Tema: Cuba y Puerto Rico

Persiste el desánimo y la desilusión en Puerto Rico a más de un mes de María

Publicado a las 18:55 ET (22:55 GMT) Miércoles, 25 octubre, 2017

A un mes del azote devastador del huracán María hay quienes no han terminado de limpiar sus hogares y los escombros son un recuerdo desconsolador de la destrucción en la isla. La recuperación lenta y la escasez de alimentos y agua fresca siembran desesperanza entre los puertorriqueños.

http://cnnespanol.cnn.com/video/cnnee-pkg-rafy-rivera-puerto-rico-recuperacion-huracan-maria-escombros-basura/

Trump: “Venezuela está sufriendo bajo el régimen de Maduro”

El presidente de Estados Unidos afirmó que su gobierno está tomando decisiones para defender a los venezolanos 43




Por EL NACIONAL WEB

06 DE OCTUBRE DE 2017 02:42 PM | ACTUALIZADO EL 06 DE OCTUBRE DE 2017 17:59 PM

El presidente de Estados Unidos, Donald Trump, aseguró que su gobierno está tomando decisiones para defender a los pueblos de Cuba y Venezuela."El pueblo de Venezuela está sufriendo bajo el régimen de Nicolás Maduro. Exigimos la restitución de la democracia y la libertad de los ciudadanos de Venezuela", agregó.El mandatario estadounidense reafirmó su rechazo a la "opresión" que está llevando a cabo el régimen "socialista" de Maduro.En cuanto a Cuba, Trump subrayó que no levantarán las sanciones contra la nación caribeña hasta que se declare la democracia en esa nación.Trump participó hoy en un evento en celebración del mes de la Herencia Hispana en EE UU. Destacó que 60 hispano-estadounidenses han recibido la medalla de honor por sus servicios al Ejército.Señaló, además, que los hispanos en EE UU lideran las iglesias, muchos negocios y luchan por el país. “Conozco a muchos de ellos y son muy rudos e inteligentes”, refirió.

http://www.el-nacional.com/noticias/...-maduro_206622

The Administrative System in the Floridas, 1781- 1821

by DUVON CLOUGH CORBITT


UPON superficial examination of the administrative system used in the Floridas during the second Spanish period, it would appear to have been simplicity itself. On closer investigation, however, it proves to have been about as complicated as Spanish genius could make it with the material at hand. The traditional check and balance system was there in all its glory, not only in the provinces of East and West Florida themselves, but in the relations of their officers with the higher authorities. Loosely joined together under a common chief (who was also either captain general of Cuba or viceroy of New Spain), and placed in a precarious position with respect to the Indians and other neighbors, the Floridas presented special problems, the study of which reveals at the same time the strength and the weakness of Spanish in- stitutions. And finally, the attempts to apply the Spanish Constitution of 1812 to the provinces (1812-1814 and 1820-1821) produced results of a nature not to be found elsewhere in the Spanish dominions. The purpose of the present study is to outline the regular administration in the Florida provinces, and to follow it up with another on the effects of the constitu- tional system.

The Captaincy General of Louisiana and the Floridas


WHEN in 1779 Spain decided to take part in the American Revolution, her province of Louisiana was attached to the captaincy general of Cuba. The governor of the province was responsible to the captain general in Havana, but he enjoyed and exercised the right of corresponding directly with the supreme authorities in Spain. The incumbent at the time was the young and energetic Bernardo de Gilvez, who upon hearing of the declaration of war, seized the initiative and attacked the British posts along the Mississippi. By March of 1780 Manchak, Baton Rouge, Natchez and Mobile were in his hands, and preparations were under way for an attack on Pensacola. He was rewarded for his activity by an appointment to govern Louisiana and the newly-conquered territory with complete independence from the captain general of Cuba, and since Pensacola was expected to be in possession of the Spaniards soon, its district was added to the new jurisdiction. The appointment, dated February 12, 1781, reads:The King, having considered the great extent acquired by the Province of Louisiana through the conquests that you have made of the English Forts and Settlements on the Mississippi and at Mobile, and having in mind the decorum with which you should be treated as Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Operations at Havana has been pleased to decree that, for the present, and while you govern Mobile and Louisiana, their administration shall be independent of the Captaincy General of the Island of Cuba, and that Pensacola and its district shall be added to your jurisdiction as soon as they are occupied by the forces of the King, who fully authorizes you to govern and defend them through Substitutes during your absence.

Galvez's first step in his new capacity was to inform Colonel Pedro Piernas, his subordinate in New Orleans, of the change. Although nothing was said about the creation of a captaincy general, colonial officials assumed that such was the intention, and later events proved that they had judged correctly. The term was officially adopted a few years later (in 1784) when East Florida was added to the new jurisdiction.


East Florida, however, seems to have been first organized as a separate administrative unit, from the tenor of the royal order appointing Vicente Zespedes was the commander of all troops in the territory. Later gover- nors were occasionally referred to by that title. On the other hand, the term "captaincy general" may have been used carelessly by the persons who drafted the order. Numerous examples of such carelessness might be cited from Spanish colonial documents.4If a new captaincy general was intended, a change of heart was soon wrought in the Peninsular authorities, for Bernardo de Galvez was given jurisdiction over a captaincy general consisting of Louisiana and both Floridas.5 At the time he was also made captain general of Cuba and given the promise of the viceroyalty of New Spain when it should become vacant. According to the historian Pezuela, this promise was given because Bernardo's father, Matias de GAlvez, then viceroy was in very bad health. When the ship bearing Bernardo to Cuba touched at Puerto Rico, the young captain general learned of his father's death. The three months that he spent in Cuba, beginning February 4, 1785, was only a period of preparation for the transfer to New Spain, much to the disappointment of the Cubans who had been looking forward to his administration of their island.


Louisiana and the Floridas seem to have been considered in Spain as a monopoly of Bernardo de Gilvaz, for, although another captain general was appointed to Cuba, they continued under his command until his death on November 30, 1786. The personal factor is clearly indicated by the disposition of those provinces after his decease, when a royal cddula transferred the captaincy general of Louisiana and the Floridas from the viceroy of New Spain to Jose de Ezpeleta who was then govern- ing Cuba. The cidula enumerated the following reasons for the change: the "particular merit, services, activities, and military ability" of Ezpeleta; his "zeal and love" for the royal service; the fact that he was "the only Executive Officer who could give the assistance, and speedy succor needed by Louisiana and the Floridas. A fourth reason might have been given: the difficulty of communication between those provinces and Spain by way of Mexico City.

In order to prevent exasperating delays, GAlvez had found it necessary to authorize his subordinates in New Orleans, Pensacola and St. Augustine to communicate directly with Spain, simply sending him duplicates of their correspondence. This privilege allowed to his subordinates was not new in Spanish administration: It had been more or less an unwritten law of the Spanish government to learn about colonial affairs from more than one source. There was not an officer of importance in the colonies but had an associate or a subordinate who exercised the privilege of writing directly to the home government. GAlvez himself, while governor of Louisiana, had been very active in the enjoyment of this right. Between 1777 and 1781 he had sent 462 letters to the Minister of the Indies and only 304 to his immediate superior, the captain general of Cuba. Those to the captain general were often duplicates or summaries of those sent to Spain, but a careful perusal of the correspondence shows that much was written home which the captain general did not hear about. Even if Galvez had forbidden his subordinates in Louisiana and the Floridas this right, it is very likely that the Spanish government would have overruled his orders.


The experience of Ezpeleta amounts to almost positive proof of this assertion. His appointment as captain general of Louisiana and the Floridas removed any necessity for direct communication between those provinces and Spain, since mail between them had necessarily to pass through Havana. Realizing this fact, and desiring naturally to increase his control of the new jurisdiction, Ezpeleta ordered the practice stopped on the ground that it was no longer necessary.9 His attitude was logical, but the home government wanted as many checks on its colonial officers as possible and his order was countermanded.


The wisdom of combining the government of Louisiana and the Floridas with that of Cuba was questioned by Governor Estevan Mir6 of Louisiana in a letter to the ministry of January 11, 1787. He believed that he himself should have been given the office of captain general, but the ministry thought otherwise. The decision was made for administrative reasons and not because of any lack of confidence in Miro's ability, as is demonstrated by the fact that upon the retirement of Intendant Martin Navarro of Louisiana early the next year the duties of the latter were given to the governor along with the corresponding increase in salary. 10 A few years later Mir6's successor, the Baron de Carondelet, developed a similar ambition to be captain general. In this he had the support of his brother-in-law, Captain General Luis de las Casas of Cuba, and that of Diego de Gardoqui, then Secretary of Treasury. In 1795 the king authorized his minister Godoy to erect Louisiana and the Floridas into a comandancia whenever he saw fit to do so and the next year Las Casas authorized Carondelet to act as comandante general interino. He filled this position from December, 1796 to August, 1797, when the continental provinces were returned to their former status. In 1801 Captain General Someruelos of Cuba recommended a separate government for them, but the cession of Louisiana to France was then pending and nothing was done about the suggestion.

What appears to have been the last attempt to separate the Floridas from dependence on the captain general in Havana was made in 1807. Governor Vicente Folch of West Florida suggested the appointment of such an officer in the Florida provinces and went so far as to nominate himself for the position, alleging his long experience on that frontier. The home authorities, however, had other opinions on the subject and Folch's proposal was passed up.'


The loss of Louisiana to Spain reduced the captaincy general to East and West Florida, but Spain managed to keep a hold on the territory as far west as the Mississippi until the revolution of 1811 in West Florida, at which time the Perdido River became the de facto boundary, though the Spaniards in the province continued to claim the Mississippi boundary for some time to come.'


The captaincy general of the Floridas was temporarily destroyed by the application of the Spanish Constitution of 1812. By that famous document all chiefs of provinces were transformed into jefes superiores politicos, and an attempt was made to separate political from military functions. If the Florida provinces had contained sixty thousand inhabi- tants each they would have been entitled to a jefe superior politico in each of their capitals, but together they could muster scarcely a sixth of that number. Therefore, East and West Florida were attached to the province of Havana as mere districts (partidos) and their respective governors became simple jefes politicos, a term used to designate subordinate officers representing the jefes superiores in important cities. This was in 1812. The next year, when the Diputación Provincial of Havana met to decide on the permanent status of the Floridas, it was voted to further reduce them to mere parishes of the partido attached to the city of Havana because they did not have the five thousand persons necessary to be rated as districts. This change was to take effect in 1815 but the Floridas escaped this additional humiliation because Ferdinand VII returned to the throne of Spain and abolished the Constitution, with whose abrogation they rose again to the status of provinces, and together made up the captaincy general of the Floridas. The jefe superiorpolitico in Havana became captain general and the jefes politicos in Pensacola and St. Augustine resumed their governorships. It should be mentioned, however, that custom was strong, and the constitutional period so short, that the time-honored titles were used even in many official documents even when the Constitution was in effect. Such combinations as "capitdn general jefe superior politico" and "gobernador militar y jefe politico," were in frequent use at the time and indicate the confusion that reigned.


The restored regime lasted until the 1820 revolution in Spain reinstated the Constitution. This automatically abolished the captaincy general and reduced the Florida provinces once more to districts, or partidos of the Cuban province of Havana. The question of further reducing them to parishes because of insufficient population was again suggested, but before it was acted upon orders came to hand over the Floridas to the United States.


Complications in the business of administering the captaincy general of the Floridas were due to a number of circumstances. In the first place it was not self-supporting and depended upon a situado, or subsidy from New Spain to make up the annual deficit. Since Cuba depended on a similar subsidy, the captain general in Havana could not supply the deficiency in the Floridas from his island jurisdiction. Any naval forces used, except a few galleys and gunboats built for river and coastwise service, were under the command of the comandante general del aposta- dero of Havana, who was the commander of the Spanish West Indies Fleet. Some of the naval commanders were very jealous of their positions, and consequently were often at cross purposes with the captains general.' 6 The right of the governors to correspond directly with the home government has been mentioned. In judicial matters there was always thepossibility of an appeal to the audiencia in Puerto Principe (now Camagiiey), Cuba. Still more troublesome were the handling of Indian affairs and the relations of the Florida officials with the intendant in Havana, topics that have been reserved for separate treatment.


The Intendancy of Louisiana and West Florida


THE disasters of the Seven Years' War led Spain to make a number of changes in her colonial system, including the introduction of intendancies into America. The creation of the Cuban intendancy in 1764 led the way. Louisiana followed in 1780 with the appointment of Martin Navarro as indendant on February 24. As Spanish dominion was extended over West Florida, Navarro's jurisdiction extended until all the province came under his financial supervision by 1781.
In Cuba the indendant was an officer equal in rank to the captain general, and independent of him. In New Spain, on the other hand, the viceroy with the title of superintendent was in charge of the financial administration. The Louisiana plan was a kind of compromise between those of Cuba and New Spain. The governor there controlled land grants until 1798. He was also responsible for Indian affairs,' but was obliged to consult the intendant in cases involving finance, such as duties on the fur trade, permits for commerce with foreign countries to secure Indian goods, and licenses for the use of foreign ships to haul these goods as well as the furs. It was necessary to spend thousands of dollars each year to keep the friendship of the Indians, and this called for the joint action
of the governor and the intendant also.

Upon the promulgation of the Ordenanza de intendentes for New Spain in 1786, the Louisiana intendant was instructed to follow it in so far as was practicable, with the reservation, however, that of the four causas mentioned therein - justicia, policia, hacienda y guerra - only two, hacienday guerra,were to come under his jurisdiction, justice and police being especially charged to the care of the governor. There were many matters calling for the joint action of the two officers; yet, they seem to have cooperated without much friction. For example, the comment by Miró on his relations with Navarro on the question of a change of Indian policy: "It is my plan, to which the intendant, with whom I always proceed in accord in Indian affairs, agrees . . . . Professor Whitaker's careful study revealed the same kind of cooperation during the administration of Francisco Rend6n (1794-1796). Not until the appoint- ment of a man with a contentious turn did the harmonious relations between governor and intendant cease, i.e., Juan Ventura Morales, of whom more later.


Such cordial relations may have resulted from the instructions sent to the first intendant, Martin Navarro, putting him in subordination to the governor. It is remarkable, however, that this was done because a few days previous to the signing of the instruction an order to the captain general of Cuba concerning his relations with the intendant in Havana stated that the king desired to have treated with decorum an officer like the intendente de ejercito y real hacienda, who is so important to His Majesty that in him is vested the collection, preservation, and disbursement of all branches of the revenue, with complete independence of you; and. . . who is a jeft principal, without other superior than the Superintendente General

Navarro retired from the Louisiana intendancy in 1788, at which time Governor Miro Was invested with the powers of the office. The inclusion of the phrase, "for the present," in Miro's commission as intendant suggests that the union of the offices was looked on as temporary; neverthe- less, it was continued until well into the term of Miro's successor, the Baron de Carondelet. In 1793 there was appointed another intendant, Francisco Rend6n, who reached his post early the next year.9 According to Professor Whitaker. this move was made in order to insure the operation of the new commercial system promulgated the year before.10 No further combination of the offices of governor and intendant occurred until long after Louisiana had passed from Spanish control.

The last occupant of the intendancy in New Orleans was Juan Ventura Morales, who achieved lasting fame by his action in closing the American deposit at New Orleans; in fact, he might be called the last of the Louisiana-Florida intendants for, with the exception of an occasional suspension from office after he went to Pensacola, he held the position until its abolition in 1817. Morales became acting intendant of Louisiana and West Florida in 1796 on the retirement of Rend6n. Ramón L6pez de Angulo, a full-fledged intendant, succeeded him in 1800, but was summarily removed the next year upon his violation of the laws by marrying a New Orleans girl named Marie Delphine Macarty." Morales again became provisional intendant and held office until the Spanish colors were struck in 1803. As a matter of fact, he remained in Louisiana three years longer, refusing to leave until expelled by the American authorities.


For some time after the lowering of the flag Morales and the other Spanish officials in New Orleans were at a loss what to do because no definite orders were sent to govern their conduct. But Morales stayed long after such orders came. He may have hoped for another diplomatic shake-up which would return Louisiana to Spain. Doubtless, he did not relish the idea of living at the frontier post of Pensacola after his taste of more attractive life in New Orleans. Furthermore, in Pensacola he would drop to the level of Governor Vicente Folch y Juan who, as subdelegado of the intendancy, had long been his subordinate. Moreover, these two officers had developed an antipathy for each other that approximated hatred, and matters did not mend after the Americans took over Louisiana. Morales continued to give orders from New Orleans as though Folch were still his subordinate, to the confusion of the com- mandant at Mobile and others. Contradictory orders were issued about trade through that port with the American territory up the river. The climax to the situation was reached in January, 1806, when Governor C. C. Claibourne peremptorily ordered Morales to leave Louisiana, and Folch flatly refused to allow him to land at Pensacola, forcing him to leave the port with his goods and papers, and to disembark at Mobile." Naturally Morales protested to Spain and he was ordered to proceed at once to Pensacola and assume the authority of intendant of the province. Both he and Folch were admonished to "try to preserve the best of har- mony, and to avoid disputes and contentions.""

But Morales willed it otherwise. Even before this admonition reached him he was accusing Folch of making innovations in the financial administration of West Florida and proceeded to take matters into his own hands as far as the western part of the province was concerned, issuing orders to the officers commanding the troops on the Pascagoula River. The officers appealed to Folch, who informed the intendant that only the commandant at Mobile had such a right. Mutual recriminations followed until the latter appealed to Spain. The king commanded all documents concerning the quarrel to be forwarded to him for examination, and in the meantime Morales was off on another tack with Folch.

Before Morales' arrival in Pensacola the finances of West Florida had been administered by the traditional oficiales reales in the form of an accountant and a treasurer, supervised by the governor as subdelegado of the intendancy in New Orleans. In addition to the oficiales there were clerks, warehousemen, porters, etc., many of whom were also officers or soldiers of the garrison. With the transfer of the seat of the intendancy to Pensacola in 1806, the number of clerks and minor employees in the financial department increased, and there was added an asesor, or legal adviser.


This appointment is interesting because the first asesor was Jose Francisco Heredia, the father of the famous Cuban poet, Jose Maria Heredia. Thus it came about that the poet lived in Pensacola between the ages of three and seven, his favorite sister, Ignacia, being born there in 1808. Of more importance to the present study is the fact that José

Francisco received his appointment from the intendant of Cuba, who, upon reporting the move to Spain for royal approval, was curtly informed that he had exceeded his authority; Morales' assistant should have been appointed by the captain general.' Heredia remained in Pensacola as asesor to the intendant, however, until 1810, at a salary of one thousand pesos assigned him by the Cuban intendant. Thereafter the auditor de guerra,or legal adviser to the governor, acted as asesor to the intendant of West Florida.

The last years of Morales in Pensacola deserve a parting comment. Rare were the epochs when he was not the center of a storm. On one occasion he was suspended from office on account of his failure to report properly the results of a hurricane on October 11 and a fire on October 24, 1810, which destroyed many records. Perhaps the dispute in 1812 over who should be his substitute can be laid to contagion. The auditor de guerra,as the intendant's legal adviser, and the accountant, as second in the financial administration, each claimed the law on his side. Never- theless, an order of the regency passed over both claimants and conferred the provisional intendancy on the governor of Pensacola. Another and more serious difficulty arose in 1817, though the exact nature of the trouble is not very clear. Finally, however, the king announced that "he was pleased to proclaim the innocence of the Intendant of Pensacola, Don Juan Ventura Morales," without mentioning any specific accusation. At this juncture Morales was transferred to Puerto Rico, and with his departure the West Florida intendancy came to an end.

Finances there had long since ceased to justify the payment of four thousand pesos for their adiministration; in fact it is doubtful whether any reason could be produced for ever having had an intendancy in Pensacola other than that of providing employment for a man released by the loss of Louisiana. During the closing years of Spanish rule in West Florida the governor supervised the treasury administration as subdelegado of the to warrant municipal government.30 There was an alcalde in Pensacola for a time who disputed with the governor the control of many phases of the administration, but this will be better treated in another connection.

The Government of West Florida, 1779-1821


B RITISH West Florida extended from the Appalachicola River to the
Mississippi, and north to the thirty-second parallel, but the governor at Pensacola also exercised some jurisdiction as far north as the Chickasaw nation, or what is now northern Mississippi.' The bound- aries of the territory that came to be known as Spanish West Florida were not so well defined. The British division line to the east was removed in 1784 when the St. Marks district was shifted from the jurisdiction of St. Augustine to that of Pensacola, a logical move since communication with the latter was much easier than with the former. In this way the trading post of Panton, Leslie and Company at St. Marks could be more effectively supervised. No division line was ever drawn between the St. Marks district and the jurisdiction of the governor at St. Augustine, but it proved to be unnecessary because the intervening territory was never settled by whites during the Spanish period. The northern boundarywas more troublesome.


The secret clause in the treaty between the United States and Great Britain dealing with the area lying between th thirty-first and the thirty- second parellels was responsible for a dispute between Spain and the United States. The matter was further complicated by Spain's claiming the whole east bank of the Mississippi and jurisdiction over the Indian nations that had formerly traded with Mobile and Pensacola. Treaties with the Creeks at Pensacola and with the Choctaws and Chickasaws at Mobile in the spring and summer of 1784 went far toward making good these claims and sent Spanish influence to Middle Georgia on the east and to the Cumberland on the north. Within a decade the imperialistic Carondelet had garrisoned the debatable land with detachments of troops stationed at Walnut Hills, Chickasaw Bluffs, Fort Confederation and Fort St. Stephen. Natchez was in the same area but it had been in Spanish hands since Galvez occupied it in 1779. The only posts whose ownership was not disputed by the Americans were Mobile, Pensacola and St. Marks, the last being garrisoned in 1787 at the request of Alexander McGillivray.


Natchez and its district had a governor but was at the same time under the supervision of the governor at New Orleans; nevertheless, the former enjoyed the privilege of corresponding directly with the home govern- ment. Walnut Hills, Fort San Fernando de las Barrancas at Chickasaw Bluffs, as well as Fort Confederation, took orders after their establish- ment in the nineties from New Orleans. Fort St. Stephen, like Mobile, was dependent on Pensacola; although, as will be pointed out later, the chief at New Orleans could send orders directly to them when he chose to do so.


It will appear from the foregoing paragraphs that between the close of the American Revolution and the loss of Louisiana by Spain, the so- called province of West Florida could be said to extend from the Pearl River on the west to some point east of St. Marks, north beyond Fort St. Stephen and the Tensaw district, and as far northeast into the Creek nation as Spanish influence reached. The frontiers just described were very indefinite, but where in her colonies did Spain delineate or survey provincial boundaries?
Internal relations between the various officers were even less clear than the boundaries of their jurisdiction. In one sense the whole of West Florida was part of Louisiana, since the governor at New Orleans exer- cised jurisdiction over it. However, Spanish officialdom chose to look upon it as a province, and the governor, or commandant at Pensacola was allowed some liberty of action. He could correspond directly with the captain general, and not infrequently received orders by the same route ; although the majority of his relations with the superior officers were conducted through the governor at New Orleans. Some of the Pensacola governors used their liberty to complain to the captain general about the conduct of their superiors in the Louisiana capital.

The position of the commandants of Mobile and St. Marks was analogous to that of the governor at Pensacola in that, athough they were nominally under the jurisdiction of the governor at Pensacola, the governor at New Orleans could send orders to them direct when he chose to do so. The system became so confusing to Pedro Favrot at Mobile that in December, 1786, he requested Governor Arturo O'Neill of Pensacola to clarify his position. The latter replied: "The Superior direction and orders of Don Estevan Mir6 are to be given preference, and it remains for me only to give a general explanation of the rules that you are to follow."

The loss of Louisiana by Spain simplified the situation by removing the governor at New Orleans. Manuel Salcedo, the last incumbent, would have had it otherwise. With no definite instructions as to his future conduct, and loath to surrender his prerogatives as governor, Salcedo moved up to Baton Rouge and attempted to continue ruling West Florida from that point. The home government, however, elected to make
Pensacola the capital, and the governor of that post came into his own. 8 Thereafter West Florida could boast of reasonably definite frontiers: the Mississippi on the west and the thirty-first parallel on the north, and the eastern boundary still undisputed.


For a time the commandant at Baton Rouge, Carlos de Grand Pre, was a vexing problem for Vicente Folch at Pensacola. Many factors con- tributed to disturb the relations of Grand Pre with his new chief, but the basis of the trouble probably lay in the fact that the former had long drawn a salary as governor of Natchez, although no Spanish governor had actually resided at that post since 1797, at which time Grand Pre had been commissioned to reoccupy it.


Until the cession of Louisiana there were no civil officers in West Florida. Financial and judicial, as well as administrative affairs were carried on by the post commanders assisted by their lieutenants and other employees, usually from the military forces. Finances were directed by the governor at Pensacola acting as subdelegado of the intendant in New Orleans. Judicial and administrative decisions were appealable to the governor of Louisiana, and beyond him to the king by way of Havana or Santo Domingo according to the fuero, or charter of privileges that might be involved; 10 the judicial powers of the governor of Pensacola himself were practically limited to conciliation and evidence collecting. Minor cases were handled after the manner of a police court, or as by a referee or friend. Major suits, along with evidence collected, were referred to New Orleans for review by the governor and his asesor as long as Louisiana belonged to Spain.

There is an eloquent though pathetic description of the working of the administration at Pensacola written by Arturo O'Neill, who had been ordered by Mir6 to deliver some munitions to McGillivray's Indians in a way that the Americans would be unable to prove Spanish complicity. O'Neill replied:
I shall carry out your orders as far as possible. I should advise you, however, that the presents of Powder and balls cannot be made in the quantities prescribed with the dis-
simulation and secrecy that you suggest to me, for these things are deposited in the royal Warehouses, and to take them out the Adjutant of the Plaza, the Officer in Command of Artillery, the Accountant who audits it, the Guard of the Indian Warehouse, the Guard of the Artillery Warehouse, and the Porters and Wagoners who bring it to this Place, must be informed; after which follows the buying, and putting the Powder and balls into sacks for transportation, turning them over to the Indians who are not a little scrupulous about weight and Quality, and the distribution which is made through others as has sometimes been done through Mr. Panton, in which manner the number of
1l persons knowing about it is increased.


After 1803 the establishment at Pensacola inherited the position that had belonged to the Louisiana capital. The first change was made in obedience to the following order of December 10, 1803:


The King has resolved that, when that Province [Louisiana] is handed over to the
French Republic, West Florida shall remain under the control of the commandant of Pensacola; that, in order that he may have an adviser in Civil and Criminal cases that shall arise in the District under his command, the Auditor de Guerra y Asesor de Gobierno that now resides in New Orleans shall move to the said Plaza; and that for

the provincial discharge of the duties of Secretary of that Province the said Commandant shall choose from the Garrison a Subaltern Officer, who shall receive a gratification above his salary of two hundred and fifty pesos annually as is the practice with the officer who performs those duties in East Florida.

In this order are to be found listed the important officers of the ad- ministration outside of those attached to the intendancy. There was the usual complement of assistants in the offices of the secretary, the auditor and the governor, but with few exceptions they were military men selected from the garrison.

Mobile and St. Marks had even less civilian interference in the government than Pensacola. The commandants and their fellow officers governed everything, even to finances. Usually the only civilians in the administration were the men in charge of the supply warehouses, one or two ware- house guards (even these were at times soldiers) and the employees of the trading post of Panton, Leslie and Company, who, although not officially part of the administration, usually counted for as much as, and some times more than the commandant himself. Baton Rouge was also governed by a commandant with military assistants.

Other factors there were that deserve special mention. As early as 1787 it was found convenient to work out a special system for dealing with the settlement of Tories, pioneers, vagabonds and half-breeds at Tensaw on the Tombigbee. As a result one of the settlers, Tom Linder by name, was appointed alcalde.


A variation of this plan was used on a wider scale in the Pearl River- Baton Rouge territory where the population had a similar composition. Even while the Baton Rouge district was part of Louisiana the white residents were allowed to have an alcalde and a syndic, chosen by the governor upon their own recommendation. By 1810 the territory between the Pearl and the Mississippi Rivers was divided into four districts (Feliciana, Baton Rouge, St. Helena, and Tangipaho or St. Tammany), each with an alcalde and a syndic. These officers were responsible for carrying out orders from the governor at Pensacola or from the neighboring commandant.


The appointment of the district alcaldes is interesting in that the practice ran parallel to a similar plan adopted in East Florida in 1813. There Governor Kindelan, faced with the necessity of ruling Anglo- Americans along the St. Marys and the St. Johns, chose some persons from among them to represent authority in the several districts. Kindelan, however, confessed that he was following the practice common since 1763 in Cuba, where he had served for some time. There the captains general had found it convenient to use residents from each locality to represent them and keep order. The practice that grew up in West Florida was very much like that followed in Cuba, but appears to have evolved from local conditions rather than having been imported from Cuba.


Ironically enough, it was in the Pearl-Mississippi territory that dis- satisfaction arose: in fact, these very alcaldes played an important part in the next move, meeting in a junta somewhat after the pattern of those which promoted independence in the South American colonies. By 1810 the inhabitants of the territory had revolted and had abolished Spanish control. United States troops occupied this district and that east of the Pearl River and west of the Perdido the next year. Thus it came about that only Mobile, Pensacola and St. Marks remained in Spanish West Florida to enjoy the blessings of the Constitution of 1812.


The Constitution provided for municipal government in towns whose districts coulds one thousand or more inhabitants. Under this provision Pensacola was organized as a municipality with an alcalde, four councilmen or regidores and a síndico procurador. This organization functioned until the abrogation of the Constitution in 1814. There was an attempt in reorganization in 1820 about which it will be necessary to say more later.

One provision of the Constitution whose purpose was to separate the political from the military functions was the cause of much contention in the two Florida provinces. Such a step would have been inadvisable in the frontier provinces of East and West Florida, where danger from Indian attacks or troublesome white neighbors called for an essentially military system. A special adaptation of the constitutional requirements were, therefore, attempted, by which the governors retained their military commands and took over the duties of jefes politicos.'7 This amounted to a cancelation of the strict orders of the national charter, and the alcaldes of St. Augustine and Pensacola were not slow in protesting to higher authorities.


The problem was further complicated by the Spanish conception of a municipality. Since all land in the Spanish dominions was considered as attached to some municipality, the alcaldes claimed jurisdiction over the respective provinces. The direction taken by their claims varied slightly, that of the alcalde of St. Augustine leaning toward giving orders to officers as well as to residents of rural areas. The essentially military character of Mobile and St. Marks prevented the alcalde at Pensacola from asserting jurisdiction over the commanders of those posts: instead, he demanded that the public records be taken from the secretariade gobierno and placed in his care. When the governor (or jefe politico as he was called) refused, he appealed to the audiencia in Puerto Principe (formerly that of Santo Domingo), which sustained the demand. It was a fruitless victory, for before the decision could be enforced the constitutional regime was abolished (1814), and the old order returned, only to be wiped out completely with the advent of Jackson in 1818. A few months later Mariscal del Campo Juan Maria Echevarria was commissioned to receive the province from the Americans, for which purpose he left Havana with twenty-four officers and four hundred and eighty-three men. Eight of the officers were for the permanent government of the province. Lieutenant Colonel Jose Callava went to assume the post of governor, and along with him went a captain to be secretary of the government. There were an adjutant and five other officers for the military establishment. Instead of restoring the intendancy that had functioned until 1817, Callava was named subdelegado of the financial administration in Havana. To assist him in this capacity went a treas- urer, one treasury official, a clerk, a warehouse guard, and an "oficial de cuenta y raz6n de artilleria."An auditor de guerra was soon appointed.


Spanish control was scarcely restored in West Florida when news arrived (early in May, 1820) that the Constitution of 1812 was back in force. Callava and the other officials took the necessary oaths to support the charter and set about reorganizing the administration so as to conform to its provisions. The title of gobernadormilitary jefe politico came into use again and the question of a municipality was taken into consideration. A census, however, revealed only 695 residents in Pensacola and its district-a number far short of the one thousand required by the Con- stitution. It was claimed, nevertheless, that Pensacola could qualify under some special conditions laid down for exceptional cases. Callava was uncertain and referred the matter to his legal adviser, the auditor de guerra, Nicholas Santos Suarez. The latter handed down the amazing opinion that Pensacola could not legally have municipal government, but that it should have an alcalde. The governor followed up this contradictory decision with a call for an election on June 15, 1820.


As soon as the new alcalde, Jose Noriega, took office, he reopened the business of the first constitutional period by demanding the public records, and he laid claim to all government functions in the province that were not strictly military. After several weeks of wrangling, with insufficient legal data (most of the documents of the former period had been taken to Havana from fear of Jackson), Noriega uncovered a law indicating that Santos Suarez could no longer hold office because of his military position as auditor de guerra. Both sides then appealed to Havana, Santos Suarez going in person to present his own case and that of Governor Callava.
It was late in October, 1820, before the West Florida troubles were laid before the DiputacidnProvincialin Havana, and a decision was not reached until November 4 to the effect that the population of Pensacola warranted neither a council nor an alcalde. Before it could be enforced, however, orders had come from Spain to hand over Florida to the United States. Thus it happened that when Andrew Jackson arrived to take control of West Florida, he found the public welfare in the hands of the mutually antagonistic alcalde and governor, neither of whom had any clear idea of his own functions or powers. Small wonder that H. M. Brackenridge, whom Jackson appointed to succeed Noriega as mayor, could find no one to coach him in his duties. Not realizing that he was trying to ascertain what related to an office that did not exist, he wrote thus to Jackson:

I canont speak positively with respect to the duties and powers peculiarly and exclusively belonging to the office .... .The alcalde here has acted as notary public; as chief of the police, he exercised a criminal jurisdiction, but of what nature I do not exactly know. . . . I have been able to procure but little information from my predecessor in office; what he said was summed by the remark that I had more power than the
Governor.

Noriega had surrendered none of his claims although Spain had lost the province.

http://digitalcollections.fiu.edu/te...42/42_1_06.pdf

El Capitán General de Puerto Rico

Contenga a guardar enterado la Real Orden de 24 de Presente en el Real Sitio de San Lorenzo: que nada había ocurrido en el Reino de Portugal, como igualmente de la perfecta que reinaba en toda la Península, participando que en la Ysla de su mando se disfruta de un sosiego inalterable, prosperando en todos sus ramos, y las noticias que así mismo ha recibido sobre el estado de Venezuela.


Madrid 20 de Abril de 1829.


Enterado.



Excelentísimo Señor

Por el Correo número 4 que procedente de La Coruña, fondeó aquí por la mañana en este puerto, he recibido la Real Orden que se ha servido V.E. comunicarme con fecha 24 de Septiembre por la que me he enterado con suma complacencia de que Sus Majestades y Altezas seguían disfrutando de la mejor salud en el Real Sitio de San Lorenzo: que nada particular había ocurrido en el Reino de Portugal, habiéndose sometido la Isla de La Madera, y que en toda la Península reinaba la más perfecta tranquilidad, y tomándose medidas rigurosas para evitar se propagase en los países vecinos a Gibraltar el contagio que se había declarado en dicha plaza.


En esta Ysla se disfruta de un sosiego inalterable y todos sus ramos siguen prosperando de un modo el más satisfactorio como lo acabo de palpar en la visita que he pasado a todos los pueblos de la Costa en veinte y cinco días.


No es así en Costafirme donde la anarquía está haciendo estragos y el aturdido Bolívar llevando el país a su completa ruina. Ha corrido que este fugó de Santa Fe, y volvió con sus partidarios a entrar en la ciudad que saqueó; también se noticia por San Tomas que en Caracas y Valencia han habido conmociones, y por los muchos papeles impresos de aquellas Provincias y otras noticias que no ha remitido el Comisionado en Curazao se deduce que hay muchos partidos, mucho aturdimiento, miseria y con disgusto general, y no será extraño que suceda una reacción o un cambio de personas y gobierno. Todo lo que comunico a V.E. Para su superior inteligencia.


Dios guarde a V.E. muchos años. Puerto Rico 10 de Noviembre de 1828


Excelentísimo Señor


Miguel de Latorre






Excelentísimo Señor de Estado y del Despacho.


Cortesía de PARES

La Florida: hija de Cuba y Puerto Rico.





La Florida fue descubierta por Juan Ponce de Leon en 1513, a pesar de que fue destituido del gobierno, este no había aceptado esa destitución, yendo a España a reclamar su derecho por la gobernación de Puerto Rico, se le concede y se le nombra Adelantado de La Florida y Biminní, Capitán de Mar y Tierra, Regidor Perpetuo del Cabildo de la Ciudad de Puerto Rico, y capitán del Regimiento del Boriquén; le es ratificada la gobernación y Adelantamiento. El libro Historia Miltar de Puerto Rico, escrito por Hector A. Negroni, comprueba esto:







Por consiguiente en ese tiempo la Florida y Puerto Rico estuvieron unidos, siendo regidos por un mismo gobernante, el Adelantamiento pasa en 1567 a Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, uniendo el Adelantamiento a Cuba, y luego la Isla pasó a la Administración directa de Cuba, en 1797 las Islas de Cuba y Puerto Rico se unifican, a este territorio se le llamó: Cuba y Puerto Rico o Islas de Cuba y Puerto Rico con las Dos Floridas. Simón Bolívar establece una República asociada a Venezuela en 1817, luego esta Republica pasa a Mexico. Las Floridas pasan a Estados Unidos, la occidental en 1813, la oriental en 1821 por virtud del Tratado de Adams-Onis.




Banderas de Puerto Rico, Florida, España (Cruz de San Andrés) y Estados Unidos en San Agustín.


La Florida aún mantiene sus lazos con Puerto Rico, y la ciudad de Kissimmee, en el área de Orlando es la ciudad con el mayor número de puertorriqueños per capita fuera de Puerto Rico, se le dice el municipio número 79.

LOS PLANES CUBANOS PARA VENEZUELA

• Colaboradores
• Columnistas
• Contrapunteo
• Elizabeth Burgos
• Secciones

Febrero 24, 2018
La evolución de la situación venezolana según el plan preconcebido en La Habana, le tiene reservado un rol de árbitro apaciguador a Raúl Castro, quien permanecerá en el poder, incluso después de su renuncia, a través de la dirección del partido. Así, en La Habana calculan, que Cuba es la que negociará la crisis venezolana.No es casual que las elecciones presidenciales en Venezuela hayan sido convocadas para el 22 de abril de este año, puesto que en Cuba será el 19 de abril cuando Raúl Castro se retire de la presidencia del Consejo de Estado y se supone sea reemplazado por el heredero designado por el poder, Miguel Díaz Canel. Es lógico que la modificación del mando de la metrópoli preceda a la del territorio anexado.Raúl Castro debía haber entregado su cargo de presidente del Consejo de Estado en el mes de febrero 2018. Así había sido anunciado en el VIIº Congreso del Partido Comunista de Cuba, celebrado en abril 2016, todavía en vida Fidel Castro, al mismo tiempo que Raúl Castro era confirmado como primer secretario del Partido Comunista de Cuba, cargo igual de poderoso que el de jefe de gobierno, que le permitirá seguir ejerciendo el poder más allá del mandato presidencial.Es muy posible, y no sería exagerado afirmar, que la prolongación del mandato del presidente cubano, no se debió a la excusa pueril de los estragos causados por el último ciclón que azotó a Cuba, sino debido a la severa crisis política que enfrentaba el representante del poder cubano en Venezuela.El gobierno de Nicolás Maduro, procónsul nombrado por La Habana, se había visto profundamente debilitado no sólo por las manifestaciones de repudio por parte de la población, sino también por el resquebrajamiento en el seno de la cúpula del poder: la deserción y huida del país de la Fiscal Luisa Ortega Díaz fue el gesto de mayor relieve.La crisis venezolana le planteó a Raúl Castro un dilema de amplia envergadura. Al mismo tiempo que se ocupaba de ultimar los detalles del tránsito del poder en Cuba, no exento de conflicto pues se barajaba la posibilidad de la entrega del mando a su hijo Alejandro Castro Espín, coronel del Ministerio del Interior y jefe del Consejo de Defensa y Seguridad Nacional.
Al no reunir su hijo el consenso de la cúpula de la oligarquía cubana, – lo que hubiese asegurando la continuidad monárquica del régimen – Raúl Castro se vio obligado a conformar una estructura que, preservando el poder de la familia Castro, impidiera futuras crisis de gobernabilidad o iniciativas individuales por parte de miembros de la cúpula del poder, a las cuales el castrismo es particularmente alérgico.Pero el poder cubano no puede permitirse perder a Venezuela; es la joya de la corona y le facilita a Cuba un posición de fuerza en sus negociaciones con Rusia, Irán, China, Siria, Corea del Norte, Bielorusia y otros gobiernos antidemocráticos, opuestos al “imperio”.Poseer el espacio geopolítico que brinda Venezuela, sin contar Cuba con las riquezas del subsuelo, no es algo que se tome a la ligera. Es más, preservar su poderío sobre Venezuela, es la condición de sobrevivencia del castrismo, en la Isla y en el resto del continente.Tras la contundente derrota de 2015, el principal objetivo de La Habana fue la de que Nicolás Maduro aplicara la receta de no dar marcha atrás en su guerra “antiimperialista”, la receta mágica, que tan excelentes resultado le ha dado al poder de los hermanos Castro.Tras el fin de la Guerra Fría, Fidel Castro modificó su modo de intervención en América Latina. En lugar de la violencia política, optó por recurrir a la instrumentalización de las normas democráticas, aplicando la elasticidad de las técnicas de la guerra de guerrillas, pero haciéndolas maleables y cambiándolas cada vez que le era necesario en su voluntad de hacerse del poder y conservarlo.Así ha procedido Maduro ante la crisis de gobernabilidad que ha enfrentado desde la contundente derrota parlamentaria de 2015 que le otorgó a la oposición una mayoría absoluta en la Asamblea Nacional.Desde entonces, el procónsul cubano se ha dedicado a despojar de sus facultades a la Asamblea, nombrando arbitrariamente nuevos magistrados de la Corte Suprema, rechazando el Referendo Revocatorio y, finalmente, eligiendo una Asamblea Constituyente, absolutamente inconstitucional, que realiza maniobras políticas de orden táctico/estratégico, sometiendo a la Asamblea y adelantando medio año las elecciones presidenciales.Su empeño de seguir negociando con la oposición en la República Dominicana, sin intención de hacer concesión alguna, le ha permitido nuevamente ganar tiempo y a la par aprovecharse de esa tribuna internacional para mostrar una fachada democrática. Él y los cubanos, saben que negociar es del gusto de la comunidad internacional.Su objetivo es reducir al máximo la capacidad negociadora de la MUD, fragmentar la Oposición, y torpedear las gestiones que está realizando la comunidad internacional en aras a un desenlace democrático, evitando a la vez toda un nuevo estallido social.Ante este panorama en el que no se avizora ninguna posibilidad de cambio de la situación dramática que vive la población, el gobierno ha ido llevando la situación a un callejón sin salida que, forzosamente, desembocará en episodios de violencia.
Previendo ese escenario, que el gobierno busca promover, Maduro ya puso en marcha un plan cívico-militar de ‘defensa popular’, “contra cualquier plan terrorista, contra cualquier intento golpista, contra cualquier provocación de la oligarquía colombiana en la frontera, contra cualquier grupo terrorista que intente insurgir otra vez” y ha puesto a Diosdado Cabello, lo que no es casual, al mando de ese plan.Para quienes conocemos mínimamente el modo de proceder del castrismo, el escenario que persigue La Habana es el de suscitar un escenario de violencia que se sume a la urgencia humanitaria, exacerbada por el éxodo masivo de una población que para sobrevivir, huye hacia los países fronterizos, creándoles un problema humanitario y de seguridad para el que no están preparados.Es el momento que Cuba espera para proponer sus buenos oficios, como lo hizo con las FARC y antes en Angola[i], con el fin de restablecer la paz en Venezuela, tomando a su cargo la urgente operación humanitaria que necesita la población. El “gobierno” de Maduro, aceptaría entonces la “intervención del país hermano” y la comunidad internacional ‘respiraría satisfecha’ de que al fin alguien tome en sus manos solucionar el caso Venezuela. De esa forma la presencia cubana en Venezuela cobraría el estatus legal al cual aspira.No es muy difícil percibir cuanto resultado le ha dado la técnica castrista de crear focos de violencia y luego proponerse como bombero capaz de instaurar la paz. La fórmula que le ha dado excelentes resultados para instaurar el dogma castrista de gobiernos vitalicios.Del otro lado de la frontera, en Colombia, Raúl Castro tiene que estar observando con interés el desarrollo de la campaña electoral que se celebrará el próximo 27 de mayo. Timochenko, líder de las FARC, pese a la poca acogida que tuvo su candidatura, ya tiene un status legal que lo apuntala en el seno de la democracia colombiana.El objetivo de La Habana, desde la llegada de Chávez al poder, fue la constitución de un bloque, Venezuela/Colombia, que constituyen el núcleo fuerte del bloque andino, que se apoya en la narrativa del sueño que Bolívar dejó sin terminar.
Evo Morales, en pleno proceso de instaurar la presidencia vitalicia, preserva un espacio ya ganado para el bloque bolivariano. Queda el Perú que hasta ahora se ha defendido de caer en el populismo castrista, pues ya vivió la experiencia del gobierno militar/populista que también actuó bajo influencia de La Habana, del general Velasco Alvarado.Desafortunadamente, la acción de los grupos identificados con el castro/chavismo se benefician de la impaciencia de Keiko Fujimori por llegar al poder: ambos empeñados en debilitar la acción gubernamental del actual presidente, se ayudan mutuamente.El panorama que se avecina en Venezuela será de máxima presión. La Habana lucirá toda la destreza y paciencia de su diplomacia y como en Angola, y Colombia, las negociaciones pueden durar años.Cabe preguntarse: ¿Cuál será el modo de acción que adoptará la MUD ante un reto de esa envergadura?Hasta ahora la MUD no ha propuesto un escenario propio, siempre se la ha visto sobrepasada por la agenda propuesta por el poder, salvo una vez, cuando asumió la presidencia de la flamante Asamblea Nacional Henry Ramos Allup y ordenó sacaran las imágenes de Hugo Chávez de la Asamblea Nacional. Gesto simbólico, cierto, pero que resultó de pocas consecuencias.[i] Cuba posee una enorme experiencia. Para comprobarlo, nada más es necesario que recordar su intervención durante la guerra de Angola en la que participó durante los 13 años que duró el conflicto. Allí Cuba puso la carne de cañón y los soviéticos las armas. Fueron en total 380.000 efectivos militares y 75.000 de personal civil. Los acuerdos de Paz entre las FARC y Colombia es otro ejemplo, no menos importante.

LOS PLANES CUBANOS PARA VENEZUELA

Febrero 24, 2018


La evolución de la situación venezolana según el plan preconcebido en La Habana, le tiene reservado un rol de árbitro apaciguador a Raúl Castro, quien permanecerá en el poder, incluso después de su renuncia, a través de la dirección del partido. Así, en La Habana calculan, que Cuba es la que negociará la crisis venezolana.No es casual que las elecciones presidenciales en Venezuela hayan sido convocadas para el 22 de abril de este año, puesto que en Cuba será el 19 de abril cuando Raúl Castro se retire de la presidencia del Consejo de Estado y se supone sea reemplazado por el heredero designado por el poder, Miguel Díaz Canel. Es lógico que la modificación del mando de la metrópoli preceda a la del territorio anexado.Raúl Castro debía haber entregado su cargo de presidente del Consejo de Estado en el mes de febrero 2018. Así había sido anunciado en el VIIº Congreso del Partido Comunista de Cuba, celebrado en abril 2016, todavía en vida Fidel Castro, al mismo tiempo que Raúl Castro era confirmado como primer secretario del Partido Comunista de Cuba, cargo igual de poderoso que el de jefe de gobierno, que le permitirá seguir ejerciendo el poder más allá del mandato presidencial.Es muy posible, y no sería exagerado afirmar, que la prolongación del mandato del presidente cubano, no se debió a la excusa pueril de los estragos causados por el último ciclón que azotó a Cuba, sino debido a la severa crisis política que enfrentaba el representante del poder cubano en Venezuela.El gobierno de Nicolás Maduro, procónsul nombrado por La Habana, se había visto profundamente debilitado no sólo por las manifestaciones de repudio por parte de la población, sino también por el resquebrajamiento en el seno de la cúpula del poder: la deserción y huida del país de la Fiscal Luisa Ortega Díaz fue el gesto de mayor relieve.La crisis venezolana le planteó a Raúl Castro un dilema de amplia envergadura. Al mismo tiempo que se ocupaba de ultimar los detalles del tránsito del poder en Cuba, no exento de conflicto pues se barajaba la posibilidad de la entrega del mando a su hijo Alejandro Castro Espín, coronel del Ministerio del Interior y jefe del Consejo de Defensa y Seguridad Nacional.




Al no reunir su hijo el consenso de la cúpula de la oligarquía cubana, – lo que hubiese asegurando la continuidad monárquica del régimen – Raúl Castro se vio obligado a conformar una estructura que, preservando el poder de la familia Castro, impidiera futuras crisis de gobernabilidad o iniciativas individuales por parte de miembros de la cúpula del poder, a las cuales el castrismo es particularmente alérgico.Pero el poder cubano no puede permitirse perder a Venezuela; es la joya de la corona y le facilita a Cuba un posición de fuerza en sus negociaciones con Rusia, Irán, China, Siria, Corea del Norte, Bielorusia y otros gobiernos antidemocráticos, opuestos al “imperio”.Poseer el espacio geopolítico que brinda Venezuela, sin contar Cuba con las riquezas del subsuelo, no es algo que se tome a la ligera. Es más, preservar su poderío sobre Venezuela, es la condición de sobrevivencia del castrismo, en la Isla y en el resto del continente.Tras la contundente derrota de 2015, el principal objetivo de La Habana fue la de que Nicolás Maduro aplicara la receta de no dar marcha atrás en su guerra “antiimperialista”, la receta mágica, que tan excelentes resultado le ha dado al poder de los hermanos Castro.Tras el fin de la Guerra Fría, Fidel Castro modificó su modo de intervención en América Latina. En lugar de la violencia política, optó por recurrir a la instrumentalización de las normas democráticas, aplicando la elasticidad de las técnicas de la guerra de guerrillas, pero haciéndolas maleables y cambiándolas cada vez que le era necesario en su voluntad de hacerse del poder y conservarlo.Así ha procedido Maduro ante la crisis de gobernabilidad que ha enfrentado desde la contundente derrota parlamentaria de 2015 que le otorgó a la oposición una mayoría absoluta en la Asamblea Nacional.Desde entonces, el procónsul cubano se ha dedicado a despojar de sus facultades a la Asamblea, nombrando arbitrariamente nuevos magistrados de la Corte Suprema, rechazando el Referendo Revocatorio y, finalmente, eligiendo una Asamblea Constituyente, absolutamente inconstitucional, que realiza maniobras políticas de orden táctico/estratégico, sometiendo a la Asamblea y adelantando medio año las elecciones presidenciales.Su empeño de seguir negociando con la oposición en la República Dominicana, sin intención de hacer concesión alguna, le ha permitido nuevamente ganar tiempo y a la par aprovecharse de esa tribuna internacional para mostrar una fachada democrática. Él y los cubanos, saben que negociar es del gusto de la comunidad internacional.Su objetivo es reducir al máximo la capacidad negociadora de la MUD, fragmentar la Oposición, y torpedear las gestiones que está realizando la comunidad internacional en aras a un desenlace democrático, evitando a la vez toda un nuevo estallido social.Ante este panorama en el que no se avizora ninguna posibilidad de cambio de la situación dramática que vive la población, el gobierno ha ido llevando la situación a un callejón sin salida que, forzosamente, desembocará en episodios de violencia.




Previendo ese escenario, que el gobierno busca promover, Maduro ya puso en marcha un plan cívico-militar de ‘defensa popular’, “contra cualquier plan terrorista, contra cualquier intento golpista, contra cualquier provocación de la oligarquía colombiana en la frontera, contra cualquier grupo terrorista que intente insurgir otra vez” y ha puesto a Diosdado Cabello, lo que no es casual, al mando de ese plan.Para quienes conocemos mínimamente el modo de proceder del castrismo, el escenario que persigue La Habana es el de suscitar un escenario de violencia que se sume a la urgencia humanitaria, exacerbada por el éxodo masivo de una población que para sobrevivir, huye hacia los países fronterizos, creándoles un problema humanitario y de seguridad para el que no están preparados.Es el momento que Cuba espera para proponer sus buenos oficios, como lo hizo con las FARC y antes en Angola[i], con el fin de restablecer la paz en Venezuela, tomando a su cargo la urgente operación humanitaria que necesita la población. El “gobierno” de Maduro, aceptaría entonces la “intervención del país hermano” y la comunidad internacional ‘respiraría satisfecha’ de que al fin alguien tome en sus manos solucionar el caso Venezuela. De esa forma la presencia cubana en Venezuela cobraría el estatus legal al cual aspira.No es muy difícil percibir cuanto resultado le ha dado la técnica castrista de crear focos de violencia y luego proponerse como bombero capaz de instaurar la paz. La fórmula que le ha dado excelentes resultados para instaurar el dogma castrista de gobiernos vitalicios.Del otro lado de la frontera, en Colombia, Raúl Castro tiene que estar observando con interés el desarrollo de la campaña electoral que se celebrará el próximo 27 de mayo. Timochenko, líder de las FARC, pese a la poca acogida que tuvo su candidatura, ya tiene un status legal que lo apuntala en el seno de la democracia colombiana.El objetivo de La Habana, desde la llegada de Chávez al poder, fue la constitución de un bloque, Venezuela/Colombia, que constituyen el núcleo fuerte del bloque andino, que se apoya en la narrativa del sueño que Bolívar dejó sin terminar.




Evo Morales, en pleno proceso de instaurar la presidencia vitalicia, preserva un espacio ya ganado para el bloque bolivariano. Queda el Perú que hasta ahora se ha defendido de caer en el populismo castrista, pues ya vivió la experiencia del gobierno militar/populista que también actuó bajo influencia de La Habana, del general Velasco Alvarado.Desafortunadamente, la acción de los grupos identificados con el castro/chavismo se benefician de la impaciencia de Keiko Fujimori por llegar al poder: ambos empeñados en debilitar la acción gubernamental del actual presidente, se ayudan mutuamente.El panorama que se avecina en Venezuela será de máxima presión. La Habana lucirá toda la destreza y paciencia de su diplomacia y como en Angola, y Colombia, las negociaciones pueden durar años.Cabe preguntarse: ¿Cuál será el modo de acción que adoptará la MUD ante un reto de esa envergadura?Hasta ahora la MUD no ha propuesto un escenario propio, siempre se la ha visto sobrepasada por la agenda propuesta por el poder, salvo una vez, cuando asumió la presidencia de la flamante Asamblea Nacional Henry Ramos Allup y ordenó sacaran las imágenes de Hugo Chávez de la Asamblea Nacional. Gesto simbólico, cierto, pero que resultó de pocas consecuencias.[i] Cuba posee una enorme experiencia. Para comprobarlo, nada más es necesario que recordar su intervención durante la guerra de Angola en la que participó durante los 13 años que duró el conflicto. Allí Cuba puso la carne de cañón y los soviéticos las armas. Fueron en total 380.000 efectivos militares y 75.000 de personal civil. Los acuerdos de Paz entre las FARC y Colombia es otro ejemplo, no menos importante.

http://www.abcdelasemana.com/2018/02...ara-venezuela/