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Tema: Capitanía General de Filipinas

  1. #1
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    Capitanía General de Filipinas

    Capitanía General de Filipinas

    image.jpg


    Capitanía de Filipinas hasta 1899
    Capitanía General de Filipinas, era una división adminsitrativa de de España. Era dependiente del Virreinato de Nueva España, que a su vez lo era del Consejo de Indias.
    Capital: Manila
    Localización: Filipinas, Guam, Micronesia, Palau, y Taiwán (temporal).
    Gobierno


    Audiencia de Manila, desde 1583
    Archidiócesis de Manila, desde 1595, diócesis de 1579
    Diócesis de Cebú, desde 1595
    Diócesis de Nueva Cáceres, desde 1595
    Diócesis de Nueva Segovia, desde 1595
    Intendencia de Manilia 1784-1819, 1824-1830, 1844-1854
    Gobernadores:
    José Basco y Vargas (1778–1787)[1]
    Pedro Pérez de Sarrio (1787-1788)
    Félix Berenguer de Marquina (1788–1793)
    Rafael María de Aguilar (1793–1806)
    Mariano Fernández de Folgueras (1806–1810)
    Manuel Gonzalez de Aguilar (1810–1813)
    José Gardoqui Jaraveitia (1813–1816)
    Mariano Fernández de Folgueras (1816–1822)


    Capitanía General de Filipinas - Epistemowikia
    La Iglesia es el poder supremo en lo espiritual, como el Estado lo es en el temporal.

    Antonio Aparisi

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    Re: Capitanía General de Filipinas

    Gobernación de las Filipinas:

    image.jpg



    La Gobernación de las Filipinas era un territorio creado en 1574 en lo que es hoy en día las Filipinas y el antiguo pacífico hispánico. Durante mucho tiempo el archipiélago filipino y los demás territorios del pacífico compartieron una historia y territorio común. Fue el antecesor de la Capitanía General de Filipinas.

    Las islas Filipinas constituyeron el límite oriental del virreinato novohispano. Tras su conquista por Miguel López de Legazpi, quedó vinculada a México por medio del Galeón de Manila, que hacía la ruta descubierta por Urdaneta en 1565. Después de ser conquistada por Legazpi llegó el gobernador Guido de Lavezares, que declaró libres a los naturales, excepto aquellos que se opusieran a la dominación, que fueron esclavizados (moros y negritos). Su libertad se compaginó con el trabajo obligatorio en las obras públicas, en la construcción naval o como bogas de las embarcaciones. Filipinas fue declarada Gobernación y Capitanía General dependiente del virreinato mexicano en 1574. En 1584, se creó la Audiencia de Manila, suprimida en 1590 y restablecida ocho años después. Su presidente era el mismo Gobernador. Manila tenía Caja Real y tres oficiales que administraban la Real Hacienda. El modelo americano se completó con la fundación del obispado de Manila, en 1579, y con la creación de tres obispados sufragáneos de la arquidiócesis de Manila, en 1591 (Cebú, Nueva Segovia y Nueva Cáceres). Los religiosos agustinos, franciscanos, jesuitas y dominicos se encargaron de la evangelización de los naturales. El clero secular era muy escaso.


    La economía filipina era de base agropecuaria. A las plantas alimenticias de los asiáticos se sumaron las europeas y americanas. La dieta popular seguía centrada en el arroz, pero el maíz tuvo gran aceptación. Las islas producían, además, buen algodón, caña y tabaco. No pudieron aclimatar las especies de las Molucas pese a intentarse varias veces. La ganadería no fue menos importante. A los ganados de carabaos y de cerda ya existentes, se sumaron el mular, caballar, vacuno y ovino. La minería estuvo limitada a algunas extracciones irregulares de hierro en Paracali. No había plata, ni se encontró oro hasta el siglo XVIII. El comercio fue su actividad más importante. Los españoles negociaban con las Molucas, Bengala, China, Japón, Siam, Borneo, Sumatra y Java, enviando las especies, nácar, carey, calaín, diamantes, alcanfor, palo de Cambac, cera, porcelana, sedas, etc. que exportaban a América (México y Perú) a cambio de plata y productos de la dieta mediterránea. Los comerciantes sevillanos se alarmaron de la fuga de plata hacia Asia y, en 1593, se ordenó que Manila negociase sólo con Acapulco y por un valor máximo de 250.000 pesos, retornando a cambio un máximo de medio millón de pesos en plata.
    La situación geopolítica filipina originó su intrusión en la guerra de mercados que sostenía el comercio internacional a comienzos del siglo XVII. Los holandeses iniciaron sus campañas para apoderarse de las Molucas, desalojando de ellas a los portugueses y la Corona española tuvo que intervenir en el conflicto. Al principio, para defender los intereses portugueses, luego con ánimo de desplazar a los holandeses. La contrapartida de ello fueron los numerosos intentos holandeses por apoderarse de las Filipinas, que no cesaron hasta la Paz de Westfalia. En 1662, los españoles abandonaron sus pretensiones en las Molucas y los holandeses en Filipinas, restableciéndose un status quo que perduró ya hasta fines de siglo.

    Filipinas - Contextos - ARTEHISTORIA V2
    Última edición por Michael; 27/06/2013 a las 16:16
    La Iglesia es el poder supremo en lo espiritual, como el Estado lo es en el temporal.

    Antonio Aparisi

  3. #3
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    Re: Capitanía General de Filipinas

    Gobernación española de Taiwán

    1626-1642


    image.jpg

    Las colonias europeas en Taiwán hacia 1650, en verde la Gobernación española de Formosa.


    Durante 16 años del siglo XVII el norte de la isla de Taiwán (llamada por los ibéricos Formosa o Isla Hermosa) estuvo bajo control español formando una gobernación dependiente de la Capitanía General de las Filipinas dentro del Virreinato de Nueva España.


    Antecedentes


    Los portugueses fueron los primeros europeos en llegar a Taiwán en 1582 bautizándola con el nombre de Ilha Formosa (Isla Hermosa). El establecimiento de los holandeses de la Compañía Holandesa de las Indias Orientales en Anping (con el nombre inicial de Orange y posteriormente Fort Zeelandia), en la bahía de la actual ciudad de Tainan al sur de la isla desde 1624, resultaba negativo para España debido al floreciente comercio entre los mercaderes chinos y la colonia española de Manila. La razón principal de ese comercio era la plata que los españoles transportaban a Manila desde el puerto de Acapulco. La plata española atrajo a Manila a un número creciente de mercaderes chinos que llegaron a formar un asentamiento permanente en las principales ciudades Filipinas y no solo Manila, en los barrios que recibieron los nombres de parianes.


    Gobernación


    La presencia holandesa en Taiwán suponía una amenaza para los intereses comerciales españoles, y España, por iniciativa del capitán general de las Filipinas Fernando de Silva, envió una expedición desde las Filipinas para conquistar Taiwán al mando de Antonio Carreño Valdés. Desembarcaron en el norte de la isla evitando a los holandeses que se hallaban asentados en el sur, el 7 de mayo de 1626 en un lugar que denominaron Santiago. Se fundó en la bahía de Jilong el puerto de La Santísima Trinidad (actualmente Keelung) defendido por un fuerte llamado de San Salvador en la pequeña isla de Heping. Se crearon 6 pequeñas fortificaciones para defender el fuerte con un contingente de 200 españoles con poco más de una docena de piezas de artillería.


    El 17 de agosto de 1627 el nuevo gobernador y capitán general de Filipinas, Juan Niño de Tabora, zarpó de Cavite con 8 barcos para reforzar la presencia española en Taiwán, sin resultados positivos. En 1629 se fundó el pueblo de Castillo en la localidad de Tamsui (Danshui), cerca de la actual Taipéi, donde se edificó otro fuerte llamado Santo Domingo.


    La presencia de los españoles en el norte de la isla y de los holandeses en el sur llevó a una rivalidad entre ambas potencias, los españoles de Taiwán consiguieron repeler la primera agresión naval holandesa en 1630 organizada por Pieter Nuyts. La pérdida de alguno de los barcos de abastecimiento anual enviado desde Manila, hizo que los españoles de la isla se internaran en el interior en busca de alimentos, como consecuencia, en 1636 se produjo un alzamiento de los indígenas del área de Tamsui, quienes destruyeron la fortificación española, muriendo 30 de sus 60 defensores, siendo reconstruida luego.[1]


    El debilitamiento de la presencia española por los constantes tifones, los enfrentamientos con los aborígenes y holandeses y la presencia de numerosas enfermedades como la malaria, hizo que abandonaran Tamsui en 1638 y en 1642 acabó con la ofensiva de un flota holandesa que conquistó La Santísima Trinidad y expulsó a los españoles de Taiwán.[2]


    Durante la presencia española en Taiwán, se desarrolló una intensa actividad misionera católica lográndose el bautismo de 5.000 indígenas por medio de los misioneros: Bartolomé Martínez (1626–1629), Domingo de la Borda (1626), Francisco Váez de Santo Domingo (1626–1636), Francisco Mola (1627–1631), Ángelo Cocchi de San Antonio (1627–1632), Juan de Elgüeta (1627–1629) y Francisco de Acebedo (1627–1629).


    El control holandés sobre la isla, limitado a las zonas costeras más accesibles, continuaría hasta el año 1662 cuando fueron expulsados de la isla por el rebelde chino Zheng Chenggong, más conocido en Occidente como Koxinga.


    Gobernadores españoles de Formosa


    Antonio Carreño Valdés, 1626–1629
    Juan de Alcarazo, 1629–1632
    Bartolomé Díaz Barrera, 1632–1634
    Alonso García Romero, 1634–1635
    Francisco Hernández, 1635–1637
    Pedro Palomino, 1637–1639
    Cristóbal Márquez, 1639–1640
    Gonzalo Portillo, 1640–1642



    Gobernación española de Taiwán - Wikipedia, la enciclopedia libre
    La Iglesia es el poder supremo en lo espiritual, como el Estado lo es en el temporal.

    Antonio Aparisi

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    Re: Capitanía General de Filipinas

    Última edición por Michael; 26/09/2013 a las 07:44
    La Iglesia es el poder supremo en lo espiritual, como el Estado lo es en el temporal.

    Antonio Aparisi

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    Re: Capitanía General de Filipinas

    Un fuerte español bajo el suelo de Taiwán
    Un fuerte español bajo el suelo de Taiwán



    Arqueología. Investigadores del CSIC excavan en la isla china para desenterrar los restos de una fortaleza colonial del siglo XVII


    JAVIER YANES MADRID


    image.jpg
    Una imagen de las excavaciones realizadas hasta ahora.


    Apocos centímetros de las ruedas de los coches, un pedazo de la historia está saliendo a la luz. El escenario no es precisamente una jungla remota o un desierto hostil: entre edificios apiñados, a la entrada de un aparcamiento y frente a los astilleros de CSBC (antes China Shipbuilding Corporation), en el puerto de Keelung (Taiwán). Allí, restos de un antiguo enclave español yacen como testigos mudos del fallido intento del rey Felipe IV por controlar una plaza estratégica en el comercio de las Indias Orientales.


    Pero una gran parte de los restos aún tendrá que esperar. El equipo hispanotaiwanés empeñado en este proyecto de enorme valor histórico se enfrenta a la incomprensión del astillero estatal, que hasta ahora ha denegado el permiso para excavar en la zona donde los arqueólogos creen que se ubicó el fuerte de San Salvador, de unos cien metros de lado. "La mayor fortaleza española en el Lejano Oriente", pondera José Eugenio Borao Mateo, un zaragozano doctorado en historia en Barcelona y que desde 1990 ejerce como profesor en la Facultad de Letras de la Universidad Nacional de Taiwán.


    El enclave pretendía proteger la ruta comercial entre China y Manila


    Borao Mateo está removiendo Madrid con Taipéi para impulsar su proyecto, Del Renacimiento al Neolítico: la fortaleza española de Keelung y su entorno previo austronesio y prehistórico. La iniciativa está cofinanciada por ambos países y en ella trabajan investigadores del Consejo Nacional de Ciencias taiwanés y del Instituto de Historia y el Centro de Ciencias Humanas y Sociales, ambos del CSIC.


    Los científicos quieren rescatar un enclave bien documentado históricamente, pero aún oculto para la arqueología. Durante los 16 años que duró la presencia española en Taiwán, de 1626 a 1642, el pequeño puerto de La Santísima Trinidad intentó proteger la ruta marítima entre la región continental costera de Fujian y la capital de la Capitanía General de las Filipinas, Manila. El gran rival era Holanda, que dominaba la costa occidental de Taiwán y que acabaría expulsando a los españoles de aquel territorio.


    Dónde marcar la X


    Con el investigador del CSIC Juan Manuel Vicent a la cabeza de la pata española del proyecto, la arqueóloga María Cruz Berrocal ha estado al frente del trabajo de campo en Taiwán. El primer paso era localizar los emplazamientos más prometedores para excavar, y no parecía tarea fácil. "Es una zona muy abigarrada de construcciones", explica Berrocal. Para marcar la X, la documentación reunida por Borao Mateo fue esencial. "Conseguí dar con las fotografías y el diario de excavaciones de los trabajos que hizo el Gobierno colonial japonés en 1936 en uno de los bastiones del fuerte, aunque al año siguiente, tal vez por la inminente guerra con China, lo destruyeron para construir los astilleros", relata el profesor. "Años atrás colaboré con un arqueólogo e hicimos un análisis de radar de penetración terrestre (GPR) que sirvió para identificar los posibles cimientos de uno de los lados de la fortaleza, a metro y medio bajo tierra".


    "San Salvador era la mayor fortaleza española en el Lejano Oriente"


    Pero tras la negativa de los astilleros a autorizar la excavación, los arqueólogos tuvieron que conformarse con el aparcamiento. "Superponiendo mapas holandeses, japoneses y modernos digitalizados, concluimos que allí se encuentra una iglesia de piedra construida por los dominicos que vinieron a la isla", expone Borao Mateo, que resume el progreso de estos trabajos: "Abrimos cuatro catas en la zona norte sin resultado aparente, por lo que nos hemos trasladado a la zona sur, donde está apareciendo un tapial impresionante; aún no podemos decir si pertenece a alguna estructura española o indígena".


    Y es que, como lonchas de embutidos en un sándwich, las excavaciones han cortado un variado menú cronológico que abarca desde el Neolítico hasta la época japonesa, pasando por la Edad del Hierro y la dominación china. "Estamos contentos porque están apareciendo finas piezas neolíticas, otras indígenas, y de la dinastía Qing y japonesas; y materiales del siglo XVII contemporáneos a la presencia hispana, pero que aún tenemos que estudiar", apunta Borao Mateo. Aunque es un primer bocado para los arqueólogos, todo se analiza exclusivamente en los laboratorios taiwaneses. "No nos dejan sacar nada del país se lamenta Berrocal. Lo único que podemos traer a España son muestras de suelo para analizarlas y estudiar cómo se formó ese suelo para la datación".


    El astillero estatal hasta ahora ha denegado el permiso para excavar


    Ciencia contra burocracia


    El equipo confía en que la naval transija para acometer las excavaciones de mayor calado, las de la fortaleza principal. Un segundo enclave de interés es otro hueso duro de roer por requerir también un permiso especial. "Hay dos zonas elevadas que los españoles llamaban La Mira y La Retirada, con fuertes auxiliares. Entre ambas, españoles y holandeses libraron una batalla de una semana. Es posible que allí aparezcan elementos hispánicos, pero se encuentran en instalaciones militares. Aunque, curiosamente, van a dar más facilidades para entrar a excavar que los astilleros", comenta Borao Mateo. "El problema en el astillero es que dicen que tienen que fabricar barcos y que nosotros estorbamos", señala Berrocal. Parte del problema parece ser el extraño limbo político en el que sigue la isla de Taiwán, una nación independiente de facto pero no reconocida por ninguna potencia, y que la República Popular del continente aún espera anexionar oficialmente. "Por eso tienen un exceso de celo con sus instalaciones estratégicas, aunque el astillero está en declive. Y la burocracia allí es terrible", apunta la experta del CSIC.


    A la espera de la próxima campaña de excavación, en primavera, los científicos confían en que el proyecto suscite tanto interés en España como lo ha hecho en Taiwán. "Allí están entusiasmados", celebra Berrocal. "Esperemos que en España ocurra lo mismo", añade. De hecho, cuenta Borao Mateo, fueron los taiwaneses quienes en 2010 viajaron a España en busca de expertos del CSIC que se sumasen al proyecto. El sueño de este profesor, después de 20 años estudiando la huella española en Taiwán, es ver construido allí un parque arqueológico. Además de servir a académicos e investigadores, atraería el turismo español hacia aquel rincón de Asia.-
    La Iglesia es el poder supremo en lo espiritual, como el Estado lo es en el temporal.

    Antonio Aparisi

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    Re: Capitanía General de Filipinas

    Interesantísimo lo de Taiwán, y muy poco conocido. Yo creo que merecería ser un hilo aparte.

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    Re: Capitanía General de Filipinas

    Cita Iniciado por Hyeronimus Ver mensaje
    Interesantísimo lo de Taiwán, y muy poco conocido. Yo creo que merecería ser un hilo aparte.

    Gracias queridísimo amigo.

    Aquí lo tienes. Tal como me lo pediste:

    Taiwán Español
    La Iglesia es el poder supremo en lo espiritual, como el Estado lo es en el temporal.

    Antonio Aparisi

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    Re: Capitanía General de Filipinas

    Macronesia Española:

    Las desconocidas islas españolas del Pacífico




    Guedes, Coroa, Pescadores y Ocea conforman la Micronesia española, un conjunto de islas que legalmente pertenecen a nuestro país, pero poseen un ínfimo valor económico y estratégico que ha llevado a no ser ocupadas de forma permanente ni ser reclamadas como posesiones por el Gobierno


    BITÁCORAS.COM




    Entre las miles de anotaciones que diariamente se publican en la blogosfera, hoy centramos nuestra atención en una curiosa y desconocida historia destacada en La Brújula Verde, que desde hace más de dos siglos relaciona nuestro país con un conjunto de islotes del océano Pacífico.


    Nos referimos a Guedes (también llamada Pegan, Onaka y Onella, en las Marianas), Coroa (también conocida como Arrecife), O Acea (también llamada Matador, en las Carolinas) y Pescadores. Todas ellas, conforman la llamada Micronesia española y constituyen uno de los resquicios de la colonización española en Oceanía. Estas posesiones de ultramar no fueron contemplados ni en el tratado hispano-estadounidense, firmado en París el 10 de diciembre de 1898, ni en el Tratado germano-español en el que se cede al Imperio alemán los archipiélagos de Carolinas, Palaos y Marianas, excepto la isla de Guam, realizado en Madrid el 30 de junio de 1899.


    Por tanto, tal y como descubrió el investigador del CSIC Emilio Pastor y Santos en 1949, España podría hacer legalmente una reclamación de soberanía. Sin embargo, debido a escaso valor económico y estratégico, el gobierno español no las ocupa de forma permanente ni las ha reclamado como posesiones propias. Ni tan siquiera protestó a los gobiernos japonés y los EE.UU. por la Segunda Guerra Mundial, a pesar de que algunas batallas y campañas se desarrollaron cerca de estas islas.


    Como consecuencia del descubrimienro de Emilio Pastor, el 12 de enero de 1949 el tema fue tratado en Consejo de Ministros, en el que el propio Francisco Franco llegó a declarar que «mientras no se aclare el asunto, procede esperar antes de efectuar gestión alguna con los Estados Unidos o con las potencias amigas que forman parte de la ONU, ya que España no tiene contactos con la ONU y sería ésta la que habría de resolver sobre la suerte definitiva de esas islas de Micronesia que pertenecieron al Japón». Y desde entonces, ahí quedó la cosa ¿qué opinan ustedes?
    Última edición por Michael; 30/09/2013 a las 20:18
    La Iglesia es el poder supremo en lo espiritual, como el Estado lo es en el temporal.

    Antonio Aparisi

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    Re: Capitanía General de Filipinas

    Micronesia Española


    La Micronesia Española comprende una serie de atolones, que legalmente, están bajo soberanía española, en el Pacífico. Se trata de uno de los Territorios de Ultramar de España más lejanos con respecto a la península Ibérica. La Micronesia Española está conformada por:


    Kapingamarangi
    Nukuoro
    Mapia


    ​Cada atolón contiene diferentes motus o islas, todos ellos bajo un clima tropical lo que hace que se
    desarrolle una vegetación frondosa típica de esas latitudes. El más grande es Kapingamarangi, el cual está habitado según el censo más reciente por 750 personas, Nukuoro también cuenta con población aunque menor en número, unos 400. El atolón mas pequeño es Mapia, el cual tiene 3 motus o islas, está prácticamente deshabitado y se encuentra cerca de Indonesia. De los 3 atolones, es el más occidental. Las poblaciones de Kapingamarangi y Nukuoro hablan lenguas distintas pero compatibles y entendibles entre sí en un 50% de ellas.


    Historia y Origen


    Tras el Desastre del 98, con la pérdida de Cuba, Puerto Rico, Filipinas y Guam, a España le era imposible
    Calle de Nukuoro,tomada por Clayton Alexandre.
    controlar las pequeñas y muy dispersas islas que le quedaban por Oceanía, por lo que acabó vendiéndoselas a Estados Unidos y Alemania. En el caso de Estados Unidos se tuvo que hacer varias veces al no haberse incluido algunas islas. España las vendió a cambio de renumeración económica y además de algunos beneficios. El problema fue que en estos tratados se olvidaron 4 atolones: Kapingamarangi, Nukuoro, Mapia y otro más del cual se cree que se trata de un escollo coralino o bajío ya hundido (Matador) que posíblemente se situe a unos 500 kilometros aproximadamente de Nukuoro (Se puede ver Matador como una elevación del fondo aquí ), y esto fue descubierto por Emilio Pastor y Santos quien no dudó, tras el descubrimiento y posterior investigacion, hacérselo llegar al en aquel entonces Jefe de Estado, Francisco Franco. Tras un Consejo de Ministros, la idea fue apartada hasta que el tiempo, economía y relaciones con la ONU mejoraran. Con el tiempo el asunto fue olvidado y por ello, ningún político ha pronunciado reclamación alguna sobre dichos territorios, haciendo que por Derecho Internacional, España legalmente ostente la Soberanía Legal, aunque no la Política, pues actualmente, Mapia está bajo soberanía política de Indonesia, y Kapingamarangi y Nukuoro bajo soberanía política de los Estados Federados de Micronesia.


    Mientras que Kapingamarangi y Nukuoro están geográficamente cerca, Mapia se encuentra a miles de kilómetros de estas dos últimas. Mapia está cercana a Indonesia, mientras que Kapingamarangi y Nukuoro están al noreste de Papúa Nueva Guinea.

    http://es.historia.wikia.com/wiki/Micronesia_Española
    La Iglesia es el poder supremo en lo espiritual, como el Estado lo es en el temporal.

    Antonio Aparisi

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    Re: Capitanía General de Filipinas

    Historia de Guam

    image.jpg



    La historia de Guam o Guaján comprende sus orígenes chamorros como fase previa a la colonización española y posterior dominio estadounidense. Quizás se trate de la más amplia historia de presencia europea entre las islas del Pacífico.


    Guam con anterioridad a la llegada de los europeosEdit
    La Historia de Guam antes del contacto con los europeos suele dividirse en los períodos: Pre-Latte (hasta antes del siglo IX) y Latte (a partir del siglo IX y hasta el siglo XVI), tomándose como hito la aparición, en las construcciones, de la Piedra latte.




    Se cree que la isla de Guam fue descubierta por azar por navegantes que emigraron del Sudeste Asiático alrededor del 4.000 a.C. Los habitantes de Guam creen ser descendientes de los pueblos austronesios originarios del Sudeste Asiático, llegados a la isla alrededor del 4.000 a.C. Estos pueblos están emparentados lingüística y culturalmente con pueblos de Malasia, Indonesia y Filipinas. Gran parte de lo que se conoce en el pueblo chamorro como "Precontacto" viene de leyendas, mitos, evidencias arqueológicas, los relatos de los misioneros jesuitas y de las observaciones de los científicos que visitaron Guam, como Otto von Kotzebue y Louis de Freycinet.


    Los Chamorro en la Antigüedad
    Cuando los europeos arribaron por primera vez a Guam, la sociedad chamorra se encontraba fuertemente estratificada: los [matao]] o clase alta, los achaot o clase media y los mana'chang o clase baja. Los matao vivían en las aldeas costeras, lo que les facilitaba el acceso a los recursos pesqueros, mientras que los mana'chang se localizaban en el interior de la isla. Matao y mana'chang rara vez se relacionaban y frecuentemente se utilizó a los achaot como intermediarios.


    También existían los makana o chamanes, especializados en las rtes curativas y la medicina. La creenecia en los espíritus, llamada Taotao Mona todavía pervive como un rasgo de la sociedad pre-europea. Los primeros exploradores europeos notaron que los navíos de los Chamorros comerciaban con otras islas de la Micronesia.


    El periodo Latte
    Las piedras Latte son, de hecho, un desarrollo reciente en la sociedad pre-contacto chamorro. Las piedras Latte son normalmente de piedra caliza y contienen una base y una cabeza. Como en la isla de Pascua, se ha especulado enormemente sobre el origen de estas piedras, así como su construcción llevada a cabo por una sociedad que desconocía el metal y no disponía de maquinaria. La teoría más aceptada sostiene que las estatutas fueron grabadas directamente en la piedra caliza, talladas y desplazadas hasta el área de asamblea por un elaborado sistema de cuerdas y troncos.


    Asumiendo que las piedras latte fueron usadas como parte de las casas de los caciques, puede decirse que la sociedad Chamorro fue estratificándose cada vez más, tanto por el aumento naturald emográfico como por la llegada de población. Aunque hay pocos datos que lo sostengan, se parte de la idea de que la sociedad Chamorro pre-europea fue una sociedad vibrante y dinámica.


    La expedición de Magallanes
    El 6 de marzo de 1521, Fernando de Magallanes llegó a Guam o Guaján en el transcurso de su expedición para circunnavegar el globo. Él y su tripulación fueron recibidos por los chamorros, descendientes de los primitivos pueblos de Guam. Los chamorros habían desarrollado el arte del comercio realizando viajes a otros islotes cercanos. Cuando vieron llegar a los europeos provistos de mercancias en sus barcos, asumieron que ellos también comerciaban. A bordo de pequeños, rápidos y eficientes barcos llamados "proas volantes", les dieron la bienvenida con comida y bebida esperando ser pagados a cambio con una grata suma de mercancias, por ejemplo con el hierro que vieron en los barcos del capitán español. No conformes con ello los chamorros lo enfrentan, robando algunas de sus naves, Magallanes tomó represalias, abandonando la isla para continuar viaje hacia las islas de especias. Por este motivo, tanto Guaján como el resto de la Islas Marianas pasaron a ser denominadas "Las Islas de los Ladrones".


    Desde el punto de vista de los europeos, se creía que los isleños eran personas gentiles y graciosas. Cuando, no habiendo sido recompensados por la comida y hospitalidad que les habían dado, los chamorros robaron en los barcos de Magallanes llevándose hierro como compensación, Magallanes se enojó y luchó contra ellos, dejando hogares quemados y varios muertos. Él y sus hombres se fueron y continuaron con el viaje que concluiría Juan Sebastián Elcano. Debido los robos de los que fueron objeto en Guam y las actuales Islas Marianas se las conoció desde entonces como las "Islas de los Ladrones". Las Marianas es el nombre recibido en 1668 por Mariana de Austria, viuda de Felipe IV de España.


    Evangelización


    Francisco Garcia, Istoria della conversione allá nostra Santaa Fede dell'Isole Mariane, Naples, 1686, pl. XV.
    En el año de 1668 llegó a la isla el primer misionero, el jesuita Diego Luis de San Vitores, que rebautizó el archipiélago con el nombre de "Las Marianas", en nombre de la reina Mariana de Austria, viuda del rey de España Felipe IV. La actual Arquidiócesis de Agaña, denominada oficialmente Archdishop de Guam, fue erigida el 1 de marzo de 1911, elevada a diócesis el 14 de octubre de 1965 y elevada a arquidiócesis metropolitana de 20 de mayo de 1984.


    Colonización
    En cuestión de décadas, Guam -o Guaján- fue colonizada por España y durante los siguientes siglos la isla se mantuvo como colonia de la potencia hispana. Fue una importante parada en la ruta comercial española entre las Filipinas y México para las flotas de Indias, los barcos balleneros y otras industrias. La población original disminuyó significativamente como resultado de las enfermedades y rebeliones contra los españoles. Gran parte de la población adulta masculina fue asesinada. Aun así, permaneció una pequeña población de nativos chamorros, aunque la cultura comenzó el mestizaje con la española, algo que también pasó con otra religión, costumbres e idioma europeos.


    El galeón de Manila
    Guaján fue una importante parada en la ruta entre Acapulco y las Filipinas para el comercio galeones y buques de pesca de la ballena.


    La conquista por Estados Unidos (1898)Edit
    El 21 de junio de 1898, Guam fue capturada por los Estados Unidos en la toma de Guam durante la Guerra Hispano-Estadounidense en la que el marino Henry Glass con veinte cañones en el USS Charleston forzó la rendición del último gobernador español, Juan Marina. Por el Tratado de París, España la cedió oficialmente a los Estados Unidos. Desde entonces, Guam sirvió como una estación para los barcos norteamericanos que viajan desde y hacia las Filipinas.


    La Segunda Guerra MundialEdit
    Durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial, Guam fue atacada e invadida por las fuerzas armadas japonesas poco tiempo después del 7 de diciembre de 1941. La mayoría del personal militar norteamericano fue evacuado antes de la invasión. La ocupación militar japonesa duró desde 1941 hasta 1944 y fue una experiencia brutal para los chamorros, cuya lealtad hacia los Estados Unidos llegó a ser un punto de contención contra los japoneses. Algunos militares estadounidenses todavía estaban en la isla y fueron ocultados por los chamorros. la batalla de Guam comenzó el 21 de julio de 1944 cuando las tropas norteamericanas que desembarcaron en la isla y Guam fue liberada del gobierno militar japonés el 10 de agosto con un victoria aliada.


    Tras la liberación, el ejército norteamericano tenía mano dura en el manejo de la isla. Esto condujo finalmente al resentimiento y a la presión política por mayor libertad para la isla en los años 1950. en los primeros años de la década de los 60, bajo el presidente John F. Kennedy, Estados Unidos finalmente concedió la ciudadanía estadounidense a los chamorros y gradualmente la isla obtuvo el estatus de semi-autonomía a través del Acta Orgánica.


    Las instalaciones militares estadounidenses en la isla son algunas de las bases más estratégicamente importantes en el océano Pacífico. Cuando las bases de la Armada y Fuerza Aérea en las Filipinas fueron cerradas tras la expiración de sus arriendos, la mayoría de las fuerzas estacionadas ahí fueron reubicadas en Guam.


    Últimos años
    Los E.E.U.U mantienen varias bases militares en Guam, incluida la base naval en la Península de Orote. La presencia militar estadounidense en Guam es de vital importancia estratégica en el Pacífico. Cuando los Estados Unidos cerraron sus bases militares en las Filipinas a principios de los 90's, un gran número de las fuerzas aéreas y navales fueron reubicadas en Guam.


    La derogación del espacio de seguridad sobre Guam por parte del presidente de los Estados Unidos John F. Kennedy en 1963 permitió el desarrollo de una incipiente industria turística. El despegue económico de la isla se debió en parte al desarrollo del turismo y en parte al aumento de las inversiones del gobierno federal durantes los años 80 y 90.


    La crisis económica que afectó a Asia a finales de los 90, en la cual Japón resultó fuertemente afectada, golpeó severamente a la industria turística de Guam. Asimismo, los recortes en la inversión militar durante la década de los 90 agravó la crisis económica de la isla. La recuperación económica de la isla se vio obstaculizada por los tifones Paka en 1997 y Pongsona en 2002 y por la crisis global en el sector del turismo como resultado de los atentados del 11S.


    Actualmente hay signos de recuperación en la economía de Guam. El aumento en la llegada de turistas japoneses refleja que la economía de la isla va recuperándose poco a poco. Además, parece que Guam está erigiéndose en un destino tropical de fin de semana. De todos modos, el impacto del descenso en el gasto militar de los Estados Unidos es severo, debido sobre todo a la lucha contra el terrorismo.


    Recientemente se ha propuesto el refuerzo en la inversión militar estadounidense, como sería el traslado de 8.000 efectivos de Okinawa, lo que indicaría un creciente interés de los Estados Unidos en el valor geoestratégico de Guam. Se prevé que los primeros marines de Okinawa empiecen a llegar a Guam en 2012 ó 2013.


    El Guam se enfrenta al mayor desafío de su historia reciente. Se trata de la lucha por la supervivencia de la cultura chamorra frente a la aculturación iniciada en los últimos años. Hay que tener en cuenta que existe hoy día un gran número de chamorros instalados en los Estados Unidos, lo que dificulta la propia definición y preservación de la identidad chamorra.


    Historia de Guam - Wikipedia, la enciclopedia libre
    Última edición por Michael; 21/10/2013 a las 11:48
    La Iglesia es el poder supremo en lo espiritual, como el Estado lo es en el temporal.

    Antonio Aparisi

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    Re: Capitanía General de Filipinas

    La Toma de Guam




    La entrada de hoy la he titulado “La Toma de Guam“, pero podría haber puesto “Una Toma de Guasa” y no hubiera faltado a la verdad en absoluto. El episodio de Guam, una pequeña isla del Pacífico occidental bajo control español desde 1668, fue un hecho ridículo y bochornoso ocurrido durante la guerra Hispano-Americana donde se puso de manifiesto algo que sería una constante durante casi todo el conflicto, la incompetencia de ambos contendientes.


    Por buscar algo positivo a esta batalla (si es que se le puede llamar así) es que no hubo víctimas y lo único que acabó maltrecho fue el orgullo de alguno.




    Todo empezó el 20 de Junio 1898, cuando la tranquilidad del puerto de Guam se vio interrumpida por la aparición de un enorme barco, el USS Charleston, un crucero de guerra reluciente, nuevecito y equipado con todos los extras. Full equip que se dice.






    El crucero USS Charleston. Tenía menos de un año de existencia cuando llegó a Guam.
    Cuando el Charleston pasa cerca de la fortaleza que protege la entrada del puerto, el intrépido capitán del barco, Henry Glass, ordena abrir fuego contra ella. El estruendo de varias andanadas llena el cielo de la bahía y la tripulación, recién estrenada igual que el barco, se prepara para recibir las respuesta de los malvados españoles. Pero nada ocurre. El silencio vuelve a apoderarse del lugar y los estadounidenses aguardan expectantes durante un buen rato.


    De pronto divisan una embarcación. El capitán Henry dirige su mirada hacia ella y observa un pequeño bote con tres personas dentro que enarbolan una bandera española y que se acercan al barco. El capitán hace una rápida valoración de la situación y aunque la desigualdad es manifiesta, ordena a sus hombres que están atentos que, aunque sólo tres, con estos españoles nunca se sabe.








    Por fin el débil esquife llega junto a la gran mole de hierro del barco y una de las personas, el teniente García, sube hasta el barco. El hombre vestido de gala y que imagino típico español de colonias regordete de cortas piernas y fino bigotillo , asciende costosamente por la escala hasta la cubierta. Una vez arriba y tras secarse el sudor(recuerden el clima tropical), presenta sus credenciales al capitán, hace varias genuflexiones y le dice que es un honor recibirles en Guam. Que agradece mucho el saludo hecho con las salvas que han tenido a bien disparar y que si hace el favor de prestarle un poco de pólvora, ya que no tienen, estarán encantados de corresponderles con el mismo honor.


    Imagino la cara de poker del capitán estadounidense al escuchar estas palabras y supongo que su primera reacción sería la de echarse a reír, pero él tampoco estaba en disposición de sacar mucho pecho ya que las feroces andanadas de su novata tripulación habían fallado en su mayoría. Superado el primer momento de confusión, el Capitán Henry tomó la palabra e informó al teniente que España y Estado Unidos estaban en guerra y que a partir de ese momento se considerara prisionero de guerra.


    Ahora la cara de poker, que va por barrios, se le puso al teniente García y es que resulta que la última comunicación de España que había recibido la isla fue el 14 de Abril, la guerra se declaró el 25 siguiente y al parecer alguien se olvidó de comunicar este pequeño detalle a los habitantes de Guam.






    Finalmente el capitán decidió soltar al español con el mensaje de que debían rendir la isla. El mensaje fue llevado al gobernador de la isla, Juan Marina (llamado por los lugareños el buen Don Juan), a quien no le quedó más remedio que claudicar. En la rendición quiso dejar constancia ante el capitán americano de su gran enojo.


    Sin defensas de ninguna clase, ni elementos que oponer con probabilidad de éxito a los que usted trae, me veo en la triste decisión de rendirme, bien que protestando por el acto de fuerza que conmigo se verifica y la forma en que se ha hecho, pues no tengo noticia de mi Gobierno de haberse declarado la guerra entre nuestras dos naciones.






    Al día siguiente los estadounidenses tomaron la isla sin disparar un solo tiro e hicieron prisioneros a los 54 soldados españoles que allí estaban. El capitán también ordenó destruir los cañones y fortificaciones de la isla, pero únicamente había un viejo cañón que se usaba para las ceremonias y las defensas estaban tan deterioradas por culpa del abandono que finalmente decidieron dejar todo como estaba.


    NOTA: Años más tarde, durante la II Guerra Mundial, la isla de Guam se convirtió en un importante punto estratégico que sería testigo de nuevas batallas pero, por desgracia, fueron mucho menos divertidas y mucho más cruentas. Battle of Guam (1941) y Battle of Guam (1944).
    Más en:
    Toma de Guam - Wikipedia, la enciclopedia libre


    Historia: Ocupacin americana de Guam


    Guam


    http://historiasconhistoria.es/2009/...ma-de-guam.php
    Última edición por Michael; 21/10/2013 a las 11:49
    La Iglesia es el poder supremo en lo espiritual, como el Estado lo es en el temporal.

    Antonio Aparisi

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    Re: Capitanía General de Filipinas

    FILIPINAS
    El largo brazo del terrorismo
    Por RUBÉN CABEZAS










    CONFLICTO
    Grupos islamistas armados tienen en jaque al Gobierno filipino en el sur del país. Militares estadounidenses ayudan al Ejército en esta confrontación.


    La actividad de grupos terroristas islámicos separatistas es el principal conflicto de este país asiático. Los grupos islamistas Abu Sayyaf y el Frente Moro de Liberación Islámica, que cuenta con unos 13.000 hombres armados, desafían al Gobierno filipino reclamando un Estado independiente en Mindanao.
    Magallanes descubrió estas islas para la Corona de Castilla en 1521. Tras la guerra hispano-norteamericana y con la firma del tratado de París, en 1898, pasan a dominio estadounidense. El 4 de julio de 1946 proclama su independencia, aunque continúa manteniendo compromisos con Washington. Filipinas sufrió la dictadura de Ferdinand Marcos, de 1965 a 1986, año en el que se restaura la democracia siendo elegida presidenta Corazón Aquino.
    La delicada economía de Filipinas lleva deteriorándose desde hace décadas, una situación que pagan las clases más pobres, víctimas de un sistema caciquista. Este proceso es especialmente grave en la Isla de Mindanao, la más rica en recursos minerales y agrícolas, pero en la que siete de cada diez familias viven por debajo del umbral de la pobreza y la renta per cápita es seis veces inferior a la media nacional. Este archipiélago, situado en la parte meridional del país, ha sido tradicionalmente musulmán, frente al catolicismo que profesan el resto de las islas. Durante los años 80, el Gobierno facilitó la implantación de millones de granjeros cristianos del resto del país, situación que dejó en minoría a los musulmanes e incrementó la escasez de recursos y las tensiones separatistas.
    Para lograr la independencia de este territorio por medio de la lucha armada se formó, en 1969, el Frente Moro de Liberación Nacional. La guerra civil se cobró más de 50.000 víctimas durante la década de los 70. Tras la concesión del estatuto de autonomía a Mindanao en 1996, firmó un acuerdo de paz con el Gobierno. A este grupo hay que sumarles el Frente Moro de Liberación Islámica, una escisión del anterior, y el último en aparecer y más sangriento: Abu Sayyaf. Esta milicia fue fundada por iraníes que se asentaron en la ínsula de Basilán para difundir la doctrina del Ayatola Jomeini. Abu Sayyaf es acusado por Estados Unidos de estar vinculado con Al-Qaeda. Además de estos movimientos armados islámicos, también opera en la zona el Nuevo Ejército Popular, una guerrilla de corte marxista.
    El 'modus operandi' de los 'portadores de la espada' (Abu Sayyaf) incluye atentados y secuestros, principalmente de turistas, con los que sacan jugosas cantidades de dinero. Su acción más famosa fue el secuestro en abril de 2000 de 21 personas, en su mayoría extranjeros. Su liberación costó 28 millones de euros. Otros no han tenido tanta suerte: más de 100 rehenes han sido decapitados hasta ahora por esta organización. El Ejército de Filipinas está apoyado por 1.750 militares de EEUU en su lucha contra estas facciones armadas. Aunque la verdadera solución para frenar a los extremistas sería corregir la miseria en la que viven sus habitantes y que nutre estos movimientos radicales. Además de las violaciones de derechos humanos, como la tortura, denunciadas recientemente por varias ONG.
    En julio de 2003, el Frente Moro de Liberación Islámica firmó un acuerdo de alto el fuego con el Gobierno filipino que pretendía desembocar en unas negociaciones de paz formales. Sin embargo, el día 26 de ese mismo mes la situación se tornaba crítica para el Gobierno con la sublevación de 300 militares que pedían la dimisión de Macapagal Arroyo, a quien culpaban de la corrupción que impera en la Administración y el Ejército. La mandataria declaró el 'estado de rebelión' y, 17 horas después, la intentona de golpe militar era sofocada. A pesar de ello, la situación para el Gobierno filipino no mejoró: el ministro de Defensa se vio obligado a dimitir y el descontento de la población se palpó en manifestaciones como las que se celebraron en noviembre de 2003.
    Un mes después, el gobierno reestableció la pena de muerte. La jefa de Estado lo justificó ante el alarmante ascenso de secuestros en el país. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo ganó de nuevo las elecciones presidenciales en mayo de 2004, con casi un millón de votos más que su principal contrincante, en unos comicios que no estuvieron ajenos a la polémica ni a las denuncias de fraude. En febrero de 2006, tras ser desbaratada una conspiración golpista, Gloria Macapagal declaró el estado de excepción. A pesar de la presión social y de la posterior renuncia de todo su Gobierno, la presidenta -que ha vuelto a abolir la pena de muerte- se ha negado a dimitir.



    ELMUNDO.ES - DOCUMENTOS -
    La Iglesia es el poder supremo en lo espiritual, como el Estado lo es en el temporal.

    Antonio Aparisi

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    Re: Capitanía General de Filipinas

    Todo sobre las Islas Marianas:

    Las Islas Marianas: el chamorro
    La Iglesia es el poder supremo en lo espiritual, como el Estado lo es en el temporal.

    Antonio Aparisi

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    Re: Capitanía General de Filipinas

    History of Efforts to Reunify the Mariana Islands

    Senator Bordallo, 1964

    Governor Manuel Guerrero

    Antonio Won Pat

    Frank George Lujan

    Kurt Moylan

    Governor Carlos Camacho




    Editor’s note: Paper presented at the 2nd Marianas History Conference, 31 August 2013, University of Guam, Mangilao. Presented here with permission from the author, with some modifications by Guampedia for length.
    “A phenomenon noticeable throughout history regardless of place or period is the pursuit by governments of policies contrary to their own interests.”
    —Barbara Tuchman, 1984
    Barbara Tuchman’s point, made in her book The March of Folly, certainly applies to the United State’s decision to acquire only Guam out of the Marianas Archipelago as a result of the Spanish-American War of 1898.
    Partitioning the Mariana Islandsat the peace table in Versailles was undoubtedly one of America’s greatest foreign policy “Follies.” Despite the best advice from naval officers who had been in the region since Commodore Matthew C. Perry opened Japan in 1853, President William McKinley chose to give a portion of America’s spoils of war to a European nation that did not even participate in the war. The decision allowed Japan to capture the Northern Mariana Islands from Germany in 1914, and ultimately to choose war against the US in 1941. Today, the partition costs American taxpayers, in both the Marianas and the mainland, millions of dollars annually to maintain two separate territorial governments for essentially one people—not to mention the price of aggravations created over inter-island commerce and taxation. Significant efforts have been made to reunify the Marianas since that artificial line was drawn through the Rota Channel 115 years ago. Why have they failed? Is reunification still a viable political status option?
    Guam’s colonial history under Spain

    For 3,000 years before the European “Age of Exploration,” the indigenous Chamorro existed in the Mariana Archipelago as one people, with one language and one cultural heritage—the primary ingredients for nationhood. When Spanish explorer Miguel Legazpi visited Guam in 1565, he discovered no valuable exportable natural resources on Guam, but he did find a safe anchorage, food and water on the route to Cathay, China. Recognizing the strategic value of the Marianas, Legazpi claimed not only Guam, but the entire archipelago for Spain.
    The Spanish-Catholic reducción of the Marianas led to a drastic reduction in the Chamorro population and the temporary abandonment of the islands north of Rota. As a result of the Mexican War of Independence (1810 – 1821) and the end of the Manila Galleon trade, various Marianas governors suggested that the colony be abandoned. However, the Spanish Court decided to maintain a colony, simply to ensure that no other country could take it.
    With the rise of the whaling industry in the Pacific, both Guam and Saipan became ports of call for ships needing refitting and resupply. By the mid-1850s, international shipping companies established themselves in Hagåtña, providing regular and affordable transportation between Guam and the Northern Marianas. Guam Chamorros began moving to Saipan and Tinian. The governor of the Marianas and his administrators established representative government in Saipan, Tinian and Rota. They enacted one set of regulations and fees for all the commercial ports in the Marianas, and one tax code for all. Businessmen on both sides of the channel enjoyed inexpensive access to all the natural resources of the Marianas. Business grew and the standard of living improved.
    The partitioning of the Mariana Islands

    In 1898, after declaring war on Spain to free Cuba from “barbaric rule,” the American Navy overwhelmed the Spanish Navy in the Caribbean and quickly defeated Spanish troops in Cuba and Puerto Rico in what Secretary of State John Hay called a “Splendid Little War.”
    In the months that followed, the US Army captured Manila from Spanish forces. After the war, President McKinley and the Republican controlled Congress decided to acquire the Philippine Islands. Because ships of the day could not carry enough coal to steam from Hawaii to the Philippines, the Navy also captured—and Congress agreed to acquire—Guam with its natural deep water port of Apra Harbor as a coaling station.
    Why only Guam? The US had just acquired all the Hawaiian Islands by joint resolution, and now they were proposing to take all the Philippine archipelago. According to the historical record, they took only Guam from among the Marianas because they did not want to appear greedy.
    German representatives in Paris had made it clear to American representatives that if the US was not going to take the islands of Spanish Micronesia as a result of the war, then Germany would like to buy them from Spain. Spanish representatives told the American representatives that they were in fact negotiating a deal with the Spanish, depending on what the Americans demanded. When the Senate Foreign Relations committee met to hear the Treaty, Commander R. B. Bradford represented the US Navy. He recommended taking not only the Marianas, but all the Carolines as well. He used the annexation of Hawaii as an example:
    “Suppose we had but one, and the others were possessed of excellent harbors…[S]uppose also the others were in the hands of a commercial rival, with a different form of government and now over [ly] friendly. Under these circumstances we should lose all the advantages of isolation.”
    In other words, it was in the best interest of America to have a unified Marianas.
    Yet, knowing that Germany was interested in acquiring more tropical islands for their copra industry, and recognizing the German Kaiser’s need for prestige, McKinley and his senior advisors allowed Germany to complete its deal with Spain over the Caroline Islands. When Germany discovered the US was willing to give up the Northern Marianas as well, they paid Spain some US$4.2 million dollars for the lot.
    On 6 February 1899, the Senate voted in favor of ratification of the Treaty of Peace. Spain subsequently ceded Guam, Puerto Rico and the Philippines to the US. Germany proceeded with its acquisition of the Caroline and Mariana Islands.
    What to do with the new American territory of Guam?

    Up to this point in American history, all new territories added to the US had fallen under the principles established by the Land Ordinance of 1785 and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which stated that “colonies were but the extensions of the nation, entitled, not as a privilege but by right, to equality.” However, adding a group of distant islands to the US that were inhabited by non-Caucasian, non-English speaking, Catholics was another story. In a series of court cases heard in the US Supreme Court between 1901 and 1904, dubbed the Insular Cases, the new territories acquired from the Spanish-American War were deemed “unincorporated territories” as opposed to “incorporated territories.” The Supreme Court ruled that the US Constitution does not fully apply, and unincorporated territories were not destined for statehood. It also confirmed that the US Congress had plenipotentiary powers over these territories according to Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the US Constitution, commonly referred to as the Territorial Clause.
    Without the opportunity for statehood, there was no guarantee of citizenship. The Treaty of Paris only provided that the “political and civil rights of the native inhabitants will be determined by Congress.” The people of these territories could be ruled as subjects of the US indefinitely, even by the US Navy.
    The Mariana Islands and the Chamorro people were politically partitioned between the US Territory of Guam and the German Northern Mariana District. President McKinley designated a US naval officer to become Commander, Naval Station Guam, and Naval Governor of Guam. Captain Richard P. Leary arrived at Guam with two companies of US marines to establish and maintain order on Naval Station, Guam, which suddenly comprised not just a coaling station at Apra Harbor, but the entire island. Guam Chamorros began studying the English language and navy law, while the Northern Marianas Chamorros and Carolinians began studying the German language and German law.
    Chamorros under German, Japanese and US rule

    The lack-luster German administration of the Northern Marianas was cut short by World War I. When England declared war on Germany in 1914 and requested its ally Japan to use its navy against German shipping and military outposts in the Pacific, Japan saw an opportunity to vastly expand its Pacific empire at little cost. The Japanese Imperial Navy quickly captured not only the German naval base at Tsingtao, China (now Kiautschou Bay), but also the German Mariana and Caroline islands. All German citizens were gathered and deported to prisoner of war camps in Japan. The Northern Marianas Chamorros and Carolinians quickly found themselves studying the Japanese language and law.
    Suddenly, just as Commander Bradford had feared in 1898, a commercial rival had gained control of Micronesia in 1914, surrounding Guam and crossing America’s line of communications to the Philippines territory. All was not necessarily lost, however. Japan announced that its intentions were perfectly honorable and in keeping with its alliance with Great Britain. Japanese Prime Minister Count Shigenobu Okuma addressed a telegram to The Independent stating, as premier, that Japan had “no desire to secure more territory, no thought of depriving China or any other peoples of anything which they now possess.”
    In January 1918 the General Board of the US Navy recommended acquisitions in the Marshalls, Carolines, and Marianas:
    “The Marianas were of outstanding importance, because of their proximity to Japan and to the American island [Guam]. Their position in the immediate vicinity of Guam is capable of development into submarine bases within supporting distance of Japan, and, in the event of war, this would make their continued possession by that country a perpetual menace to Guam, and to any fleet operations undertaken for the relief of the Philippines.”
    At the end of the World War I, President Woodrow Wilson personally drafted the Versailles Peace Treaty, especially the section creating the League of Nations. However, because of partisan party politics, the Republican controlled US Senate, led by Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Henry Cabot Lodge, rejected the peace treaty. Therefore, the United States did not become a member of the League of Nations. When Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy subsequently kept their secret pledges to Japan in February 1919, the League awarded a Class C Mandate over German Micronesia to Japan—over President Wilson’s objections. As non-members, America had no voice in the League of Nations.
    The US Navy had been quite vociferous about the need to prevent Japan from taking the Marianas. But some important questions should be considered: Could the combined US Fleet have forced the issue? When the Senate failed to ratify the treaty, it had no obligation to the ill-fated organization. Could the same “gunboat diplomacy” wielded by Perry and Roosevelt have produced a split-mandate over Micronesia, with the US taking the Marianas and Japan the rest of German Micronesia? Did America’s failure to ratify the treaty and become a member of the League of Nations doom Japan and the US to a war for control of the Pacific? If the Marianas and Philippines had been fortified, might Japan have decided to choose war with Russia, their age-old enemy in Asia, rather than the US?
    As Bradford had feared in 1898 and the General Board in 1918, Japan eventually became less friendly. Japan walked out of the League of Nations in 1933 after a censure vote for their invasion of the Chinese province of Manchuria in 1931, and allowed the last of its treaties with the US to expire in 1936. The Japanese Navy established a base in the natural harbor at Tanapag, Saipan, with supporting airbases on the natural limestone plateaus at As Lito, Saipan, and Hagoi, Tinian. Then, on 8 December 1941, Japanese aircraft from Saipan strafed and bombed Guam in preparation for a December 10 invasion. Thus, Japan reunified the Marianas by force of arms, and the Guam Chamorros soon found themselves studying Japanese language, law and customs.
    Japanese naval planners anticipated the problems of establishing a government on Guam, including managing the island’s infrastructure—in particular the power plant, the water system and the communications system—and beginning the assimilation of the Guam Chamorros into the Japanese way of life, just as they had done with Northern Marianas Chamorros. Guam’s public works systems had been constructed by US Navy contractors and were being operated by US Navy military personnel and Chamorro civilian personnel. The obvious solution was to replace the US navy operators with Japanese operators and bring loyal Chamorro-Japanese from the NMI to translate for the Guam Chamorro civilians until they could learn Japanese.
    The Chamorros on Saipan, Tinian and Rota who were chosen for these jobs had worked their way up the Japanese civil service ladder to become technicians and police officers since 1914. They had been born and raised during the Japanese administration and wore their uniforms proudly. Because of the lack of private economic development on Guam, many Guamanians had moved to the Northern Marianas after 1922 to take advantage of the bustling Japanese economy there. The Japanese tried to convince the Chamorros that they were better off with the Japanese and predicted that the Americans would never fight for Asia.
    In 1936, the US Congress adopted the Philippine Independence Bill, granting independence to the Territory of the Philippines 10 years hence. Following this legislation, the US made little or no effort to develop Guam. Meanwhile the Chamorros in the north were enjoying a much higher standard of living than their counterparts on Guam. Japanese administrators in the Northern Marianas again tried to convince the Chamorros that the Americans would eventually abandon the Marianas. By all outward appearances, the Japanese could demonstrate that they had done a better job of managing the Northern Mariana Islands than the US Navy had done managing Guam. It is no wonder then that when the Chamorro Police from the NMI arrived on Guam, they encouraged their Guam counterparts that it was best to learn how to deal with the Japanese, rather than resist assimilation.
    The vast majority of NMI Chamorros who were sent to Guam to work for the Japanese administration were not police officers. Chamorro police were, in fact, only a small handful of the total. The larger number were civil service employees or employees of the Nippon Kokan K. K. (NKK), the company contracted to manage public utilities and economic development. Many of these northern Marianas Chamorros had relatives on Guam. Many were very sympathetic with the Guam Chamorros, providing them with secret information and food.
    Yet, it is true that some of the NMI translators, particularly zealous police officers, informed on loyal Chamorro-Americans who were hiding flags or radios. Some Guam Chamorros were executed. Many were beaten. Even at the time of the reunification plebiscite in 1969, twenty-four years after war’s end, many bitter feelings remained. It was undoubtedly a factor in the final vote. (On a similar note, today’s Northern Marianas Chamorro tell stories about how some Guam Chamorros betrayed their roots and “sold their souls” to the Spanish conquest for blood money and prestige, particularly during the last stand at Aguiguan in 1695.)
    Operation Forager, the Campaign for the Mariana Islands in June and August 1944, equally destroyed Saipan, Tinian, Rota and Guam. Out of the ashes, the US Navy reestablished its naval base in Apra Harbor and established advance naval and air bases on Saipan and Tinian. Guam returned to its prewar status as a US Territory, and the Guam Chamorros began campaigning for self-government and US citizenship. The Chamorros on Saipan began learning the English language, the principles of American democracy, and the workings of modern self-government. The American military established a rudimentary local government in Saipan, via elections.
    After the battle ended, the people of the Northern Marianas were amazed at the massive military buildup on Tinian and Saipan. They thought the Japanese had been economically powerful, but the Seabee construction followed by the US Army-Air Force buildup was awe-inspiring. And, much to their relief, the Americans were not the animals portrayed by the Japanese, but some were rather hospitable and generous, especially after the Japanese defeat in September 1945.
    Postwar years, political status and citizenship

    No sooner was the war over than the debate began over what would happen to the island captured from Japan. The US military had no doubt about their position: “Those islands belonged to the Japanese before the war and as we captured them they belong to us.” However, the late president Franklin D. Roosevelt had made a pledge to decolonization and self-determination in the Atlantic Charter, which both he and Bristish Prime Minister Winston Churchill had signed in August 1941, before America even entered the war.
    After Roosevelt died on 12 April 1945, President Harry Truman stood by the late president’s pledge and, despite the Department of Defense’s opposition, on 18 July 1947, he placed the former Japanese Mandated Islands (Micronesia) into the United Nations trusteeship system, to be administered by the US. In signing the trusteeship agreement, the US recognized that the people of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) had an inherent right to sovereignty, which could only be changed by the free choice of the people of the islands, not through unilateral action by an outside power. The people of Micronesia, including the people of the Northern Mariana Islands, were guaranteed the right to decide on their own what form of government they wanted. They would be able to decide if they wanted to be independent or if they wanted to be associated with another independent country, such as the United States.
    At the time, Chamorros from Guam and the Northern Marianas had some liberty to move between the islands, to choose where they wanted to live. Many moved to Guam, Hawaii, Fiji or elsewhere for education or on-the-job training. They became fluent in English and liked the things Americans enjoyed. They learned about the American form of government and the economy it helped produce. They saw the opportunity to go to school, live, and work in the US. As a result, more people in the Northern Marianas began to think about the possibility of reunifying the Marianas.
    They watched closely as the Guam Congress reopened and petitioned the US Congress for an Organic Act. This would give Guam Chamorros limited US citizenship and self-government. In 1949 the civil affairs administrator for Saipan took the members of the Saipan High Council to Guam to study the activities of the Guam Congress. Upon their return they established a new Saipan Congress, in which the old unicameral High Council became the upper house of a bicameral legislature. Herein, the people of the Northern Marianas began to discuss the political status developments on Guam. Their interest in US citizenship and self-government were heightened when, on 1 August 1950, President Truman signed the Organic Act of Guam into law.
    By the Organic Act, all federal income taxes paid by residents of Guam were returned to the Government of Guam for operations. This, along with other federal programs, brought about significant progress in the economic and social development of Guam. Residents of Guam could move to the mainland US to seek education or employment. Most importantly, the Organic Act gave the people of Guam US citizenship and limited self-government. The new Guam Legislature, a unicameral body, replaced the old Guam Congress. The Guam Legislature made the laws for Guam, although the governor of Guam, who was appointed by the president of the United States, could veto laws. Despite the limitations, most residents of the Northern Marianas saw this as a great step forward for Guam.
    Many people of the Northern Marianas, who had gone to live on Guam, also became US citizens at that time. However, because they were US citizens, they were not allowed to return to their families in the Northern Marianas, unless they renounced their US citizenship and became naturalized trust territory citizens. Those Guam Chamorros who had moved to the Northern Marianas also were not allowed to become US citizens when they tried to return to Guam. The only way to rectify the problem was to have the same political status as Guam—to become US citizens.
    It is not surprising, therefore, that the first official statement on political status from the Northern Marianas was a 1950 joint petition from the Saipan House of Council and the House of Commissioners to the first United Nations Visiting Mission. It requested that the Northern Marianas be incorporated into the United States either as a possession or a territory, and that its people be given US citizenship. However, the members of the Visiting Mission advised the people of Saipan that they could not make a political status decision separately from the rest of the TTPI.
    The TTPI had been created as one political unit by the US and the United Nations Trusteeship Council. Rules and regulations were organized to serve the same purposes in all Micronesian islands, regardless of population or location, language or culture. There was concern that if Micronesia fractured into a hundred little countries, each would want an equal vote in the United Nations. In light of these factors, no one outside of Micronesia paid much attention to the reunification effort in the Northern Marianas for another decade. Thus, the creation of the TTPI forced the Northern Mariana islanders to associate politically with the rest of the TTPI.
    The people of the Northern Marianas were not asked if they wanted to be a part of the TTPI. They had never been asked to be part of Spanish Micronesia, German Micronesia or Japanese Micronesia. Nonetheless, the Northern Mariana Islands and the rest of Micronesia were lumped together as the TTPI, without the people of Micronesia having any say in the matter. The people of the Northern Marianas were politically isolated from the people of Guam by a foreign decision outside of their control.
    The question of Marianas reunification

    After 1950, the people of the US territory of Guam steadily advanced in their political and economic development. The people of the Northern Mariana Islands district of the TTPI, however, began to lag behind. The US Navy was building up Guam, while most US military personnel left Saipan and Tinian, other than the navy administrators. The Northern Marianas faced a depressed economy and a dim outlook for the future. When the second UN visiting mission arrived on Saipan on 11 March 1953, they received a petition requesting the physical restoration of war-damaged property, compensation for the occupation of private property from 10 July 1944 to 30 June 1949, and an organic act for the TTPI. However, the other districts of the TTPI were not ready to make a political status decision, and the visiting mission rejected the petition.
    In the aftermath of the Popular Party victory in 1957 in both Guam and the Northern Marianas, an unofficial poll on reunification was conducted. The people of Saipan voted 63.8 percent in favor of reunification. The Guam Legislature then adopted Resolution No. 367 requesting the US Congress to incorporate the Northern Marianas within the governmental framework of the territory of Guam. It was adopted on 8 July 1958, and was transmitted to the Northern Marianas and to Washington, DC, on July 23. It read in part:
    “WHEREAS despite this unfortunate and perhaps accidental division of one race, the people of the Marianas have never lost hope that a day will come when all the Chamorros once again will be reunited within a homogenous political and economic union under one governmental administration.”
    A report by the Saipan Committee on Reunification was published on 5 May 1959. A resolution was then passed by the Saipan Municipal Congress inviting the members of the Guam Legislature to Saipan for a meeting on reunification. From 11 to 14 September 1959, members of the Guam Legislature met with members of the Saipan Congress in Saipan’s Congressional Hall. Speaker Olympio T. Borja of the Saipan Congress and Senator James T. Sablan, chairman of the 5th Guam Legislature’s Select Committee on the Saipan Mission, conducted the meetings. Most of the members of the Saipan Congress were in favor of reunification. On 25 September 1959, the Saipan Congress forwarded Resolution No. 7, modeled after Guam’s Resolution 367, to the United Nations. The resolution requested incorporation of the Mariana Islands within the framework of the US territory of Guam.
    Richard Barrett Lowe, the presidentially appointed governor of Guam at the time, wrote to Anthony T. Lausi, director of the Office of Territories, about the resolutions. Lowe advised Lausi that the Department of the Interior should take the position that it had no objection to discussions about an eventual reunification of the Marianas. It was Governor Lowe’s opinion that “if and when the Cold War ends, the ultimate reunification of these islands not only will be advisable, but probably inevitable.”
    With a special UN visiting mission scheduled for 1961, an unofficial poll on political status was conducted on Saipan and Tinian on 5 February 1961. Of the 2,847 registered voters, 2,404 cast their ballots. Rota could not participate because at that time it was a separate district of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Registered voters could pick one of three different political status choices. The results of that poll were as follows:

    1. Do you desire to become US citizens within the political framework of the government of Guam? (Saipan 1,557 ; Tinian 85)
    2. Do you desire to become US citizens by becoming a separate territory of the United States? (Saipan 818; Tinian 57)
    3. Do you want to remain in the same status? (Saipan 21; Tinian 6)

    The poll showed that the voters were overwhelmingly in favor of gaining US citizenship and some form of permanent affiliation with the US. A significant number wanted a status similar to but separate from Guam. These results were given to the 1961 visiting mission when it arrived. The Carolinian community, however, submitted a resolution in opposition to reunification. Neither position had any effect on the members of the UN mission when they arrived. The mission indicated that certain conditions would have to be met before the Marianas people could join the US: they would have to achieve a greater degree of self-government and economic self-sufficiency, and all the people of Micronesia would have to be ready to choose their political status.
    “The Trusteeship Agreement treats the Trust Territory as one single Territory and there is no likelihood of the United Nations considering at the present time any proposal which looks like a premature effort aimed at ‘cessation’ or ‘partition’.”
    In essence, they told the people of the Northern Marianas that they should begin working with the other Micronesians toward a joint resolution of political status issues.
    Except for Rota, the islands of the Northern Marianas had been under US naval administration since 1953. They were transferred back to the Department of the Interior on 1 July 1962. The Charter of the Mariana Islands District Legislature was adopted on 21 December 1962. During the election for the new Marianas District Legislature, the Popular Party again made reintegration an issue, winning seven of the eleven seats available for Saipan. They proposed that the Northern Marianas be reunited with Guam.
    On 30 July 1963, the Saipan Municipal Congress adopted a resolution supporting a previous resolution calling for the political reintegration of the Mariana Islands and Guam. In October 1963 another unofficial plebiscite was conducted, and again, the people voted for reunification. The results were presented to the 1964 UN visiting mission. Not unexpectedly, the mission’s report stated that secession, or separation, was not possible under the trusteeship agreement: “Both the Trusteeship Council and the Administering Authority have made this point clear to the people of Saipan and the question should be regarded as firmly settled,” the report said.
    Members of the Guam Legislature visited with the Marianas District Legislature in February 1966 to once again discuss the possibility of reunification. Carlos P. Taitano, speaker of the 8th Guam Legislature, felt that it was important for Guam and the Northern Marianas to reassert their position in favor of reunification. He and other political leaders on Guam wanted the island to become a state of the United States. They felt their chances were better if they had a bigger population and a bigger land area. Reunifying the Marianas would help their cause. Subsequently, the Guam Legislature adopted Resolution No. 177, requesting that the president of the United States reintegrate the Mariana Islands. This resolution was taken to Washington, DC, where they were rejected by both State and Interior representatives.
    The issue then was presented to the 1967 UN visiting mission, which concluded that any integration of the Northern Marianas with Guam “cannot be contemplated so long as Micronesia remains a trust Territory.”
    On 19 January 1968, the Second Mariana Islands District Legislature adopted a resolution requesting that the US congressional visiting team urge US citizenship for the inhabitants of the Northern Mariana Islands and reunification of the Marianas. Economically and culturally, a reunified Northern Marianas and Guam would help improve the standards of living for the people of the Northern Mariana Islands.
    In 1968 the Pacific Conference of Legislators was organized in favor of reintegration. Vicente Santos, president of the Marianas District Legislature, was also head of the Pacific Conference of Legislators. Membership in this conference was offered to members of all the legislative bodies in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. The conference hoped to promote a dialogue in support of reintegration of Guam and the Northern Marianas, or Guam and the TTPI. It was an opportunity for leaders from the 10th Guam Legislature under Speaker Joaquin C. Arriola and the Northern Marianas District Legislature to get together and discuss a common political status goal. At the time, the Democrats (formerly the Popular Party) were in control of the 10th Guam Legislature as well as the Mariana Islands District Legislature. Most of these legislators felt that it was in the best interest of all the people to reintegrate the Marianas.
    In August 1969, an organization called Leaders of Guam and Marianas Reintegration Conference was formed in Saipan. Guam Senator William D. L. Flores was named chairman of the special committee on reintegration. Other members of the committee included Senators George Bamba, James T. Sablan, Joaquin Perez, Florencio Ramirez, Leonardo Paulino, Richard F. Taitano, and Manuel Lujan. The committee was to study the question of reintegration, report their findings to the people of Guam, and conduct public hearings in all the villages of Guam.
    Members of the Marianas Reunification Committee from the Northern Marianas worked with the Guam committee. Vicente Santos, Leon T. Camacho, Herman Q. Guerrero, Daniel T. Muna, Francisco M. Diaz, Antonio R. Camacho, Felipe Q. Atalig, and Bernard V. Hofschneider were among the Northern Marianas leaders.
    With another UN visiting mission expected to arrive in the TTPI in early 1970, the two organizations decided to conduct a joint referendum on reintegration in November, only two months away.
    The committee, in its report to the people of Guam, said the principal motivations of the push for reintegration were political, economic, social, and cultural. The members wanted eventual statehood for Guam. If Guam was expanded to include the Marianas, even the rest of the trust territory, statehood could be achieved much more quickly. A reunified Marianas Islands would also provide greater opportunities for investment, particularly in the tourism industry. The standard of living would be improved. The cultural unity of the Chamorros would be reestablished.
    Hurried public hearings were conducted in all the villages of Guam in October 1969. The members of the Guam Legislature’s select committee on reintegration tried to convince the public that reintegration was in Guam’s best interest. At most of these meetings the reaction from the public was favorable. Members of the committee were predicting that the people of Guam would vote in favor of reintegration. If both Guam and the Northern Marianas voted in favor of reintegration, as they expected, the island’s leaders would petition the UN and the US Congress for the separation of the Northern Marianas from the TTPI and reintegration with the US Territory of the Marianas.
    The people of Guam voted in a special election conducted on 4 November 1969. The question put to the voters was: “Should all of the islands of the Marianas be politically reintegrated within the framework of the American Territory of Guam, such as a new territory to be known as the Territory of the Marianas?” Voters marked either “Yes” or “No.” The turnout for the election, however, was very low. Only 32 percent of the 20,000 registered voters actually cast ballots. There were 3,720 “No” votes and 2,688 “Yes” votes.
    Reintegration rejected by Guam

    Several theories were offered as to why the Guam voters rejected reintegration. One reason given for the poor turnout was that there were no candidates for election, and thus no aggressive drive to get out the vote. Another reason may have been the poor political education process that occurred on Guam. Public hearings were conducted for only one month. Had they begun earlier, more people may have felt more confident about going to the polls. Another reason was that many Guamanians had not forgotten the pro-Japanese actions of a few of the Northern Marianas Chamorro translators and police officers employed by the Japanese. Other Guamanians simply felt that Guam’s money would be diverted to the undeveloped Northern Marianas. Guam did not want to accept the burden of developing the Northern Mariana Islands. Guam at the time was having serious difficulties with its utilities and school system. Some Guamanians were also concerned with protecting their jobs. The wage scale in the Northern Marianas was much lower than that on Guam. The Guamanians feared that Northern Marianas residents might move to Guam to get better paying jobs.
    Perhaps, however, the major factor influencing the outcome of the plebiscite was the upcoming 1970 election on Guam. This was to be the island’s first election for governor. The Popular Party, which had dominated politics on Guam since the Organic Act, split three ways. The frontrunner was Speaker of the 10th Guam Legislature Joaquin C. Arriola and running mate Vicente Bamba, a retired judge and popular former senator, who favored reunification. Another team was formed by Senator Ricardo J. Bordallo and Senator Richard F. Taitano, and another by former governor Manuel F. L. Guerreroand his running mate Dr. Antonio C. Yamashita. Although the Bordallo/Taitano team did not openly oppose reunification, a whisper campaign was launched that “a vote for reintegration was a vote for Arriola.” Their supporters were told that if they were really sure about reunification, just do not vote at all. That is why the turnout was so low.
    Chamorros in the Northern Mariana Islands were very upset by “the Guam rejection.” They had read positive reports in the Guam Daily News about the possibility of a favorable vote. The low voter turnout and the rejection caused many to give up on reunification.
    Despite Guam’s rejection, a majority of people in the Northern Marianas still wanted to support reunification at the polls. There were strong hopes among supporters that the Marianas might someday become a state, just like Hawai`i. They felt that reunification would result in a significant increase in economic development. On 9 November 1969, a week after the Guam rejection, the citizens of the Northern Marianas voted strongly in favor of integration. Of the 4,954 registered voters, 3,233 voted in the plebiscite, 65 percent, twice that on Guam. Reintegration received 1,942 votes; freely associated state 1,116; independence 19; unincorporated territory of US 107. There was 1 vote for integration with the US; 5 votes for remaining a trusteeship; 1 vote for unincorporated territory of Japan; 1 vote for integration with Japan; and 40 invalid votes. Ironically, a single write-in vote was cast for commonwealth status. The strong support for the freely associated state came from the Territorial Party, and particularly, from the Carolinian community. The Northern Marianas Carolinians wanted to strengthen their ties with the other Carolinians of Micronesia.
    The results of the Guam vote dampened the efforts of the Popular Party to achieve reunification. But other developments had been taking place in the trust territory that would ultimately lead the Northern Mariana Islands down the path to commonwealth. In the final analysis, the Guam rejection turned out to be in the best interest of the Northern Mariana Islands. Because of that rejection, the leadership of the Northern Marianas fought on for their own unique political status that would include a close affiliation with the United States and US citizenship.
    Northern Marianas quest for self-determination

    The Congress of Micronesia (the bicameral legislative body for the TTPI) created a political status commission, responsible for studying the political status options available to the people of the TTPI and make recommendations. The Northern Marianas District was ably represented in both houses and on the political status commission. The joint commission recommended independence. However, for the Northern Mariana Islands, independence was exactly the opposite of what they wanted. The great majority of Northern Marianas residents wanted a permanent alliance with the United States and US citizenship. Once again, the Mariana Islands District Legislature adopted a resolution, informing the Congress of Micronesia of its position in favor of integration with Guam.
    Talk of independence among the majority of Trust Territory leaders sparked the US Joint Chiefs of Staff to advise the Secretary of Defense in October 1968 that the strategic value of the central Pacific Ocean had not changed, especially in light of the potential need to redeploy American forces to Guam or the TTPI because of the Vietnam War. The Congress of Micronesia Future Political Status Commission met again in July 1969 and “flatly rejected” unincorporated territorial status and adopted a position in favor of free association, which they officially submitted to the Congress of Micronesia. However, the Northern Marianas delegation was able to incorporate in the report that the Congress of Micronesia did not oppose separate negotiations between the US and the Northern Mariana Islands.
    In 1971, the Marianas Islands District Legislature and the Congress of Micronesia held simultaneous sessions on Saipan. On February 1, Vicente N. Santos, president of the Legislature, delivered a speech urging that Japanese investors be allowed to begin joint-venture projects in the Marianas. Francisco C. Ada, district administrator, reaffirmed that “a substantial majority of our people are in favor of a closer, permanent affiliation with the United States of America.” These speeches were timed to coincide with the opening session of the Congress of Micronesia on Saipan.
    On March 13, Nixon formally appointed Ambassador Franklin Haydn Williams as his Personal Representative to the Micronesian political status negotiations. The meetings were held 4 to 12 October 1971 in Hana, Maui. During the Hana meetings, the Department of Defense (DoD) revealed its land requirements for Guam and the TTPI. Secretary Melvin Laird advised Williams that the strategic interests of the US were to implement “defense-in-depth” in the western Pacific; carry out treaty commitments; defend lines of communication through the central Pacific; and maintain “a credible nuclear and conventional deterrent to armed aggression” against the US, its allies, and countries considered vital to its security. This was based on political realties in the Trust Territory, the importance of land in the Micronesian culture, the possibility of joint-service basing in order to prevent duplications, and the relative economic value of the land to the Micronesians.
    The DoD only needed land in the Marshalls, Palau and the Marianas. In the Marianas, DoD was interested in a multi-service base on Tinian. They wanted the whole island, but would settled for the northern part and joint-use of the harbor.
    On 12 April 1972, Ambassador Williams formally announced,
    “that my Government is willing to respond affirmatively to the request that has been formally presented to us today to enter into separate negotiations with the representatives of the Marianas in order to satisfy a desire which the Joint Committee has already recognized.”
    The Marianas District Legislature created the Northern Marianas Political Status Commission in May 1972. The law authorized the Commission to negotiate with the US, perform public education, hire consultants, study alternative forms of democratic internal government, and make periodic reports. The Commission’s appointed members were authorized a total budget of only US$25,000, all from local taxes, to perform all these duties. The Commission held its first meeting on 7 September 1972. The first plenary session of the Marianas political status negotiations opened on 13 December 1972 in Saipan.
    When the US-NMI joint communiqué was published, revealing the preliminary agreements with the Northern Marianas on the issues of mutual consent, a locally drafted constitution, and assurances about maximum local self-government, Guam Senator Paul M. Calvo expressed concern that Guam was not involved in the negotiations. He announced his intention to visit Washington, DC, to register his complaint. Joe Murphy, editor of the Pacific Daily News, wrote that the Northern Marianas was getting a far better deal than what Guam had. He also thought that many in the US Congress would object to establishing two separate governments in the small Mariana Islands.
    In May 1973, the Guam Legislature created a nine-member Political Status Commission, which was approved by Governor Carlos G. Camacho. The six-member Democrat majority chose Senator Frank G. Lujan to chair the committee, which was obligated to study and make recommendations on Guam’s future political status. Governor Camacho created his own advisory task force.
    To resolve the problem, Haydn Williams advised President Nixon that something had to be done to improve Guam’s political status. The Department of Defense agreed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff added their support on 20 July 1973. On September 12, the Under Secretaries Committee decided that “a study of US national objectives, policies, and programs in Guam be undertaken to identify a prospective course of action by which US interests may most effectively be fostered.” The “Guam study” was supposed to be completed by 17 December 1973.
    Meanwhile, Guam Delegate Antonio B. Won Pat introduced a resolution into the US House of Representatives stating that Guam also had a right to choose its own political status, and requested President Nixon to create a special commission to work with the Guam Political Status Commission. According to Won Pat’s unofficial polling, 86.2 percent of the people interview believed in reunification. US Congressman Phil Burton reassured Won Pat that they would get to the Guam question as soon as the Northern Marianas issue was resolved. Burton met with the Guam Legislature, which now asked for assistance reunifying with the Northern Marianas. Burton told them it was up to them to take the initiative.
    In October 1973, Secretary of the Interior Rogers Morton asked Governor Camacho to send two or three representatives to Washington, DC, to discuss federal-territorial relations. Lt. Governor Kurt Moylan would lead the group to Washington to meet with Stanley Carpenter, chairman of the interagency working group preparing the Guam study on November 8. Moylan convinced Carpenter to bring a delegation from the Department of the Interior to Guam to meet with the governor, the Guam Legislature and the media.
    As scheduled, the interagency group met on December 17 to consider Phase I of the Guam study. Then, on 31 January 1974, Won Pat complained to Congress that the NMI was getting a better political status than Guam. Northern Marianas lawyers in Washington subsequently met with Won Pat’s staff and assured them that whatever was being created for the NMI could surely apply to Guam. The Northern Marianas negotiators were concerned that if Guam made a loud enough complaint, some members of Congress might be convinced to insist that NMI’s political status should be put on hold until Guam’s political status was resolved.
    Joe Murphy opined:
    “Many of us living on Guam view the proceedings with mixed emotions. We naturally welcome the addition of the Northern Marianas to the American community, and feel that we have, perhaps, contributed something to the desire of the islanders to become a permanent part of America. We have developed a small guilt complex, however, about the negotiations. We feel that somehow through the lack of leadership on Guam, that Guam has missed the boat. We feel that the Mariana Islands really should be re-integrated, politically, although self-governing. We certainly can’t blame the people of the Northern Marianas for that. They tried, and it was Guam that dropped the ball.”
    Burton was impressed with the progress that had been made during the third round of negotiations and began to take a more aggressive role. While on Guam in January 1974, before arriving on Saipan, Burton had made frequent references to the future reunification of Guam and the Northern Marianas. He wanted to reassure his friend Won Pat that Guam would eventually benefit from the successful completion of the Northern Marianas negotiations. Burton, though, was blunt on certain issues. He stated flatly that there was no possibility of achieving a non-voting delegation in Congress for the new commonwealth.
    In August 1974, President Nixon resigned and was replaced by his vice-president, Gerald Ford. President Ford received the Guam study from the Under Secretaries Committee. They advised him that,
    “due to internal Guamanian political considerations, it was not possible at this time for the Governor [Camacho] to engage in talks related even tangentially to political status. This study has been conducted with limited consultation with the Guamanians, however. And further consultation is planned.”
    They also advised the new president that the US government,
    “in the near future is required to provide an improved political status for Guamanians and to address their economic and social aspirations—including further diversification of the economy.”
    Because the Northern Mariana status negotiations had already resulted in the promise of commonwealth for them, “the Guamanians are anxious about their own future,” and the committee stated that, “a decision on the status question is desirable in August.”
    On 23 December 1974, the National Security Council sent their analysis of the Guam study to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Kissinger advised President Ford that,
    “our essential need in our political relationship with Guam are control over Guam’s defenses and foreign affairs and continued military basing rights. To achieve this, we need a political framework that will continue Guam’s close relationship with the Federal Government, but that will keep the island’s growing political demands within manageable bounds.”
    On 9 December 1974, the Marianas political status negotiators were dealt a severe blow. The Department of Defense announced it would not build a base on Tinian. The prima fascia for the NMI negotiations became moot. Nonetheless, Haydn Williams and the Political Status Commission moved forward with the Covenant.
    On 1 February 1975, shortly before the last round of NMI negotiations, Kissinger directed the Under Secretaries Committee to:
    “seek agreement with Guamanian representatives on a commonwealth arrangement no less favorable than that which we are negotiating with the Northern Marianas. If, however, Guamanian representatives prefer a modified unincorporated Territorial status, we will be willing to accept such an arrangement.”
    In other words, the door for Guam to achieve its desired political status was opened. However, Kissinger decided that,
    “the Assistant Secretary of Interior for Program Developments and Budget should develop and implement a negotiating approach that will give effect to the above instructions, and should organize a US negotiating team that will include representation from the Departments of State and Defense as well as the Department of the Interior.”
    In a meeting with Williams on Guam in early February, before the last round of negotiations on Saipan, newly elected Governor Ricardo J. Bordallo told Williams that,
    “unification with Guam should have been the original goal of Marianas negotiations and that anything setting up a separate commonwealth in the Northern Marianas would make unification that much more difficult in his opinion.”
    The commonwealth covenant was signed by Haydn Williams for President Ford and by the NMI Political Status Commission for the people on 15 February 1975. It was unanimously approved by the Mariana Islands District Legislature five days later. Working with Ed Pangelinan and Pete A. Tenorio, the status commission conducted the popular plebiscite on 17 June 1975. Ninety-five percent of the registered voters cast ballots, and the covenant was approved by 78.8 percent of the people voting.
    In June, following on the heels of the favorable vote on Commonwealth for the Northern Marianas, and with Phil Burton’s full support, Delegate Won Pat introduced a joint resolution into the US Congress, providing Guam with the opportunity to create a constitution that would “supersede such provisions of the Organic Act of Guam as may be inconsistent with such constitution,” once approved by the president.
    Governor Bordallo, however, decided to follow up on the Guam study. He shelved the work done by Frank Lujan’s committee on political status and created his own Special Commission on the Political Status of Guam. Senator Frank F. Blas was chosen to chair the commission, which included former lieutenant governor Kurt Moylan, Vice-chairman Pedro Sanchez, and Senators Tommy Tanaka, Ed Duenas, Carl Gutierrez, Frank Santos, and Benigno Palomo. Bordallo then wrote to President Ford on 2 August 1975, urging the president to appoint a representative (as Nixon had done for the NMI) to begin dialogues with Guam. The letter, however, went unanswered for 13 months.
    On 24 February 1976, the US Senate called for a floor vote on Joint Resolution 549, the proposed NMI Commonwealth Covenant. Passage of the Senate bill required only a simple majority. The final Senate vote on the covenant was 66 in favor and 23 opposed and 11 not voting, far beyond the 51 votes needed to approve the covenant.
    On 24 March 1976, surrounded by covenant supporters from the Marianas and Washington, DC, President Ford signed Public Law 94-241: 90 Stat. 263, approving the covenant. The Northern Marianas had exercised its right to self-determination and defined an agreement with the United States that would give it the maximum degree of self-government. Most importantly, it contained a “Mutual Consent” clause that gave the people an assurance of fair treatment should there be a need for either side to change a fundamental part of the agreement at some time in the future.
    Guam’s political status?

    Dialogues in DC relative to Guam’s political status dragged until July 1977, the end of the Ford administration, and suggested that the issue “will be referred to those in the next Administration who will be responsible for overseeing the negotiations on the Guam-Federal relationship.” One can only speculate on what the current political status of the Marianas might be, had the Department of the Interior acted aggressively on President Ford’s Guam study. Although Guam did create a constitution during a constitutional convention under the leadership of Senator Carl Gutierrez, it failed to receive public approval because of outstanding issues that had not been resolved with the federal government.
    In 1980, Bordallo created a Commission on Self-Determination (CSD), chaired by Professor Robert Rogers. According to Rogers, Bordallo’s goal was to establish a commonwealth status for Guam, similar to that achieved by the NMI, then attempt to merge the two commonwealths which might lead to statehood. Barely two years after its creation, the CSD organized a status referendum. On 12 January 1982, 49% of voters chose a closer relationship with the US via Commonwealth. Twenty-six percent voted Statehood, while 10 percent voted for the Status Quo (Unincorporated territory). A subsequent run-off referendum held between Commonwealth and Statehood saw 73% of Guam voters choosing Commonwealth over Statehood (27%).
    However, the draft Commonwealth Act which had been drawn up by the CSD since 1986 languished in Congress over the next decade and was never approved. The 24th Guam Legislature established the “Commission on Decolonization” in 1996 to enhance the CSD’s ongoing studies of various political status options and public education campaigns.
    Reunificiation considerations and the military buildup

    Today, there are sufficient reasons for Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands to consider joint dialogues. The Mariana Islands are the focus of President Barack Obama’s “Pivot to the Pacific.” What began with Nixon in 1969, and was continued by George W. Bush in 2006, is now in President Obama’s lap—base agreements in Okinawa.
    There was no further talk of a military buildup in the Marianas until 23 January 2006, when President George W. Bush signed an amended Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan. On 25 April 2006, the US announced its intention to relocate Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to the northern Okinawa city of Nago, and move 8,000 marines and their dependents to Guam. The new United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation was issued on May 1.
    The Roadmap led to the creation of JGPO, the Joint Guam Program Office. The Navy set forth a plan that would meet the mandate of the new US-Japan security alliance, primarily the movement of marines to Guam with training facilities on Tinian. The Secretary of the Navy issued his Record of Decision on 20 September 2010. Subsequently, the Senate Armed Forces Committee visited Hawai`i, Okinawa and the Marianas and stopped funding for that plan, until a larger plan for the “Pivot to the Pacific” had been completed.
    A new EIS was developed, this time by the US Marine Corps. Following Section 106 of the National Environmental Protection Act, Draft Environmental Impact Statements were issued for proposed actions within the territory of Guam, and another for the CNMI at Tinian and Pagan. Separate Memorandums of Understanding will be signed relative to the impact on historic sites in each territory. Separate Records of Decision also will have to be issued.
    Both plans must be approved by Congress, at least for funding. Because of the Covenant, the land acquisition in the NMI must be approved by Congress before funding for the plan can be entertained. The Marianas plan is set on a three legged table, with one leg on Guam and two in the NMI. Guam cannot provide the constant training that Marines must undergo to remain in a high state of readiness, should an unfriendly situation develop somewhere in our region. That training must take place in the NMI.
    Tinian acknowledges the legitimacy of the DoD lease on two-thirds of Tinian. Tinian, however, is not sufficient to meet all the Navy/USMC training requirements for amphibious assault operations. Pagan is the necessary third leg. The military buildup in the Marianas is not a Guam affair, therefore, any more than it is a Tinian or Pagan affair. It is a Marianas issue that must address the concerns of all stakeholders.
    Today, both Guam and the Commonwealth remain unincorporated territories. Although the NMI did exercise its right to self-determination, the mandate to establish a permanent political status for Guam still exists. The Guam study, or at least the principles it embodied, are still viable. It is certainly worth a professional study to create a joint Guam-NMI Commission to analyze the pros and cons of one Commonwealth and report their findings to the Guam and CNMI legislatures.
    Shall the Marianas ever be reunited?

    Some suggest that the time for reunification has passed. Some say the separate governments for Guam and the Northern Marianas have become institutionalized—that the political leaders on Guam and the NMI do not have it within them to make the sacrifices that would be required to create an elected government for all Mariana residents.
    However, many Guamanians point to the CNMI Covenant, with the protections provided to the people through its embedded concept of Mutual Consent as a significantly better political status than Guam’s unilateral Organic Act. Others suggest that the problems of having two separate governments within the Marianas is a foolish waste of money and aggravation. And many point to the military buildup in the Marianas as a reunifying factor. They say that having one bargaining group will get a better deal out of the Department of Defense than two different groups negotiating separately.
    One point is clear: after the war, the people of Guam fought for US citizenship and self-government with a unified passion. The people of the Northern Marianas fought for the same principles with the same passion. Times have changed. Both gained US citizenship and self-government, although the Northern Marianas acquired slightly more self-government than Guam. Both Guam and the CNMI have greatly improved their standards of living. Many, particularly the business community, seem satisfied with the status quo. They are indifferent to the indignity of “unincorporated” status, and that the Marianas are not on the road to the ultimate political status within the American system, which, in this writer’s opinion, is an incorporated Commonwealth of the Marianas, leaving the door open to Statehood.
    Regardless of emotional arguments for or against reunification, it seems the time for a comprehensive, scientific study of the economic and legal pros and cons of reunification is long overdue. What are the differences and similarities between the laws of Guam and the Northern Marianas and the economic impacts of both on our people? Should our two legislatures battle over competitive tax rates for investors? Should our two port authorities be charging each other for landing fees and counter space for the same airlines, and increasing the cost of inter-island transportation? Should there be separate border control stations, two separate US District Courts, two separate offices for all federal agencies in our two territories?
    It is time to create a joint commission on political status to study the financial and legal impacts of having two different governments for the same people, having more in common within their historical heritage than is different. Then, with some solid numbers in hand, perhaps it would be time to once again address the question: Shall the Mariana Islands be reunified?
    By Don Farrell
    For further reading

    Cabranes, José A. 1978. Citizenship and the American Empire: Notes on the Legislative History of the United States Citizenship of Puerto Ricans. New Haven: Yale University Press.
    Cogan, Doloris Coulter. 2008. We Fought the Navy and Won: Guam’s Quest for Democracy. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
    Dudden, A. 1992. The American Pacific, from the old China trade to the present. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Farrell, Don. 1981. The Americanization of Guam, 1898-1918. Hagåtña: Micronesian Productions.
    Farrell, Don. 1994. “The Partition of the Marianas: A Diplomatic History, 1898-1919.” ISLA: A Journal of Micronesian Studies, 2:2 (Dry Season), pp. 273-301.
    Freidel, Frank. 1958. The Splendid Little War. Boston: Little Brown.
    Gale: Roger W. 1979. The Americanization of Micronesia: A Study of the Consolidation of US Rule in the Pacific. Washington, DC: University Press of America.
    Garraty, J. 1953. Henry Cabot Lodge: A Biography. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
    Heine, Carl. 1974. Micronesia at the Crossroads: A Reappraisal of the Micronesian Political Dilemma. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
    Kissinger, Henry. 2011. On China. London: Penguin Books.
    Leibowitz, Arnold H. 1989. Defining Status: A Comprehensive Analysis of United States Territorial Relations. Amsterdam: Nartinus Nijhoff Publishers.
    Hofschneider, Penelope Bordallo. 2001. A Campaign for Political Rights on the Island of Guam; 1899-1950. Saipan: CNMI Division of Historic Preservation, Occasional Historical Papers Series No. 8.
    Meller, Norman. 1985. Constitutionalism in Micronesia.Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
    Meller, Norman. 1969. The Congress of Micronesia: Development of the Legislative Process in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
    Pomeroy, E. 1951. Pacific Outpost: American Strategy in Guam and Micronesia. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
    Rogers, Robert F. 1995. Destiny’s Landfall: A History of Guam.Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
    Treaty of Peace Between the United States and Spain Signed at Paris, December 10, 1898, accompanied by protocols and other papers (Senate Doc. No. 62, Part 1, 55th Cong., 3rd Session). (1898). Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
    Tuchman, Barbara W. 1984. The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
    Webb, James H., Jr. 1974. Micronesia and U.S. Pacific Strategy: A Blueprint for the 1980s. New York:Praeger Publishers.
    Willens, Howard P. and Deanne C. Siemer. 2000. National Security and Self-Determination: United States Policy in Micronesia, 1961-1972. Westport, Connecticut: Preager, 2000.
    Willens, Howard P. 2002. An Honorable Accord: The Covenant Between the Northern Mariana Islands and the United States.Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
    Willens, Howard P. with Dirk A. Ballendorf. 2004. The Secret Guam Study: How President Ford’s 1975 Approval of Commonwealth Was Blocked by Federal Officials.Micronesian Area Research Center and NMI Division of Historic Preservation.
    Wyttenbach, Richard H. 1971. Micronesia and Strategic Trusteeship: A Case Study in American Politico-Military Relations. PhD thesis. Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

    La Iglesia es el poder supremo en lo espiritual, como el Estado lo es en el temporal.

    Antonio Aparisi

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    Re: Capitanía General de Filipinas

    Libros antiguos y de colección en IberLibro
    History of Efforts to Reunify the Mariana Islands

    Senator Bordallo, 1964

    Governor Manuel Guerrero

    Antonio Won Pat

    Frank George Lujan

    Kurt Moylan

    Governor Carlos Camacho




    Editor’s note: Paper presented at the 2nd Marianas History Conference, 31 August 2013, University of Guam, Mangilao. Presented here with permission from the author, with some modifications by Guampedia for length.
    “A phenomenon noticeable throughout history regardless of place or period is the pursuit by governments of policies contrary to their own interests.”
    —Barbara Tuchman, 1984
    Barbara Tuchman’s point, made in her book The March of Folly, certainly applies to the United State’s decision to acquire only Guam out of the Marianas Archipelago as a result of the Spanish-American War of 1898.
    Partitioning the Mariana Islandsat the peace table in Versailles was undoubtedly one of America’s greatest foreign policy “Follies.” Despite the best advice from naval officers who had been in the region since Commodore Matthew C. Perry opened Japan in 1853, President William McKinley chose to give a portion of America’s spoils of war to a European nation that did not even participate in the war. The decision allowed Japan to capture the Northern Mariana Islands from Germany in 1914, and ultimately to choose war against the US in 1941. Today, the partition costs American taxpayers, in both the Marianas and the mainland, millions of dollars annually to maintain two separate territorial governments for essentially one people—not to mention the price of aggravations created over inter-island commerce and taxation. Significant efforts have been made to reunify the Marianas since that artificial line was drawn through the Rota Channel 115 years ago. Why have they failed? Is reunification still a viable political status option?
    Guam’s colonial history under Spain

    For 3,000 years before the European “Age of Exploration,” the indigenous Chamorro existed in the Mariana Archipelago as one people, with one language and one cultural heritage—the primary ingredients for nationhood. When Spanish explorer Miguel Legazpi visited Guam in 1565, he discovered no valuable exportable natural resources on Guam, but he did find a safe anchorage, food and water on the route to Cathay, China. Recognizing the strategic value of the Marianas, Legazpi claimed not only Guam, but the entire archipelago for Spain.
    The Spanish-Catholic reducción of the Marianas led to a drastic reduction in the Chamorro population and the temporary abandonment of the islands north of Rota. As a result of the Mexican War of Independence (1810 – 1821) and the end of the Manila Galleon trade, various Marianas governors suggested that the colony be abandoned. However, the Spanish Court decided to maintain a colony, simply to ensure that no other country could take it.
    With the rise of the whaling industry in the Pacific, both Guam and Saipan became ports of call for ships needing refitting and resupply. By the mid-1850s, international shipping companies established themselves in Hagåtña, providing regular and affordable transportation between Guam and the Northern Marianas. Guam Chamorros began moving to Saipan and Tinian. The governor of the Marianas and his administrators established representative government in Saipan, Tinian and Rota. They enacted one set of regulations and fees for all the commercial ports in the Marianas, and one tax code for all. Businessmen on both sides of the channel enjoyed inexpensive access to all the natural resources of the Marianas. Business grew and the standard of living improved.
    The partitioning of the Mariana Islands

    In 1898, after declaring war on Spain to free Cuba from “barbaric rule,” the American Navy overwhelmed the Spanish Navy in the Caribbean and quickly defeated Spanish troops in Cuba and Puerto Rico in what Secretary of State John Hay called a “Splendid Little War.”
    In the months that followed, the US Army captured Manila from Spanish forces. After the war, President McKinley and the Republican controlled Congress decided to acquire the Philippine Islands. Because ships of the day could not carry enough coal to steam from Hawaii to the Philippines, the Navy also captured—and Congress agreed to acquire—Guam with its natural deep water port of Apra Harbor as a coaling station.
    Why only Guam? The US had just acquired all the Hawaiian Islands by joint resolution, and now they were proposing to take all the Philippine archipelago. According to the historical record, they took only Guam from among the Marianas because they did not want to appear greedy.
    German representatives in Paris had made it clear to American representatives that if the US was not going to take the islands of Spanish Micronesia as a result of the war, then Germany would like to buy them from Spain. Spanish representatives told the American representatives that they were in fact negotiating a deal with the Spanish, depending on what the Americans demanded. When the Senate Foreign Relations committee met to hear the Treaty, Commander R. B. Bradford represented the US Navy. He recommended taking not only the Marianas, but all the Carolines as well. He used the annexation of Hawaii as an example:
    “Suppose we had but one, and the others were possessed of excellent harbors…[S]uppose also the others were in the hands of a commercial rival, with a different form of government and now over [ly] friendly. Under these circumstances we should lose all the advantages of isolation.”
    In other words, it was in the best interest of America to have a unified Marianas.
    Yet, knowing that Germany was interested in acquiring more tropical islands for their copra industry, and recognizing the German Kaiser’s need for prestige, McKinley and his senior advisors allowed Germany to complete its deal with Spain over the Caroline Islands. When Germany discovered the US was willing to give up the Northern Marianas as well, they paid Spain some US$4.2 million dollars for the lot.
    On 6 February 1899, the Senate voted in favor of ratification of the Treaty of Peace. Spain subsequently ceded Guam, Puerto Rico and the Philippines to the US. Germany proceeded with its acquisition of the Caroline and Mariana Islands.
    What to do with the new American territory of Guam?

    Up to this point in American history, all new territories added to the US had fallen under the principles established by the Land Ordinance of 1785 and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which stated that “colonies were but the extensions of the nation, entitled, not as a privilege but by right, to equality.” However, adding a group of distant islands to the US that were inhabited by non-Caucasian, non-English speaking, Catholics was another story. In a series of court cases heard in the US Supreme Court between 1901 and 1904, dubbed the Insular Cases, the new territories acquired from the Spanish-American War were deemed “unincorporated territories” as opposed to “incorporated territories.” The Supreme Court ruled that the US Constitution does not fully apply, and unincorporated territories were not destined for statehood. It also confirmed that the US Congress had plenipotentiary powers over these territories according to Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the US Constitution, commonly referred to as the Territorial Clause.
    Without the opportunity for statehood, there was no guarantee of citizenship. The Treaty of Paris only provided that the “political and civil rights of the native inhabitants will be determined by Congress.” The people of these territories could be ruled as subjects of the US indefinitely, even by the US Navy.
    The Mariana Islands and the Chamorro people were politically partitioned between the US Territory of Guam and the German Northern Mariana District. President McKinley designated a US naval officer to become Commander, Naval Station Guam, and Naval Governor of Guam. Captain Richard P. Leary arrived at Guam with two companies of US marines to establish and maintain order on Naval Station, Guam, which suddenly comprised not just a coaling station at Apra Harbor, but the entire island. Guam Chamorros began studying the English language and navy law, while the Northern Marianas Chamorros and Carolinians began studying the German language and German law.
    Chamorros under German, Japanese and US rule

    The lack-luster German administration of the Northern Marianas was cut short by World War I. When England declared war on Germany in 1914 and requested its ally Japan to use its navy against German shipping and military outposts in the Pacific, Japan saw an opportunity to vastly expand its Pacific empire at little cost. The Japanese Imperial Navy quickly captured not only the German naval base at Tsingtao, China (now Kiautschou Bay), but also the German Mariana and Caroline islands. All German citizens were gathered and deported to prisoner of war camps in Japan. The Northern Marianas Chamorros and Carolinians quickly found themselves studying the Japanese language and law.
    Suddenly, just as Commander Bradford had feared in 1898, a commercial rival had gained control of Micronesia in 1914, surrounding Guam and crossing America’s line of communications to the Philippines territory. All was not necessarily lost, however. Japan announced that its intentions were perfectly honorable and in keeping with its alliance with Great Britain. Japanese Prime Minister Count Shigenobu Okuma addressed a telegram to The Independent stating, as premier, that Japan had “no desire to secure more territory, no thought of depriving China or any other peoples of anything which they now possess.”
    In January 1918 the General Board of the US Navy recommended acquisitions in the Marshalls, Carolines, and Marianas:
    “The Marianas were of outstanding importance, because of their proximity to Japan and to the American island [Guam]. Their position in the immediate vicinity of Guam is capable of development into submarine bases within supporting distance of Japan, and, in the event of war, this would make their continued possession by that country a perpetual menace to Guam, and to any fleet operations undertaken for the relief of the Philippines.”
    At the end of the World War I, President Woodrow Wilson personally drafted the Versailles Peace Treaty, especially the section creating the League of Nations. However, because of partisan party politics, the Republican controlled US Senate, led by Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Henry Cabot Lodge, rejected the peace treaty. Therefore, the United States did not become a member of the League of Nations. When Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy subsequently kept their secret pledges to Japan in February 1919, the League awarded a Class C Mandate over German Micronesia to Japan—over President Wilson’s objections. As non-members, America had no voice in the League of Nations.
    The US Navy had been quite vociferous about the need to prevent Japan from taking the Marianas. But some important questions should be considered: Could the combined US Fleet have forced the issue? When the Senate failed to ratify the treaty, it had no obligation to the ill-fated organization. Could the same “gunboat diplomacy” wielded by Perry and Roosevelt have produced a split-mandate over Micronesia, with the US taking the Marianas and Japan the rest of German Micronesia? Did America’s failure to ratify the treaty and become a member of the League of Nations doom Japan and the US to a war for control of the Pacific? If the Marianas and Philippines had been fortified, might Japan have decided to choose war with Russia, their age-old enemy in Asia, rather than the US?
    As Bradford had feared in 1898 and the General Board in 1918, Japan eventually became less friendly. Japan walked out of the League of Nations in 1933 after a censure vote for their invasion of the Chinese province of Manchuria in 1931, and allowed the last of its treaties with the US to expire in 1936. The Japanese Navy established a base in the natural harbor at Tanapag, Saipan, with supporting airbases on the natural limestone plateaus at As Lito, Saipan, and Hagoi, Tinian. Then, on 8 December 1941, Japanese aircraft from Saipan strafed and bombed Guam in preparation for a December 10 invasion. Thus, Japan reunified the Marianas by force of arms, and the Guam Chamorros soon found themselves studying Japanese language, law and customs.
    Japanese naval planners anticipated the problems of establishing a government on Guam, including managing the island’s infrastructure—in particular the power plant, the water system and the communications system—and beginning the assimilation of the Guam Chamorros into the Japanese way of life, just as they had done with Northern Marianas Chamorros. Guam’s public works systems had been constructed by US Navy contractors and were being operated by US Navy military personnel and Chamorro civilian personnel. The obvious solution was to replace the US navy operators with Japanese operators and bring loyal Chamorro-Japanese from the NMI to translate for the Guam Chamorro civilians until they could learn Japanese.
    The Chamorros on Saipan, Tinian and Rota who were chosen for these jobs had worked their way up the Japanese civil service ladder to become technicians and police officers since 1914. They had been born and raised during the Japanese administration and wore their uniforms proudly. Because of the lack of private economic development on Guam, many Guamanians had moved to the Northern Marianas after 1922 to take advantage of the bustling Japanese economy there. The Japanese tried to convince the Chamorros that they were better off with the Japanese and predicted that the Americans would never fight for Asia.
    In 1936, the US Congress adopted the Philippine Independence Bill, granting independence to the Territory of the Philippines 10 years hence. Following this legislation, the US made little or no effort to develop Guam. Meanwhile the Chamorros in the north were enjoying a much higher standard of living than their counterparts on Guam. Japanese administrators in the Northern Marianas again tried to convince the Chamorros that the Americans would eventually abandon the Marianas. By all outward appearances, the Japanese could demonstrate that they had done a better job of managing the Northern Mariana Islands than the US Navy had done managing Guam. It is no wonder then that when the Chamorro Police from the NMI arrived on Guam, they encouraged their Guam counterparts that it was best to learn how to deal with the Japanese, rather than resist assimilation.
    The vast majority of NMI Chamorros who were sent to Guam to work for the Japanese administration were not police officers. Chamorro police were, in fact, only a small handful of the total. The larger number were civil service employees or employees of the Nippon Kokan K. K. (NKK), the company contracted to manage public utilities and economic development. Many of these northern Marianas Chamorros had relatives on Guam. Many were very sympathetic with the Guam Chamorros, providing them with secret information and food.
    Yet, it is true that some of the NMI translators, particularly zealous police officers, informed on loyal Chamorro-Americans who were hiding flags or radios. Some Guam Chamorros were executed. Many were beaten. Even at the time of the reunification plebiscite in 1969, twenty-four years after war’s end, many bitter feelings remained. It was undoubtedly a factor in the final vote. (On a similar note, today’s Northern Marianas Chamorro tell stories about how some Guam Chamorros betrayed their roots and “sold their souls” to the Spanish conquest for blood money and prestige, particularly during the last stand at Aguiguan in 1695.)
    Operation Forager, the Campaign for the Mariana Islands in June and August 1944, equally destroyed Saipan, Tinian, Rota and Guam. Out of the ashes, the US Navy reestablished its naval base in Apra Harbor and established advance naval and air bases on Saipan and Tinian. Guam returned to its prewar status as a US Territory, and the Guam Chamorros began campaigning for self-government and US citizenship. The Chamorros on Saipan began learning the English language, the principles of American democracy, and the workings of modern self-government. The American military established a rudimentary local government in Saipan, via elections.
    After the battle ended, the people of the Northern Marianas were amazed at the massive military buildup on Tinian and Saipan. They thought the Japanese had been economically powerful, but the Seabee construction followed by the US Army-Air Force buildup was awe-inspiring. And, much to their relief, the Americans were not the animals portrayed by the Japanese, but some were rather hospitable and generous, especially after the Japanese defeat in September 1945.
    Postwar years, political status and citizenship

    No sooner was the war over than the debate began over what would happen to the island captured from Japan. The US military had no doubt about their position: “Those islands belonged to the Japanese before the war and as we captured them they belong to us.” However, the late president Franklin D. Roosevelt had made a pledge to decolonization and self-determination in the Atlantic Charter, which both he and Bristish Prime Minister Winston Churchill had signed in August 1941, before America even entered the war.
    After Roosevelt died on 12 April 1945, President Harry Truman stood by the late president’s pledge and, despite the Department of Defense’s opposition, on 18 July 1947, he placed the former Japanese Mandated Islands (Micronesia) into the United Nations trusteeship system, to be administered by the US. In signing the trusteeship agreement, the US recognized that the people of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) had an inherent right to sovereignty, which could only be changed by the free choice of the people of the islands, not through unilateral action by an outside power. The people of Micronesia, including the people of the Northern Mariana Islands, were guaranteed the right to decide on their own what form of government they wanted. They would be able to decide if they wanted to be independent or if they wanted to be associated with another independent country, such as the United States.
    At the time, Chamorros from Guam and the Northern Marianas had some liberty to move between the islands, to choose where they wanted to live. Many moved to Guam, Hawaii, Fiji or elsewhere for education or on-the-job training. They became fluent in English and liked the things Americans enjoyed. They learned about the American form of government and the economy it helped produce. They saw the opportunity to go to school, live, and work in the US. As a result, more people in the Northern Marianas began to think about the possibility of reunifying the Marianas.
    They watched closely as the Guam Congress reopened and petitioned the US Congress for an Organic Act. This would give Guam Chamorros limited US citizenship and self-government. In 1949 the civil affairs administrator for Saipan took the members of the Saipan High Council to Guam to study the activities of the Guam Congress. Upon their return they established a new Saipan Congress, in which the old unicameral High Council became the upper house of a bicameral legislature. Herein, the people of the Northern Marianas began to discuss the political status developments on Guam. Their interest in US citizenship and self-government were heightened when, on 1 August 1950, President Truman signed the Organic Act of Guam into law.
    By the Organic Act, all federal income taxes paid by residents of Guam were returned to the Government of Guam for operations. This, along with other federal programs, brought about significant progress in the economic and social development of Guam. Residents of Guam could move to the mainland US to seek education or employment. Most importantly, the Organic Act gave the people of Guam US citizenship and limited self-government. The new Guam Legislature, a unicameral body, replaced the old Guam Congress. The Guam Legislature made the laws for Guam, although the governor of Guam, who was appointed by the president of the United States, could veto laws. Despite the limitations, most residents of the Northern Marianas saw this as a great step forward for Guam.
    Many people of the Northern Marianas, who had gone to live on Guam, also became US citizens at that time. However, because they were US citizens, they were not allowed to return to their families in the Northern Marianas, unless they renounced their US citizenship and became naturalized trust territory citizens. Those Guam Chamorros who had moved to the Northern Marianas also were not allowed to become US citizens when they tried to return to Guam. The only way to rectify the problem was to have the same political status as Guam—to become US citizens.
    It is not surprising, therefore, that the first official statement on political status from the Northern Marianas was a 1950 joint petition from the Saipan House of Council and the House of Commissioners to the first United Nations Visiting Mission. It requested that the Northern Marianas be incorporated into the United States either as a possession or a territory, and that its people be given US citizenship. However, the members of the Visiting Mission advised the people of Saipan that they could not make a political status decision separately from the rest of the TTPI.
    The TTPI had been created as one political unit by the US and the United Nations Trusteeship Council. Rules and regulations were organized to serve the same purposes in all Micronesian islands, regardless of population or location, language or culture. There was concern that if Micronesia fractured into a hundred little countries, each would want an equal vote in the United Nations. In light of these factors, no one outside of Micronesia paid much attention to the reunification effort in the Northern Marianas for another decade. Thus, the creation of the TTPI forced the Northern Mariana islanders to associate politically with the rest of the TTPI.
    The people of the Northern Marianas were not asked if they wanted to be a part of the TTPI. They had never been asked to be part of Spanish Micronesia, German Micronesia or Japanese Micronesia. Nonetheless, the Northern Mariana Islands and the rest of Micronesia were lumped together as the TTPI, without the people of Micronesia having any say in the matter. The people of the Northern Marianas were politically isolated from the people of Guam by a foreign decision outside of their control.
    The question of Marianas reunification

    After 1950, the people of the US territory of Guam steadily advanced in their political and economic development. The people of the Northern Mariana Islands district of the TTPI, however, began to lag behind. The US Navy was building up Guam, while most US military personnel left Saipan and Tinian, other than the navy administrators. The Northern Marianas faced a depressed economy and a dim outlook for the future. When the second UN visiting mission arrived on Saipan on 11 March 1953, they received a petition requesting the physical restoration of war-damaged property, compensation for the occupation of private property from 10 July 1944 to 30 June 1949, and an organic act for the TTPI. However, the other districts of the TTPI were not ready to make a political status decision, and the visiting mission rejected the petition.
    In the aftermath of the Popular Party victory in 1957 in both Guam and the Northern Marianas, an unofficial poll on reunification was conducted. The people of Saipan voted 63.8 percent in favor of reunification. The Guam Legislature then adopted Resolution No. 367 requesting the US Congress to incorporate the Northern Marianas within the governmental framework of the territory of Guam. It was adopted on 8 July 1958, and was transmitted to the Northern Marianas and to Washington, DC, on July 23. It read in part:
    “WHEREAS despite this unfortunate and perhaps accidental division of one race, the people of the Marianas have never lost hope that a day will come when all the Chamorros once again will be reunited within a homogenous political and economic union under one governmental administration.”
    A report by the Saipan Committee on Reunification was published on 5 May 1959. A resolution was then passed by the Saipan Municipal Congress inviting the members of the Guam Legislature to Saipan for a meeting on reunification. From 11 to 14 September 1959, members of the Guam Legislature met with members of the Saipan Congress in Saipan’s Congressional Hall. Speaker Olympio T. Borja of the Saipan Congress and Senator James T. Sablan, chairman of the 5th Guam Legislature’s Select Committee on the Saipan Mission, conducted the meetings. Most of the members of the Saipan Congress were in favor of reunification. On 25 September 1959, the Saipan Congress forwarded Resolution No. 7, modeled after Guam’s Resolution 367, to the United Nations. The resolution requested incorporation of the Mariana Islands within the framework of the US territory of Guam.
    Richard Barrett Lowe, the presidentially appointed governor of Guam at the time, wrote to Anthony T. Lausi, director of the Office of Territories, about the resolutions. Lowe advised Lausi that the Department of the Interior should take the position that it had no objection to discussions about an eventual reunification of the Marianas. It was Governor Lowe’s opinion that “if and when the Cold War ends, the ultimate reunification of these islands not only will be advisable, but probably inevitable.”
    With a special UN visiting mission scheduled for 1961, an unofficial poll on political status was conducted on Saipan and Tinian on 5 February 1961. Of the 2,847 registered voters, 2,404 cast their ballots. Rota could not participate because at that time it was a separate district of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Registered voters could pick one of three different political status choices. The results of that poll were as follows:

    1. Do you desire to become US citizens within the political framework of the government of Guam? (Saipan 1,557 ; Tinian 85)
    2. Do you desire to become US citizens by becoming a separate territory of the United States? (Saipan 818; Tinian 57)
    3. Do you want to remain in the same status? (Saipan 21; Tinian 6)

    The poll showed that the voters were overwhelmingly in favor of gaining US citizenship and some form of permanent affiliation with the US. A significant number wanted a status similar to but separate from Guam. These results were given to the 1961 visiting mission when it arrived. The Carolinian community, however, submitted a resolution in opposition to reunification. Neither position had any effect on the members of the UN mission when they arrived. The mission indicated that certain conditions would have to be met before the Marianas people could join the US: they would have to achieve a greater degree of self-government and economic self-sufficiency, and all the people of Micronesia would have to be ready to choose their political status.
    “The Trusteeship Agreement treats the Trust Territory as one single Territory and there is no likelihood of the United Nations considering at the present time any proposal which looks like a premature effort aimed at ‘cessation’ or ‘partition’.”
    In essence, they told the people of the Northern Marianas that they should begin working with the other Micronesians toward a joint resolution of political status issues.
    Except for Rota, the islands of the Northern Marianas had been under US naval administration since 1953. They were transferred back to the Department of the Interior on 1 July 1962. The Charter of the Mariana Islands District Legislature was adopted on 21 December 1962. During the election for the new Marianas District Legislature, the Popular Party again made reintegration an issue, winning seven of the eleven seats available for Saipan. They proposed that the Northern Marianas be reunited with Guam.
    On 30 July 1963, the Saipan Municipal Congress adopted a resolution supporting a previous resolution calling for the political reintegration of the Mariana Islands and Guam. In October 1963 another unofficial plebiscite was conducted, and again, the people voted for reunification. The results were presented to the 1964 UN visiting mission. Not unexpectedly, the mission’s report stated that secession, or separation, was not possible under the trusteeship agreement: “Both the Trusteeship Council and the Administering Authority have made this point clear to the people of Saipan and the question should be regarded as firmly settled,” the report said.
    Members of the Guam Legislature visited with the Marianas District Legislature in February 1966 to once again discuss the possibility of reunification. Carlos P. Taitano, speaker of the 8th Guam Legislature, felt that it was important for Guam and the Northern Marianas to reassert their position in favor of reunification. He and other political leaders on Guam wanted the island to become a state of the United States. They felt their chances were better if they had a bigger population and a bigger land area. Reunifying the Marianas would help their cause. Subsequently, the Guam Legislature adopted Resolution No. 177, requesting that the president of the United States reintegrate the Mariana Islands. This resolution was taken to Washington, DC, where they were rejected by both State and Interior representatives.
    The issue then was presented to the 1967 UN visiting mission, which concluded that any integration of the Northern Marianas with Guam “cannot be contemplated so long as Micronesia remains a trust Territory.”
    On 19 January 1968, the Second Mariana Islands District Legislature adopted a resolution requesting that the US congressional visiting team urge US citizenship for the inhabitants of the Northern Mariana Islands and reunification of the Marianas. Economically and culturally, a reunified Northern Marianas and Guam would help improve the standards of living for the people of the Northern Mariana Islands.
    In 1968 the Pacific Conference of Legislators was organized in favor of reintegration. Vicente Santos, president of the Marianas District Legislature, was also head of the Pacific Conference of Legislators. Membership in this conference was offered to members of all the legislative bodies in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. The conference hoped to promote a dialogue in support of reintegration of Guam and the Northern Marianas, or Guam and the TTPI. It was an opportunity for leaders from the 10th Guam Legislature under Speaker Joaquin C. Arriola and the Northern Marianas District Legislature to get together and discuss a common political status goal. At the time, the Democrats (formerly the Popular Party) were in control of the 10th Guam Legislature as well as the Mariana Islands District Legislature. Most of these legislators felt that it was in the best interest of all the people to reintegrate the Marianas.
    In August 1969, an organization called Leaders of Guam and Marianas Reintegration Conference was formed in Saipan. Guam Senator William D. L. Flores was named chairman of the special committee on reintegration. Other members of the committee included Senators George Bamba, James T. Sablan, Joaquin Perez, Florencio Ramirez, Leonardo Paulino, Richard F. Taitano, and Manuel Lujan. The committee was to study the question of reintegration, report their findings to the people of Guam, and conduct public hearings in all the villages of Guam.
    Members of the Marianas Reunification Committee from the Northern Marianas worked with the Guam committee. Vicente Santos, Leon T. Camacho, Herman Q. Guerrero, Daniel T. Muna, Francisco M. Diaz, Antonio R. Camacho, Felipe Q. Atalig, and Bernard V. Hofschneider were among the Northern Marianas leaders.
    With another UN visiting mission expected to arrive in the TTPI in early 1970, the two organizations decided to conduct a joint referendum on reintegration in November, only two months away.
    The committee, in its report to the people of Guam, said the principal motivations of the push for reintegration were political, economic, social, and cultural. The members wanted eventual statehood for Guam. If Guam was expanded to include the Marianas, even the rest of the trust territory, statehood could be achieved much more quickly. A reunified Marianas Islands would also provide greater opportunities for investment, particularly in the tourism industry. The standard of living would be improved. The cultural unity of the Chamorros would be reestablished.
    Hurried public hearings were conducted in all the villages of Guam in October 1969. The members of the Guam Legislature’s select committee on reintegration tried to convince the public that reintegration was in Guam’s best interest. At most of these meetings the reaction from the public was favorable. Members of the committee were predicting that the people of Guam would vote in favor of reintegration. If both Guam and the Northern Marianas voted in favor of reintegration, as they expected, the island’s leaders would petition the UN and the US Congress for the separation of the Northern Marianas from the TTPI and reintegration with the US Territory of the Marianas.
    The people of Guam voted in a special election conducted on 4 November 1969. The question put to the voters was: “Should all of the islands of the Marianas be politically reintegrated within the framework of the American Territory of Guam, such as a new territory to be known as the Territory of the Marianas?” Voters marked either “Yes” or “No.” The turnout for the election, however, was very low. Only 32 percent of the 20,000 registered voters actually cast ballots. There were 3,720 “No” votes and 2,688 “Yes” votes.
    Reintegration rejected by Guam

    Several theories were offered as to why the Guam voters rejected reintegration. One reason given for the poor turnout was that there were no candidates for election, and thus no aggressive drive to get out the vote. Another reason may have been the poor political education process that occurred on Guam. Public hearings were conducted for only one month. Had they begun earlier, more people may have felt more confident about going to the polls. Another reason was that many Guamanians had not forgotten the pro-Japanese actions of a few of the Northern Marianas Chamorro translators and police officers employed by the Japanese. Other Guamanians simply felt that Guam’s money would be diverted to the undeveloped Northern Marianas. Guam did not want to accept the burden of developing the Northern Mariana Islands. Guam at the time was having serious difficulties with its utilities and school system. Some Guamanians were also concerned with protecting their jobs. The wage scale in the Northern Marianas was much lower than that on Guam. The Guamanians feared that Northern Marianas residents might move to Guam to get better paying jobs.
    Perhaps, however, the major factor influencing the outcome of the plebiscite was the upcoming 1970 election on Guam. This was to be the island’s first election for governor. The Popular Party, which had dominated politics on Guam since the Organic Act, split three ways. The frontrunner was Speaker of the 10th Guam Legislature Joaquin C. Arriola and running mate Vicente Bamba, a retired judge and popular former senator, who favored reunification. Another team was formed by Senator Ricardo J. Bordallo and Senator Richard F. Taitano, and another by former governor Manuel F. L. Guerreroand his running mate Dr. Antonio C. Yamashita. Although the Bordallo/Taitano team did not openly oppose reunification, a whisper campaign was launched that “a vote for reintegration was a vote for Arriola.” Their supporters were told that if they were really sure about reunification, just do not vote at all. That is why the turnout was so low.
    Chamorros in the Northern Mariana Islands were very upset by “the Guam rejection.” They had read positive reports in the Guam Daily News about the possibility of a favorable vote. The low voter turnout and the rejection caused many to give up on reunification.
    Despite Guam’s rejection, a majority of people in the Northern Marianas still wanted to support reunification at the polls. There were strong hopes among supporters that the Marianas might someday become a state, just like Hawai`i. They felt that reunification would result in a significant increase in economic development. On 9 November 1969, a week after the Guam rejection, the citizens of the Northern Marianas voted strongly in favor of integration. Of the 4,954 registered voters, 3,233 voted in the plebiscite, 65 percent, twice that on Guam. Reintegration received 1,942 votes; freely associated state 1,116; independence 19; unincorporated territory of US 107. There was 1 vote for integration with the US; 5 votes for remaining a trusteeship; 1 vote for unincorporated territory of Japan; 1 vote for integration with Japan; and 40 invalid votes. Ironically, a single write-in vote was cast for commonwealth status. The strong support for the freely associated state came from the Territorial Party, and particularly, from the Carolinian community. The Northern Marianas Carolinians wanted to strengthen their ties with the other Carolinians of Micronesia.
    The results of the Guam vote dampened the efforts of the Popular Party to achieve reunification. But other developments had been taking place in the trust territory that would ultimately lead the Northern Mariana Islands down the path to commonwealth. In the final analysis, the Guam rejection turned out to be in the best interest of the Northern Mariana Islands. Because of that rejection, the leadership of the Northern Marianas fought on for their own unique political status that would include a close affiliation with the United States and US citizenship.
    Northern Marianas quest for self-determination

    The Congress of Micronesia (the bicameral legislative body for the TTPI) created a political status commission, responsible for studying the political status options available to the people of the TTPI and make recommendations. The Northern Marianas District was ably represented in both houses and on the political status commission. The joint commission recommended independence. However, for the Northern Mariana Islands, independence was exactly the opposite of what they wanted. The great majority of Northern Marianas residents wanted a permanent alliance with the United States and US citizenship. Once again, the Mariana Islands District Legislature adopted a resolution, informing the Congress of Micronesia of its position in favor of integration with Guam.
    Talk of independence among the majority of Trust Territory leaders sparked the US Joint Chiefs of Staff to advise the Secretary of Defense in October 1968 that the strategic value of the central Pacific Ocean had not changed, especially in light of the potential need to redeploy American forces to Guam or the TTPI because of the Vietnam War. The Congress of Micronesia Future Political Status Commission met again in July 1969 and “flatly rejected” unincorporated territorial status and adopted a position in favor of free association, which they officially submitted to the Congress of Micronesia. However, the Northern Marianas delegation was able to incorporate in the report that the Congress of Micronesia did not oppose separate negotiations between the US and the Northern Mariana Islands.
    In 1971, the Marianas Islands District Legislature and the Congress of Micronesia held simultaneous sessions on Saipan. On February 1, Vicente N. Santos, president of the Legislature, delivered a speech urging that Japanese investors be allowed to begin joint-venture projects in the Marianas. Francisco C. Ada, district administrator, reaffirmed that “a substantial majority of our people are in favor of a closer, permanent affiliation with the United States of America.” These speeches were timed to coincide with the opening session of the Congress of Micronesia on Saipan.
    On March 13, Nixon formally appointed Ambassador Franklin Haydn Williams as his Personal Representative to the Micronesian political status negotiations. The meetings were held 4 to 12 October 1971 in Hana, Maui. During the Hana meetings, the Department of Defense (DoD) revealed its land requirements for Guam and the TTPI. Secretary Melvin Laird advised Williams that the strategic interests of the US were to implement “defense-in-depth” in the western Pacific; carry out treaty commitments; defend lines of communication through the central Pacific; and maintain “a credible nuclear and conventional deterrent to armed aggression” against the US, its allies, and countries considered vital to its security. This was based on political realties in the Trust Territory, the importance of land in the Micronesian culture, the possibility of joint-service basing in order to prevent duplications, and the relative economic value of the land to the Micronesians.
    The DoD only needed land in the Marshalls, Palau and the Marianas. In the Marianas, DoD was interested in a multi-service base on Tinian. They wanted the whole island, but would settled for the northern part and joint-use of the harbor.
    On 12 April 1972, Ambassador Williams formally announced,
    “that my Government is willing to respond affirmatively to the request that has been formally presented to us today to enter into separate negotiations with the representatives of the Marianas in order to satisfy a desire which the Joint Committee has already recognized.”
    The Marianas District Legislature created the Northern Marianas Political Status Commission in May 1972. The law authorized the Commission to negotiate with the US, perform public education, hire consultants, study alternative forms of democratic internal government, and make periodic reports. The Commission’s appointed members were authorized a total budget of only US$25,000, all from local taxes, to perform all these duties. The Commission held its first meeting on 7 September 1972. The first plenary session of the Marianas political status negotiations opened on 13 December 1972 in Saipan.
    When the US-NMI joint communiqué was published, revealing the preliminary agreements with the Northern Marianas on the issues of mutual consent, a locally drafted constitution, and assurances about maximum local self-government, Guam Senator Paul M. Calvo expressed concern that Guam was not involved in the negotiations. He announced his intention to visit Washington, DC, to register his complaint. Joe Murphy, editor of the Pacific Daily News, wrote that the Northern Marianas was getting a far better deal than what Guam had. He also thought that many in the US Congress would object to establishing two separate governments in the small Mariana Islands.
    In May 1973, the Guam Legislature created a nine-member Political Status Commission, which was approved by Governor Carlos G. Camacho. The six-member Democrat majority chose Senator Frank G. Lujan to chair the committee, which was obligated to study and make recommendations on Guam’s future political status. Governor Camacho created his own advisory task force.
    To resolve the problem, Haydn Williams advised President Nixon that something had to be done to improve Guam’s political status. The Department of Defense agreed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff added their support on 20 July 1973. On September 12, the Under Secretaries Committee decided that “a study of US national objectives, policies, and programs in Guam be undertaken to identify a prospective course of action by which US interests may most effectively be fostered.” The “Guam study” was supposed to be completed by 17 December 1973.
    Meanwhile, Guam Delegate Antonio B. Won Pat introduced a resolution into the US House of Representatives stating that Guam also had a right to choose its own political status, and requested President Nixon to create a special commission to work with the Guam Political Status Commission. According to Won Pat’s unofficial polling, 86.2 percent of the people interview believed in reunification. US Congressman Phil Burton reassured Won Pat that they would get to the Guam question as soon as the Northern Marianas issue was resolved. Burton met with the Guam Legislature, which now asked for assistance reunifying with the Northern Marianas. Burton told them it was up to them to take the initiative.
    In October 1973, Secretary of the Interior Rogers Morton asked Governor Camacho to send two or three representatives to Washington, DC, to discuss federal-territorial relations. Lt. Governor Kurt Moylan would lead the group to Washington to meet with Stanley Carpenter, chairman of the interagency working group preparing the Guam study on November 8. Moylan convinced Carpenter to bring a delegation from the Department of the Interior to Guam to meet with the governor, the Guam Legislature and the media.
    As scheduled, the interagency group met on December 17 to consider Phase I of the Guam study. Then, on 31 January 1974, Won Pat complained to Congress that the NMI was getting a better political status than Guam. Northern Marianas lawyers in Washington subsequently met with Won Pat’s staff and assured them that whatever was being created for the NMI could surely apply to Guam. The Northern Marianas negotiators were concerned that if Guam made a loud enough complaint, some members of Congress might be convinced to insist that NMI’s political status should be put on hold until Guam’s political status was resolved.
    Joe Murphy opined:
    “Many of us living on Guam view the proceedings with mixed emotions. We naturally welcome the addition of the Northern Marianas to the American community, and feel that we have, perhaps, contributed something to the desire of the islanders to become a permanent part of America. We have developed a small guilt complex, however, about the negotiations. We feel that somehow through the lack of leadership on Guam, that Guam has missed the boat. We feel that the Mariana Islands really should be re-integrated, politically, although self-governing. We certainly can’t blame the people of the Northern Marianas for that. They tried, and it was Guam that dropped the ball.”
    Burton was impressed with the progress that had been made during the third round of negotiations and began to take a more aggressive role. While on Guam in January 1974, before arriving on Saipan, Burton had made frequent references to the future reunification of Guam and the Northern Marianas. He wanted to reassure his friend Won Pat that Guam would eventually benefit from the successful completion of the Northern Marianas negotiations. Burton, though, was blunt on certain issues. He stated flatly that there was no possibility of achieving a non-voting delegation in Congress for the new commonwealth.
    In August 1974, President Nixon resigned and was replaced by his vice-president, Gerald Ford. President Ford received the Guam study from the Under Secretaries Committee. They advised him that,
    “due to internal Guamanian political considerations, it was not possible at this time for the Governor [Camacho] to engage in talks related even tangentially to political status. This study has been conducted with limited consultation with the Guamanians, however. And further consultation is planned.”
    They also advised the new president that the US government,
    “in the near future is required to provide an improved political status for Guamanians and to address their economic and social aspirations—including further diversification of the economy.”
    Because the Northern Mariana status negotiations had already resulted in the promise of commonwealth for them, “the Guamanians are anxious about their own future,” and the committee stated that, “a decision on the status question is desirable in August.”
    On 23 December 1974, the National Security Council sent their analysis of the Guam study to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Kissinger advised President Ford that,
    “our essential need in our political relationship with Guam are control over Guam’s defenses and foreign affairs and continued military basing rights. To achieve this, we need a political framework that will continue Guam’s close relationship with the Federal Government, but that will keep the island’s growing political demands within manageable bounds.”
    On 9 December 1974, the Marianas political status negotiators were dealt a severe blow. The Department of Defense announced it would not build a base on Tinian. The prima fascia for the NMI negotiations became moot. Nonetheless, Haydn Williams and the Political Status Commission moved forward with the Covenant.
    On 1 February 1975, shortly before the last round of NMI negotiations, Kissinger directed the Under Secretaries Committee to:
    “seek agreement with Guamanian representatives on a commonwealth arrangement no less favorable than that which we are negotiating with the Northern Marianas. If, however, Guamanian representatives prefer a modified unincorporated Territorial status, we will be willing to accept such an arrangement.”
    In other words, the door for Guam to achieve its desired political status was opened. However, Kissinger decided that,
    “the Assistant Secretary of Interior for Program Developments and Budget should develop and implement a negotiating approach that will give effect to the above instructions, and should organize a US negotiating team that will include representation from the Departments of State and Defense as well as the Department of the Interior.”
    In a meeting with Williams on Guam in early February, before the last round of negotiations on Saipan, newly elected Governor Ricardo J. Bordallo told Williams that,
    “unification with Guam should have been the original goal of Marianas negotiations and that anything setting up a separate commonwealth in the Northern Marianas would make unification that much more difficult in his opinion.”
    The commonwealth covenant was signed by Haydn Williams for President Ford and by the NMI Political Status Commission for the people on 15 February 1975. It was unanimously approved by the Mariana Islands District Legislature five days later. Working with Ed Pangelinan and Pete A. Tenorio, the status commission conducted the popular plebiscite on 17 June 1975. Ninety-five percent of the registered voters cast ballots, and the covenant was approved by 78.8 percent of the people voting.
    In June, following on the heels of the favorable vote on Commonwealth for the Northern Marianas, and with Phil Burton’s full support, Delegate Won Pat introduced a joint resolution into the US Congress, providing Guam with the opportunity to create a constitution that would “supersede such provisions of the Organic Act of Guam as may be inconsistent with such constitution,” once approved by the president.
    Governor Bordallo, however, decided to follow up on the Guam study. He shelved the work done by Frank Lujan’s committee on political status and created his own Special Commission on the Political Status of Guam. Senator Frank F. Blas was chosen to chair the commission, which included former lieutenant governor Kurt Moylan, Vice-chairman Pedro Sanchez, and Senators Tommy Tanaka, Ed Duenas, Carl Gutierrez, Frank Santos, and Benigno Palomo. Bordallo then wrote to President Ford on 2 August 1975, urging the president to appoint a representative (as Nixon had done for the NMI) to begin dialogues with Guam. The letter, however, went unanswered for 13 months.
    On 24 February 1976, the US Senate called for a floor vote on Joint Resolution 549, the proposed NMI Commonwealth Covenant. Passage of the Senate bill required only a simple majority. The final Senate vote on the covenant was 66 in favor and 23 opposed and 11 not voting, far beyond the 51 votes needed to approve the covenant.
    On 24 March 1976, surrounded by covenant supporters from the Marianas and Washington, DC, President Ford signed Public Law 94-241: 90 Stat. 263, approving the covenant. The Northern Marianas had exercised its right to self-determination and defined an agreement with the United States that would give it the maximum degree of self-government. Most importantly, it contained a “Mutual Consent” clause that gave the people an assurance of fair treatment should there be a need for either side to change a fundamental part of the agreement at some time in the future.
    Guam’s political status?

    Dialogues in DC relative to Guam’s political status dragged until July 1977, the end of the Ford administration, and suggested that the issue “will be referred to those in the next Administration who will be responsible for overseeing the negotiations on the Guam-Federal relationship.” One can only speculate on what the current political status of the Marianas might be, had the Department of the Interior acted aggressively on President Ford’s Guam study. Although Guam did create a constitution during a constitutional convention under the leadership of Senator Carl Gutierrez, it failed to receive public approval because of outstanding issues that had not been resolved with the federal government.
    In 1980, Bordallo created a Commission on Self-Determination (CSD), chaired by Professor Robert Rogers. According to Rogers, Bordallo’s goal was to establish a commonwealth status for Guam, similar to that achieved by the NMI, then attempt to merge the two commonwealths which might lead to statehood. Barely two years after its creation, the CSD organized a status referendum. On 12 January 1982, 49% of voters chose a closer relationship with the US via Commonwealth. Twenty-six percent voted Statehood, while 10 percent voted for the Status Quo (Unincorporated territory). A subsequent run-off referendum held between Commonwealth and Statehood saw 73% of Guam voters choosing Commonwealth over Statehood (27%).
    However, the draft Commonwealth Act which had been drawn up by the CSD since 1986 languished in Congress over the next decade and was never approved. The 24th Guam Legislature established the “Commission on Decolonization” in 1996 to enhance the CSD’s ongoing studies of various political status options and public education campaigns.
    Reunificiation considerations and the military buildup

    Today, there are sufficient reasons for Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands to consider joint dialogues. The Mariana Islands are the focus of President Barack Obama’s “Pivot to the Pacific.” What began with Nixon in 1969, and was continued by George W. Bush in 2006, is now in President Obama’s lap—base agreements in Okinawa.
    There was no further talk of a military buildup in the Marianas until 23 January 2006, when President George W. Bush signed an amended Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan. On 25 April 2006, the US announced its intention to relocate Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to the northern Okinawa city of Nago, and move 8,000 marines and their dependents to Guam. The new United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation was issued on May 1.
    The Roadmap led to the creation of JGPO, the Joint Guam Program Office. The Navy set forth a plan that would meet the mandate of the new US-Japan security alliance, primarily the movement of marines to Guam with training facilities on Tinian. The Secretary of the Navy issued his Record of Decision on 20 September 2010. Subsequently, the Senate Armed Forces Committee visited Hawai`i, Okinawa and the Marianas and stopped funding for that plan, until a larger plan for the “Pivot to the Pacific” had been completed.
    A new EIS was developed, this time by the US Marine Corps. Following Section 106 of the National Environmental Protection Act, Draft Environmental Impact Statements were issued for proposed actions within the territory of Guam, and another for the CNMI at Tinian and Pagan. Separate Memorandums of Understanding will be signed relative to the impact on historic sites in each territory. Separate Records of Decision also will have to be issued.
    Both plans must be approved by Congress, at least for funding. Because of the Covenant, the land acquisition in the NMI must be approved by Congress before funding for the plan can be entertained. The Marianas plan is set on a three legged table, with one leg on Guam and two in the NMI. Guam cannot provide the constant training that Marines must undergo to remain in a high state of readiness, should an unfriendly situation develop somewhere in our region. That training must take place in the NMI.
    Tinian acknowledges the legitimacy of the DoD lease on two-thirds of Tinian. Tinian, however, is not sufficient to meet all the Navy/USMC training requirements for amphibious assault operations. Pagan is the necessary third leg. The military buildup in the Marianas is not a Guam affair, therefore, any more than it is a Tinian or Pagan affair. It is a Marianas issue that must address the concerns of all stakeholders.
    Today, both Guam and the Commonwealth remain unincorporated territories. Although the NMI did exercise its right to self-determination, the mandate to establish a permanent political status for Guam still exists. The Guam study, or at least the principles it embodied, are still viable. It is certainly worth a professional study to create a joint Guam-NMI Commission to analyze the pros and cons of one Commonwealth and report their findings to the Guam and CNMI legislatures.
    Shall the Marianas ever be reunited?

    Some suggest that the time for reunification has passed. Some say the separate governments for Guam and the Northern Marianas have become institutionalized—that the political leaders on Guam and the NMI do not have it within them to make the sacrifices that would be required to create an elected government for all Mariana residents.
    However, many Guamanians point to the CNMI Covenant, with the protections provided to the people through its embedded concept of Mutual Consent as a significantly better political status than Guam’s unilateral Organic Act. Others suggest that the problems of having two separate governments within the Marianas is a foolish waste of money and aggravation. And many point to the military buildup in the Marianas as a reunifying factor. They say that having one bargaining group will get a better deal out of the Department of Defense than two different groups negotiating separately.
    One point is clear: after the war, the people of Guam fought for US citizenship and self-government with a unified passion. The people of the Northern Marianas fought for the same principles with the same passion. Times have changed. Both gained US citizenship and self-government, although the Northern Marianas acquired slightly more self-government than Guam. Both Guam and the CNMI have greatly improved their standards of living. Many, particularly the business community, seem satisfied with the status quo. They are indifferent to the indignity of “unincorporated” status, and that the Marianas are not on the road to the ultimate political status within the American system, which, in this writer’s opinion, is an incorporated Commonwealth of the Marianas, leaving the door open to Statehood.
    Regardless of emotional arguments for or against reunification, it seems the time for a comprehensive, scientific study of the economic and legal pros and cons of reunification is long overdue. What are the differences and similarities between the laws of Guam and the Northern Marianas and the economic impacts of both on our people? Should our two legislatures battle over competitive tax rates for investors? Should our two port authorities be charging each other for landing fees and counter space for the same airlines, and increasing the cost of inter-island transportation? Should there be separate border control stations, two separate US District Courts, two separate offices for all federal agencies in our two territories?
    It is time to create a joint commission on political status to study the financial and legal impacts of having two different governments for the same people, having more in common within their historical heritage than is different. Then, with some solid numbers in hand, perhaps it would be time to once again address the question: Shall the Mariana Islands be reunified?
    By Don Farrell
    For further reading

    Cabranes, José A. 1978. Citizenship and the American Empire: Notes on the Legislative History of the United States Citizenship of Puerto Ricans. New Haven: Yale University Press.
    Cogan, Doloris Coulter. 2008. We Fought the Navy and Won: Guam’s Quest for Democracy. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
    Dudden, A. 1992. The American Pacific, from the old China trade to the present. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Farrell, Don. 1981. The Americanization of Guam, 1898-1918. Hagåtña: Micronesian Productions.
    Farrell, Don. 1994. “The Partition of the Marianas: A Diplomatic History, 1898-1919.” ISLA: A Journal of Micronesian Studies, 2:2 (Dry Season), pp. 273-301.
    Freidel, Frank. 1958. The Splendid Little War. Boston: Little Brown.
    Gale: Roger W. 1979. The Americanization of Micronesia: A Study of the Consolidation of US Rule in the Pacific. Washington, DC: University Press of America.
    Garraty, J. 1953. Henry Cabot Lodge: A Biography. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
    Heine, Carl. 1974. Micronesia at the Crossroads: A Reappraisal of the Micronesian Political Dilemma. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
    Kissinger, Henry. 2011. On China. London: Penguin Books.
    Leibowitz, Arnold H. 1989. Defining Status: A Comprehensive Analysis of United States Territorial Relations. Amsterdam: Nartinus Nijhoff Publishers.
    Hofschneider, Penelope Bordallo. 2001. A Campaign for Political Rights on the Island of Guam; 1899-1950. Saipan: CNMI Division of Historic Preservation, Occasional Historical Papers Series No. 8.
    Meller, Norman. 1985. Constitutionalism in Micronesia.Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
    Meller, Norman. 1969. The Congress of Micronesia: Development of the Legislative Process in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
    Pomeroy, E. 1951. Pacific Outpost: American Strategy in Guam and Micronesia. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
    Rogers, Robert F. 1995. Destiny’s Landfall: A History of Guam.Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
    Treaty of Peace Between the United States and Spain Signed at Paris, December 10, 1898, accompanied by protocols and other papers (Senate Doc. No. 62, Part 1, 55th Cong., 3rd Session). (1898). Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
    Tuchman, Barbara W. 1984. The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
    Webb, James H., Jr. 1974. Micronesia and U.S. Pacific Strategy: A Blueprint for the 1980s. New York:Praeger Publishers.
    Willens, Howard P. and Deanne C. Siemer. 2000. National Security and Self-Determination: United States Policy in Micronesia, 1961-1972. Westport, Connecticut: Preager, 2000.
    Willens, Howard P. 2002. An Honorable Accord: The Covenant Between the Northern Mariana Islands and the United States.Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
    Willens, Howard P. with Dirk A. Ballendorf. 2004. The Secret Guam Study: How President Ford’s 1975 Approval of Commonwealth Was Blocked by Federal Officials.Micronesian Area Research Center and NMI Division of Historic Preservation.
    Wyttenbach, Richard H. 1971. Micronesia and Strategic Trusteeship: A Case Study in American Politico-Military Relations. PhD thesis. Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.


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    Última edición por Michael; 20/08/2017 a las 18:30
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