and León; after the union of 1230, both realms were usually convened together in a single cortes, but occasionally they were summoned separately. In this respect, Castilian development bears a closer resemblance to France. There the authority of the king was gradually extended over the several provinces of the kingdom, but each of them retained a consciousness of its special character. Only occasionally did a French assembly of estates represent the greater part of the kings dominions. Most often the estates of Languedoil and Languedoc met simultaneously but in different places; at other times provincial assemblies of estates were convened. Provincial assemblies or cortes in Castile-León met infrequently, but it is striking that during his majority Alfonso XI preferred to deal with partial or regional assemblies rather than a plenary cortes. The similarities between the parliamentary histories of Gastile-León and France are also marked in terms of the threefold division of the estates, as compared with the English bicameral parliament.
[195] In assessing the work of the cortes, it should not be forgotten that the cortes, though a parliamentary assembly, was no more a modern parliament than the medieval English parliament or the French assemblies of estates. Much of the argument about its role and functions has been prompted by the assumption that it was essentially the same as the modern cortes of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. But the cortes was a medieval assembly born out of the medieval milieu to serve medieval needs.
Two questions persistently arise when the development of the medieval cortes or any other parliamentary assembly is considered: how representative was it, and how democratic was it? In comparison with modern parliaments, the representative nature of the medieval cortes was limited, and it did not meet modern standards for a democratic assembly.
In the period discussed in this book, the cortes ordinarily consisted of the prelates, magnates, and representatives of the towns. Members of the two former estates were traditional counselors of the king and sources of political power and influence, whereas the latter typified the comparatively new force of the municipalities. Bishops and magnates, summoned individually on account of their office or their status as vassals of the crown, acted on their own behalf but also in the name of the estates to which they belonged. In that sense bishops and magnates virtually represented the entire body of the clergy and of the nobility, respectively. As for the third estate, self-governing municipalities directly dependent on the crown were represented, rather than the entire conglomerate of urban dwellers. Not all towns were summoned, for many were held in lordship by secular or ecclesiastical lords. Certain geographical areas where there were few autonomous municipalities were represented in the cortes scarcely or not at all. For example, the towns in the modern province of Ciudad Real were unrepresented in the cortes, except that the masters of Calatrava or Santiago, as lords of most of that region, ordinarily participated in the cortes. The rural population was represented insofar as they were considered part of the municipality or dependents of secular or ecclesiastical lords; otherwise they had no direct representation. By comparison, in England the sheriff had the responsibility of determining which towns and boroughs in his county should send representatives to parliament; some were ignored entirely, while others (the so-called rotten boroughs) continued to send representatives long after they had ceased to flourish or even exist.
[196] The cortes was never democratic in the sense that representation was proportional to population size. As a general rule, each municipality was represented by two procurators. Thus, despite obvious variations in numbers of inhabitants, such cities and towns as Seville, Ávila, Burgos, Laredo, Segovia, and León could each be represented by two procurators. This was because the Roman legal principle quod omnes tangit ab omnibus debet approbari, on which representation was based, was a principle of juridical rather than democratic consent, as Gaines Post emphasizes. In addition, as the urban aristocracy consolidated its hold over the towns, municipal representatives were chosen from the aristocracy and reflected its interests. Similar situations prevailed both in England, where London, York, Lincoln, and other towns usually sent two burgesses to parliament, and in France, where cities such as Paris and Orléans each sent two procurators. Although the electoral process in modern-day parliaments is democratic, the fact that the representatives as a rule tend to be wealthy and drawn from the legal profession or the mercantile aristocracy raises the same questions: how representative and how democratic is a modern parliament?
In spite of the inadequacies of the cortes when judged by the standards of a modern democratic parliament, the king obviously believed that, together with the three estates, he could treat "the estate of the realm" and take actions that would be binding on everyone who inhabited his dominions, even though all were not summoned to, or directly represented in, the cortes. The cortes was indisputably a creature of the crown. It was the kings court, summoned by him, when and where he wished to summon it. Only after a time did the participants begin to realize that these were new developments, modifications of earlier traditions, and that it was their assembly as well as the kings. The cortes might serve the purposes of the king, but it could also be used by those summoned to attend it.
Although Maria de Molina and Infante Pedro, regents for Alfonso XI, assured the cortes of Palencia 1313 that they would convoke the cortes every two years, the king always considered himself free to summon the cortes when it suited his purposes. Other monarchs gave similar guarantees. Thus, Pedro III pledged in 1283 to convene the Catalan corts each year, and in response to the demands of the Union, both he and Alfonso III agreed to summon the Aragonese cortes annually. The call for annual parliaments was sounded in England in the Provisions of [197] Oxford 1258, the Ordinances of 1311, and the Statutes of 1330 and 1362. Even so, pledges of this sort were never implemented with consistent regularity and were honored more in the breach than in the observance.
Nevertheless, the king of Castile-León realized that in certain circumstances it was to his advantage to summon the cortes. He needed to take counsel about projected enterprises both at home and abroad, such as the improvement of the economy, the defense of the realm against the Moors, the enactment of laws, and relations with his neighbors, and he needed to obtain financial help to fulfill his burgeoning responsibilities. From a practical standpoint, the cortes enabled the king to bring together all the principal political elements in the kingdom and seek their support and cooperation for policies that he considered essential. Invariably he described his plans as furthering the service of God, his own well-being, and that of the entire realm. In seeking counsel or consent, the king was well aware that any major policy--such as a military campaign, a new law, or the regulation of the succession--was bound to founder without the active collaboration of the estates of the realm. Unless he wished to play the tyrant, he had to persuade, cajole, and convince, otherwise he could expect little success.
Those who were summoned to the cortes came to realize that it also provided them with opportunities. The prelates, whose influence was essentially moral and spiritual, were accustomed to dealing directly with the king. Seeing their primary responsibility as upholding the liberties of the church, they attempted to check royal efforts to tax the clergy without limit, and to curb encroachments on ecclesiastical jurisdiction. They also appealed to the king to defend them against the nobles and townsmen who abused them. The nobles, whose power was primarily military and who, as vassals of the crown, received annual stipends for their service, naturally assumed the role of royal counselors. They were not in awe of the king and endeavored to guide him to right action, as they saw it, and to defend their own special privileges and customs, as they did in the cortes of Burgos 1272.
The townsmen, though perhaps hesitant when summoned initially to the cortes, gradually acquired a greater case in the presence of the king and the powerful men of the kingdom. Conscious of the importance of their responsibility for the administration of vast areas, and of the value of their militias in the armies of the reconquest, they began to [198] speak up. For them the cortes was an occasion to limit royal demands for extraordinary taxes or to require an appropriate quid pro quo by reforms and improvements in government, economic life, and social relations. By means of their hermandades, brought to vigorous life in 1282 and again in 1295 and 1315, they exercised an effective political clout in the cortes that neither the king nor the regents could ignore.
In effect, each of the estates could utilize the cortes to make its concerns known directly to the king, to take steps to protect its particular interests, and to challenge royal policy if necessary. Each estate might define the needs of the realm as a whole in terms of specific issues or problems that affected it directly, and it would be easy to describe the estates as selfish. Yet in pressing its views, each estate could claim, as the king did, to have the well-being of the realm at heart. Out of these differing perceptions and conflicting views, a consensus might be reached as to what was in the best interests of the kingdom as a whole.
Over the course of many years, the roles of the participants changed. The king, who summoned the cortes, might dominate it if he were an especially strong personality; if he were weak, the balance of power might shift to the assembly. Alfonso X seems to have been reasonably successful in persuading the cortes to follow his lead in the first part of his reign, but the denouement, dating at least from his confrontation with the nobility and then with the prelates and townsmen at the cortes of Burgos 1272, was a time of increasing tension and ultimate failure on his part. Thus, the threat that the cortes might pose to royal power was gradually perceived. Consequently, Sancho IV, who needed the support of the cortes early in his reign, tended to avoid convocation once his position on the throne was secure. Fernando IV appears as a weak king whose relationships with the cortes were always tense. His mother, Maria de Molina, must be given the highest marks for her ability to influence the cortes, and to play off contending interests and factions while preserving the throne for her son and later her grandson, Alfonso XI. Even so, during the two royal minorities, the cortes was frequently hostile to the king and the regents. Acknowledging the capacity of the cortes to create difficulties for the crown, Alfonso XI, upon attaining his majority, allowed many years to elapse between convocations, and in the interim divided the estates by summoning partial assemblies rather than the full cortes.
The issues confronting the kings of Castile-León when they met [199] with the cortes hardly differed from those of their contemporaries in England and France. The dispute over the succession to the throne after the death of Fernando de la Cerda was unusual, however, and allowed the cortes, by rejecting counter-claimants, to assist Sancho IV and Fernando IV in consolidating their rights. Sometimes the cortes was summoned to acknowledge the heir to the throne, but its greatest power came during the troublesome minorities when, courted by the different contenders for office, it had a major role in determining the regency. Otherwise, like the English parliament or the French assemblies of estates, the cortes counseled the king concerning such questions as Alfonso Xs imperial quest, the proposed invasion of Africa, and the war against the Moors. In addition, the king, like his fellow monarchs elsewhere, promulgated new laws or ordinances in the cortes and often accepted petitions presented to him by the estates, thereby giving them the force of law. These ordinances, whether initiated by the king and his council or by the cortes, covered an extensive range of topics: the administration of justice and taxation, the regulation of the economy, social relationships, and so forth.
As royal power gathered strength in all countries under the influence of Aristotelian thought and Roman law, the prelates, nobles, and townsmen meeting in cortes, parliament, or assembly of the estates strove to influence and perhaps curb the kings actions. As Gods vicar, emperor in his own kingdom, acknowledging no superior in temporal matters, the king developed a capacity for arbitrary rule. In counteraction, the cortes often sought written guarantees of their rights and customs. Alfonso X, faced with protest about the influence of Roman law and men trained in the law, confirmed the fueros of the nobility and the towns in the cortes of Burgos 1272 and through his son, Fernando de la Cerda, gave similar pledges to the prelates at Peñafiel three years later. The Aragonese nobles obtained like assurances from Pedro III in the General Privilege of 1283 and from Alfonso III in the Privileges of the Union in 1287. Edward Is Confirmation of the Charters in 1297 and Louis Xs Charters to the Normans, Burgundians, and others in 1315 were in response to comparable demands for the restoration of the good old laws.
The crown's attempt to establish the principle that royal jurisdiction was paramount resulted in the subordination of municipal and noble courts, but it also provoked a demand that men be tried by their [200] peers. In the cortes of Burgos 1272, Alfonso X had to agree to appoint noble judges in his court to adjudicate litigation involving the nobility. In a similar fashion, Jaime I, Pedro III, and Alfonso III consented that the justiciar of Aragón should be a noble with the same responsibilities. When the clergy protested royal intrusions on ecclesiastical jurisdiction, Alfonso X (Peñafiel 1275), Fernando IV (Valladolid 1295), and Alfonso XI (Valladolid 1325) assured them that their liberties remained intact, though the need for reiteration suggests that the prelates had reason to be ever watchful. In England, Edward I, by means of the statute, Circumspecte agatis, attempted to circumscribe the jurisdiction of church courts; Philip IV of France trampled on ecclesiastical privilege when he insisted on trying the bishop of Pamiers in his court.
The novelty of extraordinary taxation also provoked hostility. The king was expected to maintain himself and his government from his customary sources of income, but times had changed. The vision of what government should do had expanded and the rise in the standard of living made the ordinary tributes inadequate. When kings attempted to tap new resources, they had to confirm their obligation to ask consent before imposing extraordinary taxes. Alfonso X made such a pledge in the cortes of Burgos 1277, as did Sancho IV (Valladolid 1293), Fernando IV (Valladolid 1295), and Alfonso XI, who promised the cortes of Madrid 1329 (art. 68) that he would not "levy any extraordinary tribute, special or general, in the entire realm, without first summoning the cortes." Edward I acknowledged this principle in the Confirmation of the Charters in 1297, and Philip VI tacitly did so in the Estates of Languedoil in 1343. The cortes occasionally limited the purpose of the grant, as at Valladolid in 1300, and sometimes granted funds for short terms. Attempts were also made to regulate the collection and subsequent disbursement of taxes. The cortes of Valladolid 1307, Burgos 1315, the assembly of Carrión 1317, and the cortes of Valladolid 1325 and Madrid 1329 asked for an accounting of royal revenues, though none seems to have been carried out in the latter two cases. The English parliament presented similar petitions in 1340 and 1341.
In order to maintain the strength of the crown and minimize the need for extraordinary taxes, efforts were made to curb the dissipation of its resources. Ordinances were enacted by Alfonso VIII at Nájera 1184, Alfonso IX at Benavente 1228, and Sancho IV at Haro 1288 to recover royal lands acquired by the church. Edward Is statute, De viris [201] religiosis 1279, attempted to limit such acquisitions in the future. The problem was exacerbated by the clergys insistence that they should not be required to pay extraordinary taxes. The repercussions of Philip IVs battle with Pope Boniface VIII over this issue were felt well beyond the confines of the kingdom of France. Fernando IVs declaration in the cortes of Valladolid 1300 that the clergy ought to contribute to the upkeep of town walls, because they, like others, enjoyed the protection of the walls, echoed similar arguments made in France. Archbishop Gonzalo of Toledo and the other bishops, emboldened by the papal stance, challenged the king in this regard at Medina del Campo 1302, though they later compromised.
Whenever a king behaved in a particularly arbitrary manner, the charge was often made that he was being led astray by evil counselors. This was essentially the position taken by the nobility in the cortes of Burgos 1308. During the minorities of Fernando IV and Alfonso XI, the townsmen in the cortes of Valladolid 1295, Cuéllar 1297, and Burgos 1315 also tried to secure a dominant place in the royal council. The English nobility tried to control appointments to the royal council through the Provisions of Oxford 1258 and the Ordinances of 1311, while the Aragonese attempted to wrest the same right from Alfonso III in the Privileges of the Union in 1287.
If all these measures to control the king failed, armed resistance was resorted to. Infante Sancho, with the backing of much of the kingdom of Castile, deprived his father of royal power (though he left him with the royal title). The Aragonese nobles threatened to depose Pedro III and Alfonso III if they did not submit to their demands, while in England Simon de Montfort kept Henry III in leading strings. Henry IIIs grandson, Edward II, who seemed incapable of learning from experience, had the misfortune to be deposed and then murdered in 1327. As these and other examples demonstrate, the study of the cortes in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries sheds light on constitutional development across western Europe.
Despite the variety of issues presented to the cortes, there were significant limitations on its influence and power, as there were on other medieval parliamentary assemblies. For example, although its support was important for one who claimed the throne, the cortes, in the strict sense, never elected a king. Nor was it always called upon to recognize the heir to the throne. Although its counsel might be requested [202] concerning foreign affairs, it did not ratify treaties. Moreover, the crown at times collected taxes without obtaining consent and transformed extraordinary taxes into customary tributes. In the reigns of Alfonso X and Sancho IV, the cortes consented to levies for excessively long periods of time, thereby yielding control over taxation. Demands that collection be placed in the hands of trustworthy townsmen were evidently not met with any consistency, and the cortes was unable to establish any permanent means of controlling expenditures. The cortes failed to gain a firm commitment from the crown that there could be no legislation outside the cortes; furthermore, it did not develop any effective means of enforcing the laws--which is, of course, a problem every legislative body has confronted and one that is often exemplified in our own day. The execution and enforcement of the laws was the kings responsibility, but even though he might be conscientious and well-intentioned, there were inevitable failures and lapses.
In some respects, these technical or mechanical weaknesses might have been corrected in time. Far more serious was the lack of any sense of cohesion or common purpose among the estates. Prelates, nobles,and townsmen surely were conscious of their identity as estates, but the first two groups had a stronger sense of unity. Among the towns, regionalism was a potent factor, to the extent that the towns of Extremadura sometimes refused to meet with those of Castile and vice versa. Social change in the towns, marked by a steadily widening gap between caballerosand peones, resulted in factionalism, which only served to undermine municipal autonomy and leave the towns open to greater royal control or the possibility of being given in lordship to a prelate or noble.
In addition to these divisions among the townsmen, often the estates were hostile to one another and acted at cross-purposes. Of the clergy, nobles, and townsmen, each group felt a strong antipathy toward members of the other two groups. Occasionally prelates and townsmen joined together, as in the hermandad of 1282, and the lower nobility and townsmen in 1314, but these were exceptional circumstances and probably did not involve the majority of the most influential prelates or nobles.
On the whole, the hermandades tended to polarize the estates rather than bring them together. In their structure and organization, these extralegal associations of towns rivaled the cortes and sometimes overshadowed it completely. The assembly of Carrión 1317, for example, [203] was primarily a meeting of the Castilian hermandad, but the regents treated it as they would have the cortes. While the hermandades enabled the towns to wield exceptional force in the cortes, their existence, if perpetuated, would have undermined the cortes as an institution.
In varying degrees each of the estates was guilty of being self-centered and self-seeking, and of failing to recognize that in certain instances, it would have been to the benefit of all to act in concert. The lack of a common sense of purpose and direction ultimately worked to the advantage of the crown.
Although we may fault the cortes for deficiencies in its composition, organization, and functions, it is nonetheless time that during the years from 1188 to 1350 it became a principal element in the government of the kingdom of Castile-León. The tradition established at that time extended well into the modern era. After tentative beginnings, the cortes assumed an identifiable shape, developed methods of operation, and confronted the great issues affecting the estate of the king and the kingdom, namely, the succession to the throne, war and peace, legislation, taxation, the administration of justice, the maintenance of law and order, the exploitation of natural resources, the regulation of industry and commerce, and relations among the people of the three religions. As time passed, the cortes developed a greater assurance as to its place in the structure of government, and the crown acknowledged that consultation with the estates assembled in the cortes was necessary and useful for the well-being of the kingdom.